Firm Performance and Institutional Context: A Theoretical Exploration With Evidence From the Italian Cooperative Sector by Gagliardi, F.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIRM PERFORMANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT: A 
THEORETICAL EXPLORATION WITH EVIDENCE 
FROM THE ITALIAN COOPERATIVE SECTOR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F. GAGLIARDI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Doctor of Philosophy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIRM PERFORMANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT: A 
THEORETICAL EXPLORATION WITH EVIDENCE 
FROM THE ITALIAN COOPERATIVE SECTOR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FRANCESCA GAGLIARDI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the University of Hertfordshire 
in partial fulfilment of the requirement of 
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my sisters Giovanna and Laura 
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
Thanks to my supervisors Professor Geoffrey M. Hodgson and Dr. Ya Ping Yin 
for stimulating discussions, for their timely, critical but supportive comments on 
successive drafts, and for their encouragement. Their intellectual and professional 
influence on me has been profound. I believe that the awarding of the Horvat-
Vanek Prize (14th Conference of the International Association for the Economics 
of Participation, Clinton, New York) for the papers that form the basis of Chapters 
6 and 7 of this thesis is much a recognition of the contribution and influence of the 
above scholars as the arguments contained therein. I am also indebted to Dr. 
Francesco Trivieri for additional comments and unstinting support over a long 
period of time. 
I am grateful to the participants of the following conferences, seminars and 
workshops at which earlier papers that formed the drafts of various chapters were 
presented: European Association for Evolutionary Political Economy 2009 
Annual Conference, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 6-8 November 2009; European 
Association for Evolutionary Political Economy 2008 Annual Conference, Rome, 
Italy, 6-8 November 2008; 14th Conference of the International Association for 
the Economics of Participation, Clinton, New York, United States, 15-17 July 
2008; Laboratoire D’Economie de la Firme et des Institutions 2007 Conference, 
University of Lyon II, Lyon, France, 19-21 November 2007; European 
Association for Evolutionary Political Economy 2007 Annual Conference, Porto, 
Portugal, 1-3 November 2007; European School on New Institutional Economics, 
Cargese, Corsica, 21–25 May 2007; University of Hertfordshire Business School 
Research Seminar Series, 7 May 2008; Centre for Research in Institutional 
Economics PhD Student Workshop, University of Hertfordshire, 16 January 2008, 
23–24 January 2007, 19 January 2006. 
Financial support for participating at the above conferences has been kindly 
provided by Professor Mick Broadbent, my Head of Department, and Dr. Susan 
Grey, Director of Research Degrees. I am very grateful to both. 
Thanks also to several anonymous referees for insightful comments and 
suggestions on the research papers that form the basis of Chapters 6 and 7.  
Despite the benevolence of so many, writing is still an unsociable business. Yet 
both my parents, Margherita and Eugenio, and my sisters, Giovanna and Laura, 
have provided remarkable support. Finally, the personal and emotional support 
that I received from friends and fellow PhD students at the Business School is 
acknowledged with deepest thanks.  
 
 
 ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines the relationship between institutional context and firm 
performance, from both a theoretical and empirical perspective. The aim is to engage 
with the debate seeking to explain the observed diversity in the forms of economic 
organisation prevailing in socio-economic systems. The focus of the empirical work 
is on investigating the effects of the structure and behaviour of banking institutions 
on firm performance, in the Italian context. The analysis is comparative in the sense 
that confronts cooperative and capitalist business structures. 
The analytical framework is institutionalist in emphasising the institutionally 
embedded nature of economic performance, and the historical and cultural 
dimensions of economic behaviour. The institutional complementarity approach is 
used to investigate the hypothesis that the relative performance of different firm 
structures is context dependent.  
The main conclusions are that the economic performance of cooperative firms is 
strongly conditioned in a sense of institutional complementarity by the degree of 
development and competition characterising the financial domain. Rejected are the 
pessimistic predictions of conventional accounts that democratic firms are 
unequivocally unviable. Instead, there are relations of context dependency, of 
institutional complementarity that influence the viability of firm types. 
The overall conclusion is that the dynamics governing the evolution of socio-
economic systems are much more complex than mainstream economics suggests; 
productive organisations may assume a multiplicity of forms. The theoretical claims 
of a universalistic history in which all production systems must follow the same line 
of development must be abandoned. This brings about major policy implications at 
the regional, national and international levels. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1 BACKGROUND TO RESEARCH 
 
The broad aim of this thesis is to examine the factors that contribute to explain the 
observed diversity in the forms of economic organisation that prevail in socio-
economic systems. The focus of the research is on investigating the relationship 
between firm performance and the specificities of the institutional context in which 
firms are embedded. The analysis first explores, from an institutionalist perspective, 
the theoretical and conceptual tools required to understand the existing variety of 
different forms of capitalism, and the performance differentials that are observable 
at various levels of today’s economies. The work then offers an empirical 
investigation of the argument that firm performance is largely context dependent. 
The empirical analysis concentrates on the Italian cooperative sector, and looks at 
the effects of the behaviour of banking institutions on the relative performance of 
cooperative firms. 
In this chapter debates that surround claims about the dynamics underlying 
socio-economic processes, and their implications for economics, are introduced. 
Following this, the nature of the present research work is explored, and the structure 
of the thesis is outlined. 
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2 NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE FEEDBACK: WHAT IMPLICATIONS 
FOR ECONOMICS? 
 
Traditional economics assumes that socio-economic processes are dominated by 
negative feedback. This concept rests on the notion of decreasing, or diminishing, 
returns to scale in production and consumption, and entails a decelerating, 
dampening, self-regulating cycle. Conventional accounts contend that economic 
actions eventually determine negative feedback loops leading to a predictable 
equilibrium. The price adjustment mechanism that pushes supply and demand back 
to equilibrium is an example of compensating, negative feedback. The equilibrium 
marks the ‘best’ possible under the circumstances: the most efficient use and 
allocation of resources (Beinhocker, 2006). Negative feedback tends to stabilise the 
economy because any major changes will be counterbalanced by the effects they 
generate (Arthur, 1990). If the system departs from its equilibrium path then 
negative feedback brings it back into line (Beinhocker, 2006). There are no 
branching points along the track. Hence any previous historical deviations have no 
impact on the future. In that sense, history does not matter.  
The Marxian idea that history progresses through a series of stages, passing from 
primitive communism, to classical antiquity, feudalism, capitalism, socialism and, 
finally, full communism underlies the notion of a revolving movement that enables 
the system to return to the original position (primitive communism), but at a higher 
level (full communism).1 This idea of perfectibility of society under communism 
reveals a conception of development as a predetermined plan that allows to reach 
the optimum status in the final stage. Regarding communism as the socially 
necessary system, Karl Marx (1818-1883) rejected other forms of production. By 
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favouring a single arrangement Marx did not recognise any value in institutional 
and structural diversity, under capitalism or socialism. Hence in Marxism economic 
variety and pluralism are downplayed over the return to the ‘ideal state’ (Hodgson, 
1993, 1999).  
Also Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) believed that variety has to be limited. 
Spencer claimed the perfectibility of society through markets and laissez-faire. His 
state of perfection was a market system based on voluntary and contractual 
cooperation between individuals. Austrian economists Friedrich Hayek (1899-1992) 
and Ludwig von Mises (1881-1973) shared the similar idea of the eventual 
perfectibility of society under a single institutional arrangement (Hodgson, 1993). 
This ‘pure’ form enabling capitalism to prosper best is dominated by market 
exchanges and individual private property (von Mises, 1949; Hayek, 1982).2 Thus, 
the above conceptualisations sustain a view of a singular and purified capitalism 
where no value is assigned to structural and institutional diversity. Ugo Pagano 
(2007) points out that the response of the Austrians to the Marxian theory consists 
in a position no less extremist than Marx. 
Walt Whitman Rostow (1959) conceived development as a linear process. He 
suggested that countries undergo a common pattern of structural change, eventually 
converging to a single global equilibrium. This is synthesised in his theory on the 
stages of economic growth. In this view, all societies are identifiable in one of the 
following five categories at a particular point of their transition process to the next 
stage: the traditional society; the preconditions for take-off; the take off; the drive to 
maturity; the age of mass consumption.3 Hence, the general idea of perfectibility of 
society under a unique superior order characterises also Rostow. In this sense also 
Rostow supports a unilinear view.  
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Francis Fukuyama (1992) argues that liberal democracy marks the “end point of 
mankind’s ideological evolution” and the “final form of human government” (ibid: 
xi). Liberal democracy “remains the only coherent political aspiration that spans 
different regions around the globe” (ibid: xiii). The main argument Fukuyama puts 
forward to support his claims is that while previous forms of government were 
characterised by inner defects and irrationalities that eventually led to their collapse, 
liberal democracy is free from fundamental internal contradictions. So that the ideal 
of liberal democracy cannot be improved on.4 As such it constitutes the ‘end of 
history’, where history is understood as a single, coherent, evolutionary process 
(Fukuyama, 1989; 1992).5 
Oliver Williamson’s work rests on the notion of negative feedback. For 
Williamson what exists is efficient. The less-than-efficient is driven out by 
competition. For instance, Williamson argues that since hierarchical firms 
predominate in today’s competitive environment, then these firms must be more 
efficient than non-hierarchical ones and better suited to survival. This efficiency 
advantage of hierarchical structures rests on their ability to economise on 
transaction costs (Williamson, 1975, 1980, 1985). ‘Nonhierarchical modes are 
merely of ephemeral duration’ (Williamson, 1980, p. 35) and are therefore doomed 
to fail in the long-run in capitalist systems.  
Such agreeable pictures often contrast with reality. In many parts of the economy 
stabilising forces do not seem to operate. Instead, economic shifts tend to be 
amplified. This suggests that positive feedback mechanisms (rather than negative 
ones) are often at work. Positive feedback is an accelerating, amplifying, self-
reinforcing cycle driven by increasing returns. It implies that propagating effects 
follow from an initial event or shock. Therefore, even little historical perturbations 
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may have significant and long-lasting effects. In other words, cumulative causation 
processes operate in socio-economic systems. For example, if a product, region or 
nation gets ahead by even just by chance it tends to stay ahead hence increasing its 
lead. In such a scenario, there is no longer guarantee of predictable, shared markets 
(Arthur, 1990).6  
Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929), in contrast with the accounts focusing on 
compensating (negative) feedback processes, put the emphasis on the theme of 
cumulative change, where equilibrating forces do not necessarily take the system 
back to a single path (Veblen, 1899, 1919). Veblen argued that the notion of 
cumulative causation allows ‘the handling of schemes of development and theories 
of a comprehensive process’ (Veblen, 1898, pp. 377-378). Mauricio Villena and 
Marcelo Villena (2004) pointed out that Veblen’s discussion on cumulative 
causation involves an idea of path dependency. Veblen considered as unconceivable 
the idea that all socio-economic systems should converge to one single type, since 
no single or natural path governing economic development exists. Variety and 
cumulative causation mean that history has “no final term” (Veblen, 1919: 37). 
Therefore, recognising that history can follow different patterns, Veblen accepted 
“the possibility of varieties of capitalism and of different paths of capitalist 
development” (Hodgson, 1996, p. 411). 
Influenced by Veblen, the notion of cumulative causation was then developed by 
Allyn Young (1928), Gunnar Myrdal (1957), Nicholas Kaldor (1967, 1972, 1978, 
1985) and William Kapp (1976). Veblen used the term cumulative causation mainly 
to refer to cumulative processes of cause and effects. Instead the above thinkers 
took on the different meaning of non-linear processes of positive feedback 
(Hodgson, 2004; Villena and Villena, 2004). They have argued that cumulative 
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causation implies that the process of development is generally divergent rather than 
convergent, both at regional and national levels. For instance, Myrdal used the 
concept to analyse the conditions of African Americans and Asian 
underdevelopment, while Kaldor applied it to investigate the role of manufacturing 
in capitalist growth (O’Hara, 2008).7 Young and Kaldor pointed out that economies 
of scale imply divergent patterns of firm growth, which lead to the dominance of a 
small number of large firms. This contradicts the emphasis that conventional 
economics places on processes of compensating feedback and mutual adjustment 
conducive to greater uniformity and convergence (Hodgson, 1996). 
Cumulative causation relates to the more recent idea that technologies and socio-
economic systems can get locked-in to relatively constrained paths of development, 
hence leading to path dependence (Arthur, 1989, 1990). Rather than equilibrium, 
positive feedback can endanger phenomena of lock-in, where outcomes become self-
reinforcing (Arthur, 1983; 1988; 1989, 1990). Such phenomena can be considered to 
be sufficiently stable units, although cumulative reinforcement of a number of 
parallel elements can eventually lead to conflict and disruption. 
By discarding the notion of convergence to a single equilibrium, path 
dependence means that history matters. The concept of path dependence was first 
elaborated by Paul David (1985) and Brian Arthur (1989). The asymptotic 
distribution of a path dependent stochastic process evolves as a function of the 
process own history (David, 2007). Hence, a process is regarded to be path 
dependent when both actual and future outcomes are influenced by the patterns 
previously observed. 
When a path is set on a specific course, this is reinforced in a path depended way 
by network externalities, organisations’ learning processes and historically formed 
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subjective models (North, 1990, 2005). So that phenomena of lock-in can occur. 
David (2007) points out that the term ‘lock-in’ describes the entry of a system into a 
trapping region. He further argues that once a system enters such a region, 
alterations in the path that becomes established are mainly determined by external 
effects and unanticipated effects of choices. These must be able to change the 
system’s configuration or transform the structural relationships among agents.  
Douglass North (1990, 2005) argues that the reversal of a given path is typically 
determined through changes in the polity. His view is shared also by David (2007), 
who has pointed out understanding path dependence, and the possibility that 
externalities lead to market failure, brings about relevant policy implications. David 
argues that public policy should try to improve the informational state in which both 
private and government agents make choices. In other words, in the areas where 
positive feedback processes are likely to prevail over negative ones, policy makers 
should maintain open options until enough information has been obtained about the 
likely technical or organisational and legal implications of a decision.  
The notion of path dependence and the related analytical framework add to the 
quest to integrate history in economics (David, 2007). The key content of the path 
dependence concept as a dynamic property refers to history as an irreversible 
branching process. Path dependent systems have multiple possible equilibria among 
which event contingent selections can occur. Some particular historical event 
initiates the sequence of transitions that select one configuration, rather than 
another, to be realised as the system’s emergent property (David, 2007).  
The economic accounts that describe positive feedback effects through 
cumulative causation and path dependence are radically different from the 
conventional ones. Diminishing returns, hence negative feedback, entail that the 
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economy will eventually reach a single equilibrium point. By contrast, positive 
feedback – i.e. increasing returns – allows for multiple equilibria to become 
established. There is no guarantee that the economic outcome(s) selected from 
among the many alternatives will be the ‘best one’. Hence the notion of local 
optima (rather than global optima) becomes prominent. Furthermore, once chance 
economic forces select a particular path, this may become locked in regardless of 
the advantages of other paths (Arthur, 1990). In other words, even if a global 
optimum existed, it might not be possible to reach it due to path dependence and 
lock-in effects. 
The issue of institutional complementarities brings further dimensions into the 
above arguments. This notion refers to situations in which interdependence among 
institutions occurs, so that the functionality of an institution is conditioned by the 
existence of other institutions. It follows that the performance of a configuration is 
influenced by the specific properties of its elements (Höpner, 2005a). Institutional 
complementarities generate increasing returns among institutions and may lead to 
mutually reinforcing patterns of behaviour. Institutional complementarity and 
context dependence mean that the arguments above that apply to whole systems can 
also apply to subsystems. A subsystem, such as a firm or an industry, may be 
subject to positive feedback. Hence, there can be divergent paths for different parts 
of the system, as well as the system as a whole, further complicating the 
development of the whole system. There are context dependence effects. 
Institutional complementarities have major implications for the conclusions 
drawn by accounts à la Williamson, postulating that competitive forces will 
inevitably lead to the ‘survival of the fitter’. Indeed, institutional complementarities 
mean that historical circumstances condition the outcome of the competitive 
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process. In other words, competition will work in different ways, with potentially 
different outcomes, in different contexts. Institutional complementarities also imply 
that competitive pressures do not necessarily enable the achievement of a globally 
efficient outcome. Sub-optimal equilibria can also emerge and persist over time. 
Thus, Panglossian claims that ‘all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds’ 
lose significance. 
 
3 RECOGNISING PATTERNED DIVERSITY IN COMPLEX SOCIO-
ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 
 
The previous section has argued that positive feedback loops are at work in 
complex socio-economic systems and operate through cumulative causation, path 
dependence, lock-in and institutional complementarities. It has been claimed there 
that recognising the existence of positive feedback brings about major implications 
for economics. The present section aims to briefly reflect on the main conclusions 
that can be drawn from the arguments discussed in Section 2.  
A first important implication is that any idea of a single and ideal state of nature 
becomes not only unfeasible but also undesirable. History follows a multiplicity of 
paths and economics must recognise it. Attempting to theorise ‘the best of all 
possible worlds’, whatever this be, is simply an intellectual exercise. Not just that. It 
deprives the economist profession of much of its value. The author of this thesis 
believes that economists should aim to explain how and why societies have come to 
present day conditions. It is only by understanding our past that we can comprehend 
today’s events, and hopefully identify sustainable solutions for some of the 
problems that are currently afflicting our lives, such as the alarming environmental 
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issues created by the global warning and the financial problems that are investing 
the world economy in the current financial crisis. 
Secondly, acknowledging the existence of structural variety entails accepting the 
possibility that present day capitalist systems can evolve in a number of different 
but sustainable ways. In this perspective, institutional and cultural variety becomes 
desirable as it allows to preserve the overall coherence of socio-economic systems. 
Hence, variations in the prevalent forms of economic organisation, both within and 
across systems, are not anymore a flaw that needs to be remedied. 
A further implication regards the link between human actors and social 
structures, and between these and the wider socio-economic context. Actors are 
involved, during the course of their lives, in a number of different structures. These 
partly determine the way in which actors are changed and reconstituted. On the 
other hand, structures evolve from the actions and interactions of given individuals 
(Hodgson, 1996). Both actors and structures are embedded in a wider socio-
economic system, whose attributes have evolved from historical events that 
produced varied impacts at different levels of the system. Through feedback 
processes, which can lead to path dependence, lock-in and institutional 
complementarities, the specific characteristics of that system (and of its subsystems) 
influence actors and structures. Their behaviour and performance is, therefore, 
largely context dependent. Atomistic and mechanist conceptions are no longer 
feasible. Instead, context matters and economics must take this into account. This is 
the thesis that the present research work intends to defend. 
The next section shows the intellectual journey from broad research aims, to a 
more specific focus and the identification of an analytical framework in which to 
examine the emergent research questions. 
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4 THE SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
 
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the broad aim of the study is to engage with the 
debate seeking to explain the observed diversity in the forms of economic 
organisation that characterise today’s socio-economic systems. The framework 
developed in this thesis builds on current institutionalist and evolutionary accounts 
(Pagano 1991, 1992, 1933; Hodgson, 1993, 1999; Aoki, 2001, 2007; Boyer, 2005a) 
on the factors explaining why different institutional settings are in place and why 
these are conducive to the emergence and perpetuation of differentials in the 
performance of organisational forms operating at various levels of the economy. 
The aim is to enrich and deepen these accounts by drawing on the institutional 
complementarity approach which has its origins in the work of Ugo Pagano (1991, 
1992, 1993) and Masahiko Aoki (1994, 2001), and has been further explored in a 
number of other studies such as Bruno Amable (2000) and Robert Boyer (2005a). 
The institutional complementarity approach adds at least two important insights 
to economic analysis. The first undermines the idea of an optimal economic 
configuration towards which all systems should converge. As earlier introduced in 
the chapter, complementarity implies that institutional elements can combine in a 
number of different ways. Therefore, it contributes to explain the evolution of 
different institutional arrangements, both across and within economies. 
The second lacuna that the institutional complementarity approach addresses is 
to provide the analytical tools for an elaboration of possible adjustment processes. 
This analytical framework takes the stance from the ahistorical conceptions of much 
mainstream economics, and explains that socio-economic systems are to a large 
extent constrained, in regard to adjustments, by history and the structures inherited 
from their past.  
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The study intends to add insights to the analysis of institutional complementarities 
between firms and their institutional environment in order to contribute to the debate 
existing in the economic literature on the determinants of the relative performance of 
firm types in different contexts. To pursue this aim firm-level complementarities are 
investigated empirically. The focus of the empirical work is on the relationship 
between the behaviour of banking institutions and firm performance, in the Italian 
context. The analysis is comparative in the sense that confronts cooperative and 
capitalist business structures. Two sets of issues deserve clarification. 
The first regards the motivation for looking at cooperative firms, in a 
comparative analysis with conventional firms. The interest in democratic and 
participatory firms comes from the long-lasting dispute that animates the economic 
analysis of this organisational form. In short, traditional economic theory postulates, 
and in this it is often aided by the use of sophisticated mathematical techniques, that 
the cooperative firm is an inefficient structure, has a perverse behaviour, suffers 
diseconomies created by its self-interested owners-members (Ward, 1958; Vanek, 
1970; Williamson, 1975, 1980, 1985; Jensen and Meckling, 1979).  
In sharp contrast with the above claims are the conclusions put forward in 
studies mainly proposed by the institutionalist approach. Writers in this tradition 
contend that democratic firms are at least as efficient as capitalist firms. Various 
arguments underpin this claim. First, is the consideration that the results reached by 
mainstream scholars are conditioned by the assumptions underlying their models. 
Several works have shown that by introducing minor changes to the traditional 
model, conclusions change by a great deal and the presumed inferiority of the 
cooperative firm vanishes (Prasnikar et al, 1994; Hodgson, 1999). Second, it has 
been pointed out that cooperatives can be very efficient since they rely to a great 
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extent on socialisation as the principal mechanism of mediation and control 
(Bowles and Gintis, 1976). Above all, the common trait of these contributions is to 
have stressed that the development of cooperative firms requires a favourable 
cultural and financial climate. There is a substantial body of empirical and 
anecdotal evidence showing that in certain institutional contexts cooperatives are a 
long-lasting, rather than a transitory, phenomenon and that their performance profile 
is in some cases even superior to that of capitalist firms (Staber, 1989; Bartlett et al, 
1992; Bonin et al, 1993). 
It is in light of the above considerations that the present research work has 
centred the empirical analysis of the institutional complementarity hypothesis on 
cooperative firms. The focus is, as earlier mentioned, on the relationship between 
cooperatives and banking institutions. This is because the issues related to the 
external financing of these firms have particularly animated the above debate.   
The second clarification requires contextualising the analysis. The Italian context 
is chosen as the locus of investigation. Compared to several other countries, Italy 
has a well developed cooperative sector. This made the country a suitable candidate 
for addressing the research questions this study poses. The empirical work is carried 
out at the local level, since there is evidence showing that credit markets are local 
(Kwast et al, 1997). In the Italian case the relevant local banking market is the 
administrative province. Hence firm-level institutional complementarities are 
investigated at provincial level. 
 
5 THE STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH WORK 
 
This chapter has identified the focus of the study as being to examine the 
relationship between institutional context and firm performance from an 
14 
institutionalist perspective. The chapter has illustrated that the scope to inquire into 
this issue is provided by long-lasting debates on the dynamics underlying socio-
economic processes. Challenging traditional economics accounts, postulating a 
single equilibrium point for all systems, the present research work explains that 
multiple equilibrium points are possible and sustainable both at system and sub-
system levels. The core argument being that the performance of a socio-economic 
system (or sub-system) and the units populating it are context dependent. 
The research work is organised in two parts. Part One offers a theoretical 
exploration of the channels through which context specificities impact on the 
performance of socio-economic systems and of firms. The study first examines 
current debates on varieties of capitalism. It then analyses a controversial issue in 
the economic literature: the behaviour and performance of cooperative firms. This 
enables exemplifying the contraposition between the conclusions reached by 
mainstream accounts relying on the notion of convergence to a single equilibrium, 
and those reached when context dependence effects on firm performance are taken 
into account. 
Part Two analyses from an empirical standpoint the relationship between 
institutional context and firm performance, within the approach of institutional 
complementarities. The empirical focus is the Italian cooperative sector, regarded as 
a relatively well-progressed example of cooperative experience. Broadly, the 
perspective adopted attempts to go beyond conventional accounts that have focused 
on a fairly narrow view of the factors influencing the economic performance of the 
cooperative firm.  
Chapter Two contextualises the debate about diversity in forms of economic 
organisation by reviewing the main approaches that have been advanced to study 
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the issue of varieties of capitalism. The chapter begins by examining the 
comparative economic systems approach. It is argued that this framework can 
broadly be described as unidimensional in terms of advocating two contrasting 
types of economic systems – one based on the free-market logic, the other on 
central planning – and attempting to identify the relative positioning of actual socio-
economic systems along the spectrum defined by the two extreme poles.  
The alternative framework discussed in Chapter Two has been developed by 
studies that could broadly be described as ‘institutionalist’. This explains the 
development of diverse modes of capitalism in different contexts in terms of those 
contexts, and emphasises the value of diversity and plurality – both within and 
across socio-economic systems. It is remarked that the main strength of the 
institutionalist framework is to have pointed out that the advantages (or efficiencies) 
of one type of capitalism over another are dependent on their historical path and 
context. The chapter then examines the major studies proposed within this research 
agenda and argues that these works can broadly be grouped in two clusters. The 
first one focuses on the market/coordination dualism (Hall and Sockice, 2001) and, 
to a certain extent, it can be regarded as an extension of the comparative economic 
systems approach. The second cluster of studies includes the régulation theory 
(Aglietta, 1987) and the comparative business systems framework (Whitley, 1999), 
both drawing on a much wider view of varieties of capitalism. 
The chapter ends with a commentary on three interrelated sets of concepts that 
contribute to explain the observed diversity of capitalist forms. First, the notion of 
path dependence and lock-in captures the historical dimension underlying socio-
economic phenomena. Second, the imperfect nature of competition among 
institutional arrangements, which implies that history can follow several courses. 
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Third, the notion of institutional complementarity explains that the type of 
institutions that become established in a particular socio-economic context, and 
their relative performance, are context dependent rather than being invariably 
conditioned by their intrinsic relative efficiency.  
Chapter Three focuses on a more detailed exploration of the institutional 
complementarity approach. The first part of the chapter looks at the complementarity 
concept and discusses how it relates to institutional analysis. It is pointed out that by 
implying that the functionality of an institutional form is conditioned by other 
institutions, the concept of institutional complementarity explains that institutional 
elements can successfully combine in a number of different ways. In this sense, it 
contributes to elucidate stylised facts about the evolution and diversity of 
institutional arrangements – both across and within economies. 
After touching on the problem of measuring institutional complementarities, the 
second part of the chapter discusses the state of the art research on institutional 
complementarity. First, the theoretical studies are discussed; then, the empirical 
evidence is reviewed. It is argued that the weight of testimony in favour of the 
relevance of institutional complementarities, despite the relatively recent 
elaboration of the approach, brings about a number of implications both in terms of 
economic analysis and of policy reforms. 
The focus of Chapter Four is the economic theory of the democratic firm. The 
general point that the two previous chapters have argued is that socio-economic 
systems are not driven by some mechanistic force. Instead, the wider institutional, 
cultural, economic and political framework in which they unfold, along with their 
historical legacy, design the trajectory that is followed. Therefore, multiple paths 
are feasible and sustainable. The reader will notice that this is at odds with that part 
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of economic theory, earlier discussed in this chapter, which adopted a unilinear 
analytical perspective based on the notion of negative feedback. 
Chapter Four intends to further elaborate on the above points. The economic 
analysis of the cooperative firm provides an exemplary case in light of the 
controversial debate that characterises the literature on the topic. The conventional 
view regards the democratic firm as a marginal and inefficient organisational form, 
unable to survive long-run competition in capitalist systems (Ward, 1958; 
Williamson, 1975, 1980, 1985; Jensen and Meckling, 1979). In contrast, more recent 
studies, mainly proposed in the institutionalist literature, contend that cooperative 
firms can be at least as efficient as their capitalist counterpart when the appropriate 
climate prevails in the local and national economy (Horvat, 1982a; Oakeshott, 1982).  
The chapter aims to show that the remarkable divergence in the above 
conclusions, and their implications for the desirability of economic democracy, are 
the result of the particular standpoints adopted. The analysis is carried out by 
paralleling the traditional literature and the institutional studies, on both theoretical 
and empirical grounds. After exploring the short-run analysis and the monitoring 
function, attention is paid to the issue of financing. Finally, economists’ views on 
cooperatives’ relative lower population density are reviewed.  
Chapter Five interrogates the idea, suggested by the institutional literature 
examined in the previous chapter, that context matters for the socio-economic 
performance of cooperative firms. The diverse history of the cooperative movement 
in different countries, combined with variations in legal provisions, make it difficult 
to generalise evaluations on the viability of the democratic firm as an organisational 
form. A case-by-case examination is required. The chapter examines wide-ranging 
anecdotal evidence, for a number of countries, on the extent to which the performance 
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of cooperative firms is influenced by the institutional context in which they are 
embedded. The most significant stages and events in the history of the development 
pattern of the cooperative sector are explored for each of the countries considered. 
Where available, figures on various performance indicators are also provided.  
Chapter Six empirically investigates the institutional complementarity 
hypothesis by focusing on the Italian cooperative sector. The two previous chapters 
have argued that the availability of external financing, and especially bank credit, is 
a critical factor influencing the creation, functioning and survival of cooperatives. 
Clearly the banking system represents also for other firms an important channel of 
resources acquisition. However, a number of scholars have contended that 
cooperatives’ property rights structure can create several issues in the relationship 
with external financers, and that this can result in credit rationing and/or higher 
costs of bank loans (Ben-Ner, 1988a; Putterman, 1993; Jossa and Cuomo, 1997; 
Dow, 2003). The main thrust of the empirical work carried out in this chapter is to 
investigate whether, ceteris paribus, the structure of the banking market – an 
important feature of the institutional environment embedding entrepreneurship – 
influences differently the financing of cooperatives, as compared to the effects 
produced for other business types, with regard to both firm creation and 
entrepreneurial activity.  
In the literature analysing the economic effects of bank market power, studies 
belonging to the information-based-approach show that, in general terms, the 
implications of the structure of the financial sector can be different from those 
predicted by the traditional structure-conduct-performance scheme, and that the 
effects on firms’ financing, hence on entrepreneurship, are also related to the 
possibility of setting in and maintaining lending relationships (Petersen and Rajan, 
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1995). In light of these considerations, focusing on possible differences among 
business types assumes relevance since cooperative firms’ institutional 
characteristics may impact on the possibility of establishing and/or maintaining 
lending relationships. 
To implement the investigation, the research employs data on firms operating in 
27 industries in the 103 Italian provinces during the period 1998-2003. Bank market 
power is measured at local (province) level by using the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index. Two models are then estimated: one for firm birth, the other for firm activity. 
The chapter then evaluates the results of the econometric investigation by means of 
the institutional complementarities approach. 
Chapter Seven continues the empirical investigation on the role of institutional 
factors in regard to the performance of cooperative firms, in the context of the 
Italian case. The analysis developed in the chapter investigates the effects of local 
banking development on the growth of cooperative firms. Once again, the study 
adopts a comparative perspective between cooperative and conventional firms.  
Focusing on the issue of financial development is relevant since more developed 
financial intermediaries should be better able to screen and monitor investors, thus 
improving the efficiency of resource allocation, lowering the cost of financing, and 
increasing the availability of funds (Goldsmith, 1969; Bencivenga and Smith, 1991; 
Rajan and Zingales, 1998). The central hypothesis of the work is that these positive 
effects could be more marked for those firms, such as cooperatives, that are 
particularly dependent on banks for their external financing. The empirical analysis 
examines the above research question by implementing a direct test of the 
institutional complementarity hypothesis. The interest is in assessing whether the 
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effectiveness of cooperatives, evaluated in terms of their growth rate, is reinforced 
by the presence of more developed banking institutions.  
The empirical test is carried out on a sample of cooperatives, partnerships and 
corporations operating in the Italian provinces during the period 1995-2003. 
Institutional complementarity is modelled by specifying a multiplicative interaction 
model. This allows the impact of local banking development on firm growth to 
differ between cooperative and non-cooperative firms. In other words, the partial 
effect of local financial development on firm growth is made conditional on firm’s 
institutional form. Hence possible context dependence effects can be captured.   
Finally, Chapter Eight reflects on the main themes of the analysis developed in 
the thesis. The theoretical arguments explored in Part One of the thesis are revisited 
in the light of the findings of the empirical investigation offered in Part Two. The 
related implications for economic analysis and policy reforms are also spelled out. 
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NOTES 
 
1 Hodgson (1993) points out that Marx inherited both the conception of history as a series of stages 
and the idea of system’s internal contradictions from Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831).  
 
2 Both Spencer and Hayek endorse a competitive pluralism of individuals and entrepreneurs, hence 
of economic agents. However, they do not place value on a pluralism of structural forms (Hodgson, 
1993). 
 
3 ‘The traditional society’ is marked by a pre-Newtonian understanding of technological and 
physical world. ‘The preconditions for take-off’ stage sees society gradually evolving to modern 
science thanks to technical changes occurring in three non-industrial sectors: transport 
infrastructures, agriculture and capital sector. These developments require prior or concurrent 
changes that foster entrepreneurial and governmental activity. ‘The take-off’ stage requires rapid 
growth in a limited number of sectors, where modern industrial techniques apply. In this phase prior 
and concurrent developments make the application of modern techniques a self-sustained process. In 
‘the drive to maturity’ phase a society has effectively applied modern technologies to the full range 
of its resources and the industrial process is differentiated, with new leading sectors emerging. Also, 
rates of poverty decrease and the living standards improve considerably. Finally, the last stage is ‘the 
age of high mass-consumption’ reached by Western nations (Rostow, 1959). 
 
4 To explain historical change and the growing uniformity of modern societies, Fukuyama (1992) 
used the historical mechanism of modern natural science, since he argued that its unfolding created 
greater homogeneity among the societies that experienced it. In his view technology allows limitless 
accumulation of wealth, hence the satisfaction of human desires; this process guarantees increasing 
homogenisation of human societies, regardless of their historical origins or cultural inheritance. This 
implies that all countries undergoing economic modernisation must increasingly resemble one 
another, in the direction of capitalism. However, considering that economic interpretations of history 
cannot account for the phenomenon of democracy, Fukuyama (1992) recovered Hegel’s human 
desire for recognition in order to link liberal economics and liberal politics. He argued that the 
striving for democracy arises from that part of the human soul demanding recognition. Since 
communism provides a defective form of recognition, it is being superseded by liberal democracy. 
 
5 Fukuyama (1992) clarifies that this notion of history is most closely associated with Hegel and was 
propagated by Marx. He points out that both Hegel and Marx believed that the evolution of human 
societies would end in the sense that when mankind had achieved the highest form of society, there 
would be no further progress in the development of underlying principles and institutions. For Hegel 
the end of history was the liberal State, while for Marx it was communism. 
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6 It is worth mentioning at this point that increasing returns, hence positive feedback, are not the sole 
driving force of socio-economic processes. The real world clearly exhibits also decreasing returns 
and negative feedback (Beinhocker, 2006). Moreover, in certain areas of activity both positive and 
negative feedback are at work. For example, in the stock market an increase in share prices typically 
generates further price rises. This is due to investors’ increased willingness to buy shares based on 
the expectation of further higher prices, hence future increased profits. At some point this positive, 
amplifying feedback loop reverses and turns into a negative, compensating one which will push share 
prices down and will eventually lead to a burst in the stock market. For an analysis of the 
interdependence of positive and negative feedback see a very recent work by Antti Sillanpää and 
Tomi Laamanen (2009). 
 
7 O’Hara (2008) points out that there are linkages between Veblen, Young, Kaldor and Myrdal. 
Veblen influenced Young who taught Kaldor. Myrdal worked with Kaldor at the United Nations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART I 
 
TOWARDS AN ECONOMICS WHERE CONTEXT 
AND HISTORY MATTER 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: FROM 
UNIDIMENSIONAL TO INSTITUTIONAL VIEWS 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The discussion carried out in the previous chapter has shown that economists have 
different views on the dynamics governing historical and socio-economic processes, 
and that the particular standpoint adopted has had major implications in terms of the 
conclusions reached when approaching the analysis of economic phenomena. To 
briefly recapitulate the general point made in Chapter One, the views that can be 
termed as ‘unilinear’ entail that shocks can only be temporary. Negative feedback 
would eventually correct them and lead to a long-term situation where all 
economies converge to the same path. By contrast, recognising that positive 
(propagating) feedback are at work, rather than negative (offsetting) ones, implies 
that initial differences both among and within socio-economic systems tend to be 
amplified over time. Then, shocks are not invariably temporary: they can also be 
permanent. This suggests that differences in starting conditions can have enduring 
effects. Hence, what is observed and experienced in certain contexts, as a result of 
past occurrences, might not be ever observed and experienced in others. Multiple 
paths are possible. 
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The prediction of convergence of economic systems postulated by theorists of ‘the 
best of all possible worlds’ is in fact hard to reconcile with the observed patterned 
diversity characterising today’s societies. Moving from this consideration, various 
approaches have been proposed to analyse diversity in real world economies. The 
main thrust of this chapter is to explore such approaches in order to unveil their 
contribution to the improvement of our understanding of varieties of capitalism. 
Initial analyses developed within the framework of comparative economic 
systems, which attempted to formulate general models of economic organisation in 
order to differentiate one type of economy from another. This approach defined a 
spectrum of economic systems along which real world economies have then been 
located. The two extreme poles refer to two opposite modes of organising economic 
activity: the first according to the logic of the market economy, the second through 
central planning (Carson, 1973; Gardner, 1998; Kennett, 2001). Then, a range of 
overlapping criteria has been used by scholars in this field to classify economic 
systems, and to locate them on different points along the spectrum. 
A more comprehensive approach to the study of varieties of capitalism has been 
developed by studies that could broadly be described as institutionalist. These 
contributions emphasise that contexts are sensitive to structures and institutions, and 
so, differences in structures shape different patterns of economic organisation. In 
this analytical perspective the development of different modes of capitalism in 
different contexts is explained in terms of those contexts. Therefore, the 
effectiveness of a particular business model is considered to be institutionally 
relative, implying that structures that are successful in certain contexts may not be 
so in others (Hodgson, 1999; Whitley, 1999). 
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Broadly speaking, two major groups of studies can be identified within the above 
literature (Mjøset and Clausen, 2007). The first one, pioneered by Peter Hall and 
David Soskice (2001), focuses on the market/coordination dualism; basically, it 
extends the approach of comparative economic systems by making the spectrum of 
possible forms more complex. The second cluster of studies, instead, poses a 
stronger emphasis on patterned diversity among business systems. This second 
strand of analysis includes both the studies of the French Régulation School 
(Aglietta, 1987; Boyer, 1999) and the research carried out within the comparative 
business systems framework proposed by Richard Whitley (1998; 1999). 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the 
approach of comparative economic systems; Section 3 is concerned with the 
contribution of institutionalism to the theme of varieties of capitalism; Section 4 
briefly discusses the analytical framework of Hall and Soskice; Section 5 outlines 
the research agenda of régulation theory; Section 6 illustrates Whitley’s 
comparative business systems approach; Section 7 delineates the major factors 
contributing to explain the persistent diversity in forms of economic organisation; 
finally, Section 8 concludes. 
 
2 THE UNIDIMENSIONAL FOCUS OF COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC 
SYSTEMS 
 
The conventional theoretical framework of comparative economic systems contends 
that the economic problem any society has to tackle to efficiently allocate its scarce 
resources among alternative ends can be broken down into three sub-problems, and 
so can be also the most important economic decisions (Carson, 1973). These are: 
the production decision, which entails choosing the mix of goods and services that 
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are to be produced; the technique decision, concerning the choice of production 
factors that will be used, and the identification of the productive organisation more 
apt to realise production; finally, the distributional decision, which is relative to 
who will receive the benefits of production (Kennett, 2001). The structural 
mechanism dealing with these three decisions in a particular society is referred to as 
the economic system. The study of how such systems differ between economies, 
and how differences in systems determine economic outcomes, constitutes the field 
of comparative economic systems. 
In this framework, models of economic organisation are formulated in order to 
differentiate one type of economy from another. The starting point has been to 
remark that the decisions governing the exchange of goods and services, as well as 
those concerning what and how to produce can take place between basically 
independent decision makers or can be ordered by higher-level authorities. This 
enabled to define a spectrum of economic systems. At one pole of the spectrum 
there is absence of any State organisation or control over economic activity except, 
perhaps, to lay down the rules of ‘fair play’ and police them. This is an extreme 
form of laissez-faire capitalism: a pure market economy characterised by the 
existence of an all-pervasive market mechanism. At the other pole of the spectrum 
lies an extreme form of command economy in which society, as embodied in the 
State, controls all material means of production and distribution, so that the 
producing sector acts as one giant firm (Carson, 1973). Moreover, the central 
planner controls the distribution of wealth in the society, and may also plan the 
consumption activity. The constraints the planner imposes upon individual 
producers and consumers replace the market constraints present in a decentralised 
system (Carson, 1973). 
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The polar forms just described are not interesting as practical cases, since 
existing systems do synthesise features from the extreme types, rather than being 
purely capitalist or socialist, market or planned, free or controlled. Societies are in 
fact mixed economies, lying somewhere between these two extreme poles. Thus, 
although for a period of time the economic system characterising a particular 
country may roughly approximate one of the pure, idealised, theoretical systems, all 
nations contain recognisable elements of both the complete laissez-faire and the 
socialist model (Gardner, 1998). The above point is further stressed by Geoffrey 
Hodgson (1999), who points out that: 
 
“The central issue in the long debate between socialism and capitalism is often 
characterised as one of planning versus markets. But this can be misleading. 
Planning in some form exists in all socio-economic systems. Both individuals 
and organisations have plans. A central problem in any socio-economic system 
is how the inevitably diverse plans of many varied individuals or organisations 
can be reconciled, without conflict or disorder” (ibid: 31).  
 
Comparative economic scholars have traditionally argued that combining 
markets with commands is a way of counterbalancing both market and bureaucracy 
failures, and can imagine two broad ways of doing so. On one hand, if the starting 
point is a basic command mechanism, markets can be devolved roles in areas in 
which the presence of bureaucracy failures makes centralised decision making 
inefficient. On the other hand, bringing back some degree of central intervention in 
a market context can both supplement the market mechanism, and enable to take 
over the allocation of goods and resources in areas where decentralised decision 
making is not optimal (Carson, 1973). 
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In order to classify economic systems, and locate them on different points along 
the spectrum, a wide range of overlapping criteria have been used (Gardner, 1998). 
Among the dimensions most commonly considered, four major criteria are 
identifiable. A first one refers to the means for coordinating economic activity that 
every economy must employ to insure some degree of consistency in the decisions 
concerning the production and exchange of commodities and resources (Gardner, 
1998). To analyse coordinating mechanisms, attention has been focused on the 
extent to which economic systems rely on planning or the market (Kennett, 2001). 
In centrally planned economies, coordination of both short- and long-run 
decisions is attempted by means of a central planning authority, designed to guide 
the economy towards certain goals. Decisions are then passed to subordinates in the 
form of instructions, directives or commands (Gardner, 1998). Yet, planning can 
vary considerably in its scope and comprehensiveness (Kennett, 2001). Beside the 
most extreme form just described (i.e. directive or command planning), 
characterising for instance the former Soviet Union pre-1991, China pre-1980 and 
Eastern Europe pre-1989, a different form of planning is the one known as 
indicative planning. This form – pursued, and to a lesser extent still in practice, in 
several Western European nations (particularly France) and in Japan (Kennett, 
2001) – is a system designed to function in parallel with (rather than to the 
exclusion of) the market. In fact, it uses the market to coordinate short-run decisions 
in combination with a plan to coordinate long-run objectives. 
Opposite to systems relying on (command or indicative) planning, in market 
systems the overall outcome of the economy is held to be determined primarily by 
individuals’ voluntary actions. The absence of bureaucratic constraints and the 
emphasis on the role of choice are thus essential features (Kennett, 2001). 
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Coordination in these economies is predominantly achieved through the free and 
spontaneous movement of market prices, responding to the forces of demand and 
supply (Gardner, 1998).1 
A second criterion used to classify economic systems is the degree of 
centralisation of the decision-making process. In command planning a single plan 
governing the use of all resources and the production of output is centrally prepared, 
codified and formalised as law. At the opposite pole, in market systems all 
decisions are taken by individuals or private institutions and the function of the 
government is largely to provide a framework within which markets can operate, 
and to ensure the stability of the system. Between these two poles lies a continuum 
of decentralised power, and identifying where a particular economy lies on this 
continuum is regarded by comparative economists as a very useful way of gaining 
insights into how this system operates (Kennett, 2001). 
A third dimension along which economic systems have been classified regards 
the extent of individual rights, particularly as they pertain to property. Although all 
systems of government place some constraints on individuals’ rights in economic 
matters, the range and force of restraint differs among systems. Hence, one needs to 
analyse: the extent of the rights that the government allows, either actively or 
passively, to remain with the individual; the degree to which the State effectively 
protects and guarantees those rights against the incursions of other individuals 
(Kennett, 2001). Under capitalism, the great part of the means of production is 
owned outright by private individuals and various forms of business organisation. By 
contrast, under socialism most production means are owned socially. Yet, since in 
practice it can be difficult to distinguish between these forms of ownership, economic 
systems are usually classified in terms of the predominant one (Gardner, 1998). 
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Passing to illustrate a fourth classificatory criterion that has been employed by 
comparative economics scholars, this regards the incentive system influencing the 
response of individuals (Kennett, 2001). Any coordinating mechanism must include 
a system of incentives to reward socially desirable behaviour and discourage 
improper actions. Incentive systems are usually made up of: coercive, material and 
moral incentives (Gardner, 1998). In market economies the incentive system is 
more orientated on material incentives, whereas it relies more on moral incentives 
and coercion in planned economies (Kennett, 2001). 
Overall considered, the approach of comparative economic systems can be 
regarded as unidimensional. In fact, this analytical framework is mainly concerned 
with identifying and analysing two opposite modes of organising economic activity, 
one according to the market logic, the other through central planning. The sole 
attention given to the variety of other existing forms lays in the attempt of 
determining how close/distant these are from the extreme poles. Yet, considering 
that diversity is a prominent characteristic of socio-economic systems, its absence 
from the comparative economic systems approach represents the main drawback of 
this unidimensional view of varieties of capitalism.  
 
3 INSTITUTIONAL VIEWS OF VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM 
 
The relatively recent literature that the institutionalist approach proposed on 
varieties of capitalism in the last 20-30 years stresses that, since contexts are 
sensitive to structures and institutions, differences in structures shape different 
patterns of capitalism, hence of development. These studies point out that the 
advantages or efficiencies of one type of capitalism over another are typically 
context dependent. For this reason, no form of capitalism can be considered 
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superior to the others. Therefore, none of the existing models can be expected to 
prevail over other forms (Hodgson, 1999). 
Claims of convergence may be justified only if it can be demonstrated that 
economic processes and outcomes are not influenced by historical events, 
institutional arrangements and collective actors. In other words, it would be 
necessary to demonstrate that economic activities are governed by some systemic 
rationality, and that this lies beyond, and is separate from, any specific set of social 
arrangements (Whitley, 1999). 
A more meaningful approach to the issue of business systems diversity is to 
recognise that economic activities can be successfully organised in a number of 
different ways, and no single pattern is superior to the others. On these grounds, the 
institutionalist literature shows, both theoretically and empirically, that substantial 
variations in types of dominant firms, customer-supplier relations, employment 
practices and work systems are still persistent not only across countries but also 
within them (Wade, 1990; Whitley, 1992; Orru, 1997). As previously introduced, 
the common trait of these studies is to explain the development of different models 
of capitalism in different contexts in terms of those contexts, rather than reducing 
all to a single economic logic, or assuming that market competition will select the 
most efficient pattern of economic organisation. 
In the institutional approach to varieties of capitalism, the effectiveness of 
particular forms of business organisation is considered to be institutionally relative. 
This implies that structures which are successful in one context may not be effective 
in others. Indeed, distinctive systems of economic organisation arise wherever 
associated key institutions are both mutually reinforcing and distinctive from other 
ones. Therefore, a key task is to understand how distinctive configurations of 
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hierarchy-market relations become institutionalised in different societies, as a result 
of variations in dominant institutions (Whitley, 1992). The ‘impurity principle’ is 
proposed by Hodgson (1999) as a general concept applicable to all socio-economic 
systems. The idea is that “every socio-economic system must rely on at least one 
structurally dissimilar sub-system to function, so that the formation as a whole has 
the requisite structural variety to cope with change” (ibid: 126). A major implication 
of the impurity principle is that capitalist systems can develop in a number of 
different ways, depending on the degree of structural variety in their sub-systems.  
The different varieties of capitalism that become established over time have been 
characterised and analysed in a number of quite different ways, and from varied 
perspectives. For instance, Michel Albert (1993) critically contrasted the neo-
American model of capitalism promoted by Ronal Reagan – based on individual 
success and short-term financial gain – with the Rhine model,2 of German 
inspiration but with strong Japanese connections, emphasising collective success, 
consensus and long-term concerns.3 Alfred Chandler (1990) emphasised the merit of 
American competitive managerial capitalism over the more ‘personal’ variant in the 
United Kingdom and the ‘cooperative managerial’ one in Germany. In contrast to 
the above writers, Louis Hartz and Albert Hirschman identified a risk of stagnation, 
of both a moral and an economic kind, in the individualistic capitalism that 
developed in the United States (Hartz, 1955; Hirschman, 1982, in Hodgson, 1993). 
Writers of twentieth century capitalism have proclaimed the fading of Fordism, 
and its associated regulation regimes, as the prevalent system of mass production 
and marketing (Boyer, 1990; Boyer and Durand, 1997). A number of contributions 
have contrasted the rigidities of such large-scale production system with the virtues 
of more flexible production systems (Piore and Sable, 1984; Boyer and 
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Hollingsworth, 1997, among others). In some cases, these analyses discuss 
competitive strategies in production and marketing alongside with organisational 
differences that emerge both within and among firms. The aim is to delineate and 
taxonomise various types of economic organisation that have prevailed in different 
economies at various periods of time (on this point see Chandler, 1977, 1990; Best, 
1990; Lazonick, 1991). 
Within the research frontier on national capitalisms it is possible to distinguish 
two major clusters of studies (Mjøset and Clausen, 2007). One pursues a by-polar 
approach focusing on the market/coordination dualism. This is the research agenda 
pursued by Hall and Soskice (2001). Basically this extends the previously discussed 
approach of comparative economic systems by making the spectrum of possible 
forms more complex. On the other hand, the second line of studies is based on a 
much wider view of varieties of capitalism. It includes the French Régulation 
School, accounting among its proponents Michel Aglietta, Robert Boyer, Benjamin 
Coriat, Alain Lipietz and others, and the comparative business systems framework 
proposed by Richard Whitley. The above institutionalist approaches to varieties of 
capitalism will be discussed in the next sections. 
 
4 HALL AND SOSKICE’S VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM 
 
Hall and Soskice (2001) focus on variations among national political economies. 
They derive the key relationships characterising the political economy in game-
theoretic terms, and focus on the types of institutions that alter the outcome of 
strategic interactions among economic actors. Their approach is firm-centred in the 
sense that the firm is regarded as the crucial actor in a capitalist economy. 
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Hall and Soskice argue that, since firms’ capabilities are ultimately relational, their 
success depends on the ability to coordinate effectively with a wide range of actors. 
More specifically, there exist five spheres where firms must develop relationships in 
order to resolve the coordination problems central to their core competencies. These 
are the spheres of industrial relations, vocational training and education, corporate 
governance, inter-firm relations, and intra-firm relations. In this approach to varieties 
of capitalism, national economies are compared with regard to the way in which firms 
solve the coordination problems they face in the above spheres. 
The core distinction that Hall and Soskice draw is between liberal market 
economies and coordinated market economies. These constitute ideal-types at the 
poles of a spectrum along which nations can be located. It can be argued that by 
establishing such a dichotomy, and attempting to then classify economies according 
to that, the main logic underlying Hall and Soskice’s approach is not dissimilar to 
the one of the comparative economic systems’ framework.  
Hall and Soskice argue that in liberal market economies (LME hereafter) 
hierarchies and competitive market arrangements enable firms to coordinate their 
activities. Market relations take place under competition and formal contracting, 
and goods and services are exchanged at arm’s-length. In such markets actors react 
to the price signals the market generates by adjusting their willingness to supply and 
demand goods and services. Also, market institutions are considered to provide, in 
many respects, effective means for coordinating the behaviour of economic actors. 
In contrast to the above scenario, in coordinated market economies (henceforth 
CME) firms mainly rely on non-market relationships both to build competencies 
and coordinate with other actors. Relational or incomplete contracting, network 
monitoring (based on the exchange of private information inside networks) and 
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collaborative relationships are the basis of these non-market modes of coordination 
enabling firms’ competencies to be built. The equilibria on which firms coordinate 
are the result of strategic interactions between firms and other actors. This is a key 
difference with LME, where the supply and demand conditions prevailing in 
competitive markets determine these equilibria. 
Developing the analysis on the dichotomy LME-CME is based on the contention 
that the incidence of different types of firm relationships varies systematically 
across nations. More precisely, Hall and Soskice (2001) argue that in any economy 
firms will gravitate towards the mode of coordination for which there is institutional 
support. Institutions (both formal and informal) enter this framework for the support 
they provide to the relationships that firms develop in order to resolve coordination 
problems. 
An important point in this conceptualisation is that institutional practices of 
various types should not be randomly distributed across countries. Instead, a nation 
with a particular type of coordination in one sphere of the economy should tend to 
develop complementary practices in other spheres, since this would increase the 
returns from (or the efficiency of) that type of coordination. As nations converge on 
complementary practices across spheres, we should observe some clustering along 
the dimensions that divide LME from CME. Among the large OECD countries, 
Hall and Soskice classify United States, Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand 
and Ireland as LME, while Germany, Japan, Switzerland, The Netherlands, 
Belgium, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Austria are regarded as CME. 
Six more countries (namely, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey) are 
considered to be hybrid types which, they argue, may constitute a Mediterranean 
type of capitalism. 
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A critique to the approach of Hall and Soskice has been put forward by Lars 
Mjøset (2006), who argues that a programme of grounded theory would best enable 
contribution to knowledge on varieties of capitalism.4 The main argument here is 
that, rather than CME/LME game-theoretical dualisms, varieties of capitalism 
should be mapped in typological maps. Along the same line, Robert Boyer (2005b) 
points out that real international comparison can begin only when scholars stop 
looking at economies on a two-by-two basis and acquire the means to undertake 
multiple comparisons. In his view, the dichotomy of two polarised models cannot 
satisfactorily take into account the full distribution of modern economies. 
Dichotomising strongly simplifies the multiple market logics and the variety of 
institutional arrangements. Instead, a more useful approach would be to leave open 
the number of configurations resulting from the comparison of quantitative and 
qualitative methods.5 It has been advocated that the analysis should be re-grounded 
in a matrix of larger dimension, as this would contribute to the elaboration of 
general substantive theory.6 Furthermore, it would also bring out the institutional 
complementarities associated with the combinations of specific types along the 
dimensions commonly examined, such as financial systems, monetary 
arrangements, trade-patterns and institutions, welfare states, labour relations, party-
systems, labour market institutions, natural resources/sectoral patterns, economic 
policy making, and corporate governance patterns (Mjøset, 2006). 
 
5 RÉGULATION THEORY 
 
The French Régulation School established itself in the second half of the 1970s on 
rigorous and radical critique of mainstream economic theory, as the following 
passage from Michel Aglietta (1987) indicates: 
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“Economists confronted with the transformations and crises of contemporary 
Western societies, and with the troubling future of the capitalist system as a 
whole, can find no foothold in general equilibrium theory. To take refuge in 
partial investigations, half empirical, half theoretical, only compounds the 
confusion. The way forward does not lie in an attempt to give a better reply to 
the theoretical questions raised by the orthodox theory, but rather in an ability to 
pose quite different theoretical questions. This means a collective effort to 
develop a theory of the régulation of capitalism which isolates the conditions, 
rhythms and forms of its social transformations” (ibid: 15). 
 
Two points are worth noting from the above passage. The first one is that for 
Aglietta the aim of economics is the study of the social laws governing the 
production and distribution of the means that human beings need for their existence. 
The other point regards the word ‘régulation’. It indicates the way in which the 
elements of a system adjust to the functioning of the unit (Benko and Lipietz, 1998). 
Hence the régulation theory of capitalism aims to analyse, quoting Aglietta from 
above, ‘the conditions, rhythms and forms of its social transformations’. However, 
in English ‘régulation’ is often translated with ‘regulation’ which is instead closer in 
meaning to ‘réglementation’. 
Régulation theory rejects univocal explanations of economic phenomena, and 
emphasises that individuals interact on the basis of a series of overlapping 
institutions (Boyer, 2002). It describes how institutional forms of capitalism have 
evolved over time, as well as illustrating the variety of architectures that are 
observed (Boyer and Saillard, 2002).7 The originality of this approach lies in the 
fact that it is centred on the endogenous dynamics driving change in modern 
economies. It specifically accounts for a potential destabilisation of national 
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regulations resulting from the diffusion of a series of economic and financial crises 
throughout the world economy (Jessop, 1997). 
Aiming to analyse the conditions that act ex post to sustain an accumulation 
process that is by its own nature subject to imbalances, contradictions and conflicts, 
régulation theory has first been more concerned with analysing capitalism’s stages, 
rather than the variety of its forms. Indeed, the initial focus has been the study of the 
Fordism era, the post-Second World War period of mass production and mass 
consumption, and its crises in the context of the long-term transformations of the 
American and French capitalism (Boyer, 2002). Subsequent research into the growth 
regimes that were likely to succeed to Fordism revealed the existence of many 
different forms of capitalism. The analysis covered diversified modes of régulation 
and institutional architectures (Boyer, 2005b). 
The aforementioned concept of mode of régulation refers to the individual and 
collective procedures and behaviours that reproduce social relationships, direct 
growth regimes and ensure the accounting of a multitude of decentralised decisions 
(Boyer, 2005b). The modes of régulation vary in different countries and time periods 
because the economies are embedded in a dense network of social and political 
relations and institutions. To identify a mode of régulation it is essential to 
characterise the following five institutional forms: wage-labour nexus; type of 
competition; monetary regime; relationships between the State and the economy, and 
insertion into the international system. Among these institutional forms, the wage-
labour nexus occupies a privileged place, since it describes the type of surplus 
appropriation characterising the capitalist mode of production (Boyer, 2002).  
The concept of mode of régulation allows to replace the notion of static 
equilibrium with an analysis of dynamic processes which reduce the disequilibria 
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constantly caused by accumulation. Moreover, it inserts markets into a series of 
institutional arrangements that socialise both information and behaviour, and restrict 
agents’ rationality to available information and cognitive abilities (Boyer and 
Saillard, 2002). Thus the possibility arises that the prevailing mode of régulation 
differs considerably, depending on the time and place, and that it is not the 
projection of a model of general equilibrium, which is separate from the 
imperfections and frictions introduced by national specificities (Benassy et al, 1979; 
Boyer and Yamada, 2000).  
The research carried out in this analytical framework explains that the 
historically and geographically variable institutional structure of each economy 
gives rise to its own economic and social cycles and crises (Boyer, 2002). To focus 
on homologies between economic adjustment processes, a set of conceptual tools 
have been developed and applied at three levels of analysis, each of which is 
characterised by a different degree of abstraction (Boyer and Saillard, 2002). The 
most abstract level is concerned with the study of modes of production and their 
connections.8 Aglietta (1987) argues that to speak of the régulation of a production 
mode is to try to formulate in general laws the way in which the determinant 
structure of a society is reproduced. This implies that studying capitalist régulation 
means analysing the transformation of social relations. These transformation 
processes can create new forms, both economic and non-economic, that are 
organised in structures and determine the mode of production. 
The second level of analysis describes accumulation regimes. These are the 
regular socio-economic patterns enabling accumulation to occur in the long-term 
between two structural crises.9 While mainstream theory looks for a general and 
invariable model, régulation theory recognises a variety of accumulation regimes, 
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according to the nature and intensity of technical change, the volume and 
composition of demand and workers’ life style (Boyer and Saillard, 2002). 
Passing to the third level of analysis, this regards the specific configurations of 
social relations defined by institutional (or structural) forms, for any given era or 
geographical context. The project of régulation theory is to first describe these 
institutional forms, which socialise the heterogeneous behaviour of economic agents, 
and then analyse their transformation. Scholars in this line of study established a 
hierarchy among institutional forms according to the mode in place at the time and in 
the country under consideration. For instance, for the Fordism of the post-Second 
World War period, credit money, an original wage-labour nexus and an oligopolistic 
form of competition proved to be more important than the transformation of the 
State in the strict sense. In contrast to this period, in the 1990s the intensification of 
monetary constraints and the internationalisation of competition appeared to precede 
and shape transformations in the wage-labour nexus (Boyer and Saillard, 2002).  
Armed with the analytical tools discussed above, régulation theory proposes to 
study modes of development. In other words, the way in which an accumulation 
regime and a régulation mode stabilise themselves over the long-term, and how they 
enter into a period of crisis and then renew themselves. 
Passing now to briefly discuss the major research proposed by the Régulation 
School, the obliged starting point is the contribution offered by Aglietta in his 1976 
book. The focus of Aglietta’s work is a long-run analysis of the history of American 
capitalism since the Civil War. The selection of the United States, he argues, is aimed 
at highlighting the general tendencies of capitalism in the twentieth century. In 
Aglietta’s view, the peculiarities of American capitalism have an exemplary character 
for capitalist regulation in that they express the most adequate structural forms for 
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perpetuating the capitalist relations of production created by the class struggle. It is in 
this sense that the United States represents a model for all contemporary capitalist 
countries. In fact, the degree of universalisation of the structural forms created in the 
United States is a decisive aspect of the global domination of American capitalism 
after the Second World War (Aglietta, 1987). 
The articulation of the laws of capital accumulation and the laws of competition 
is the nodal point of Aglietta’s theory of capitalist régulation. The laws of capital 
accumulation are explored through a study of the transformations of the wage 
relation, while the laws of competition are analysed through a study of the 
transformations of inter-capitalist relations. Then, Aglietta shows that the 
competition between autonomous capitals issues from the antagonism of the wage 
relation, which is the motivating force of capital accumulation. 
A major conclusion in Aglietta (1987) is that the social transformations that 
occurred in the twentieth century produced two main effects. On one hand, they 
tended to unify the wage-earning class by the universal extension of the wage 
relation. On the other hand, they led to a marked division within the capitalist class, 
by accentuating the uneven development of capitals and reinforcing the 
concentration of capital. Yet, the growth of the productive forces of collective 
labour remains dependent on capital accumulation. 
To summarise, the idea that the concentration of capital is the most fundamental 
process in the history of twentieth century capitalism is rejected by Aglietta (1987). 
The key theoretical process lies instead in a radical change in the conditions of 
capital reproduction. The interaction between this transformation and the change in 
the forms of competition is at the heart of the problems of capitalist régulation. This 
latter must be interpreted as a process of social creation, whose continuous 
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reproduction is interrupted by the occurrence of crises, the resolution of which 
involves an irreversible transformation of the mode of production. Indeed, any 
social system develops in such a way that reproduces a determinant relationship 
whose presence is what assures the integrity and cohesion of the system. When a 
threat is posed to the reproduction of the invariant element, hence to the system, this 
reacts as a totality to modify the form of régulation. A change of regime then takes 
place. However, and this is a central result in régulation theory, in periods of 
structural crisis the emergence of a viable configuration is not automatic and 
generally does not result from a ‘big bang’. Instead, the success of a new mode of 
development requires a slow, contradictory process during which representations, 
ideologies, skills, locations and ways of life are newly adjusted (Boyer, 2002).10  
Further studies, aimed at comparing economies, classified two capitalisms as 
belonging to the same category if they displayed the same style in macroeconomic 
adjustments, that is to say if they shared the same régulation mode and 
accumulation regime. On these grounds régulation theorists explained the late 
1960s events, when accumulating tensions in the United States led to a crisis 
marked by the coexistence of inflation and lower activity levels. It has been 
remarked that the crisis evolved from a change in structural forms,11 which made it 
possible to set up Fordism, an intensive mass consumption oriented growth regime 
(Boyer, 2005b). Historical studies of French capitalism (Cepremap-Cordes, 1977, 
1978) confirmed a striking parallelism in the way growth regimes developed both in 
France and in the United States. However, the architectures of institutional forms 
guiding these growth regimes were not identical. The market logic played a crucial 
role in the United States, while France was characterised by State interventions 
(Boyer, 1999). This difference was regarded as the first sign of a contraposition 
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between a market-dominated capitalism and one with a strong statist impetus. As 
Boyer (2005b) notices, the fact that these two different institutional architectures 
could sustain two growth regimes of the same type reinforces the argument that 
economic performance is context dependent. It also shows that convergences and 
divergences are tied to a particular period of time, and do not constitute a general 
feature of economic systems. 
Prompted by the conclusion that Fordism established itself both in France and in 
the United States, régulation studies addressed the question of whether 
industrialised OECD economies were part of the same process. Although mass 
production and mass consumption dominated in most European countries, 
institutional forms were given different codifications from one country to the other: 
hindered Fordism in Great Britain; flexi-Fordism in Germany (Boyer, 1988); 
permeable Fordism in Canada (Jenson, 1990); imposed Fordism in Brazil (Coriat 
and Saboia, 1987), and so on. So that, it started to be acknowledged that Fordism 
was a distinctive feature of only a few countries, when defined by a conjunction of 
the following three properties: an intensive production mechanism driven by 
mechanisation; a capital-labour compromise aiming to ensure shared gains; a circuit 
of accumulation operating within the national space (Boyer, 2005b). 
An increasing number of international comparisons among OECD countries in a 
variety of fields (such as employment relationships and innovation systems) 
revealed the coexistence of at least four configurations of capitalism (Boyer, 1996; 
Amable et al, 1997). The first is market-oriented capitalism; this relies on markets 
and independent authorities responsible for facing market excess, and the 
opportunism it can generate. The second is meso-corporatist capitalism, a 
modernised version of nineteenth century paternalistic capitalism, where capital 
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concentration led to the emergence of large conglomerates. The third is social-
democratic capitalism, emphasising the role of social partners in the emergence and 
management of most institutional forms. The fourth involves State-driven 
capitalism, which revolves around the role played by national, regional, or local 
State authorities in making economic adjustments. This taxonomy has widened 
since the transformation of former Soviet-type economies in Eastern Europe and in 
China, as well as with the rapid changes occurring in new industrialising countries, 
especially in Asia (Boyer, 2005b). 
To conclude this section with a reflection on the themes touched in the preceding 
pages, régulation scholars centred their investigation on varieties of capitalism by 
mainly focusing on macroeconomic aspects. The contribution of the research 
carried out by these writers is surely significant; however, equally important 
microeconomic issues have been largely overshadowed.  
 
6 WHITLEY’S COMPARATIVE BUSINESS SYSTEMS APPROACH 
 
To address persistent diversity in business systems and how these latter evolve, 
Whitley’s comparative business systems approach attempts to identify the central 
differences characterising established systems of economic organisation and control 
in terms of their institutional environments.12 In this framework economic 
relationships and activities are conceived to be socially constructed and 
institutionally variable. Thus, the ways competitive pressures operate, the actors 
engaged in them, and the outcome of the competitive process, vary significantly 
between different institutional contexts. Moreover, the extent to which business 
systems are distinct and coherent depends on the degree of integration of dominant 
institutions and their mutually reinforcing features (Whitley, 1999). 
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Although a number of key institutions help to generate and reproduce different 
business systems’ types, Whitley suggests that four dimensions can be used to 
characterise and compare institutional arrangements across market economies. 
These are: the State; the skills development and control system; the financial 
system; the conventions governing trust and authority relations. 
Variations in dominant institutions evolve interdependently with specific 
business systems’ characteristics. This generates and reproduces a variety of forms 
of economic organisation. Therefore, the establishment and change of diverse forms 
of capitalism is closely related to diversity in institutional contexts. The 
interdependence among institutional characteristics in structuring business systems 
implies that the forms of economic organisation prevailing in a market economy 
will be influenced by the dominant institutions that evolved in conjunction with 
each other. Seeking to explain variations among business systems, and changes in 
their characteristics, then relies on analysing all key institutions and the way these 
have interdependently structured the forms of economic organisation that are 
observed (Whitley, 1998; 1999). 
A relevant aspect in this approach, as well as in the other comparative analyses 
of varieties of capitalism, is identifying the phenomena characterising socio-
economic systems in ways that are both sufficiently standardised across them, to 
enable systematic comparisons, and variable enough to capture the distinctive 
dimensions in which they differ (Whitley, 1999). 
In line with Hall and Soskice (2001), firms’ characteristics and behaviour are 
regarded as key variables in the identification of varieties of capitalism. Hence, they 
need to be explained in any comparative analysis of business systems.13 An 
important point stressed by Whitley (1998; 1999) is that since firms are embedded 
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in the wider social context of nations, a uniform firm type is very unlikely to spread 
across countries – despite conjunctural political reforms and prevalent market 
forces. This contrasts sharply with views á la Williamson (1975, 1980, 1985) 
contending that competitive pressures lead to the long-term dominance of the most 
efficient firm type (i.e. the hierarchical structure). 
Along with variations in firms’ characteristics, this approach also considers 
differences in the ways that economic activities and resources are controlled by 
various groups of actors. In fact, the organisation of ownership and control of 
private property rights varies across capitalist socio-economic systems (Whitley, 
1998). For instance, those controlling financial assets have various types of 
connection with the actors and the authority structures they dominate. Furthermore, 
capital owners and controllers, managers and workers are organised differently 
across economic systems. Competition and cooperation with each other occurs in 
contrasting ways. These differences imply significant variation across economies 
not only in regard to the nature of economic actors but also with respect to 
interrelations among them (Whitley, 1999). This implies that it is necessary to 
recognise and incorporate diversity in economic analysis. 
Broadly speaking, in Whitley’s conceptualisation comparing business systems 
requires looking at differences in the relationships between five categories of 
economic actors. These are: firms in different sectors; customers and suppliers; 
capital providers and users; competitors; employers and employees. Yet, from an 
empirical viewpoint the numerous combinations of possible types of economic 
organisations described in terms of the above sets of relationships are restricted by 
their degree of interdependence with societal institutions. Such interconnections 
imply that the number of business systems that become established and reproduced 
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over time is less than the number of possible combinations that can be obtained 
from business systems’ characteristics (Whitley, 1999). 
A crucial point in this approach to varieties of capitalism is that the significance 
of business systems is regarded to be dependent on the structures and policies of 
States, and on political economies in general. This is because State actions 
determine the effectiveness of legal and educational systems, hence the role of 
formal institutions in governing relevant aspects of economic coordination. It is also 
remarked that State boundaries are particularly relevant in those socio-economic 
systems where national political systems structure both the formation of interest 
groups and the modes of conflict resolution. If these groups are mainly organised 
regionally (or internationally) and so are also the major institutions governing their 
formation, competition and collaboration, then they would constitute separate sub-
systems (or international systems) of economic organisation (Whitley, 1999). 
The arguments just discussed highlight the need to identify the dominant role of 
institutions at each level of analysis. For instance, distinctive types of economic 
organisation are expected to become established at the regional level if there are 
significant differences between regional and national governments, financial 
institutions, skills development, control systems, broad cultural norms and values, 
(Whitley, 1999). 
It is also relevant to point out that several national patterns of economic 
organisation emerged from conflicts between distinct regional ones. For example, in 
the case of Germany, Gary Herrigel (1996) emphasised that the development of the 
German State and its policies of competition in the late nineteenth century have 
been strongly influenced by the ‘decentralised’ industrial order that developed in 
Saxony and in other parts of the country, and the ‘autarkic’ industrial order that 
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characterised the Ruhr as well as other regions. According to Herrigel, the German 
industrial order emerged from the struggles between two rather different regional 
orders, each one having its own pattern of arrangements and agencies. 
An important conclusion that can be drawn from the comparative business 
systems approach is that, regardless of the level of analysis, the boundedness of 
distinctive systems of economic organisation is both historically contingent and 
variable. This implies that, at various levels, diversity is a persistent characteristic of 
business systems.   
The approaches to varieties of capitalism discussed in this Chapter are 
summarised in Table 2.1. 
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7 THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF DIVERSITY IN CAPITALIST 
CONFIGURATIONS 
 
The approaches to varieties of capitalism discussed in this chapter suggest that 
contemporary capitalisms differ significantly both in terms of their basic 
institutional forms and the types of organisations prevailing at the firm level. What 
is argued in this section is that at least three interrelated theoretical reasons 
contribute to explain the observed diversity in capitalist configurations. 
Firstly, since institutions exhibit large sunk costs and display increasing returns, 
specific features of different socio-economic systems may be blocked through lock-
in effects. Further, the constraints that lock-in imposes on actors may inhibit their 
incentives or ability to innovate. Hence, the process of institutional and economic 
change is largely path dependent. When a path is set on a particular course, the 
network externalities, the learning process of organisations and the historically 
derived subjective models reinforce the course in a path dependent way (North, 
1990), in the sense that actual and future outcomes are influenced by previous 
patterns (David, 1985; Arthur, 1989). “It is in the path dependency of institutional 
varieties that different histories are preserved” (Hodgson, 1999, p. 117). A major 
implication of path dependence is that it is unlikely that a country’s overall 
institutional configuration can be transformed from one type of capitalism to 
another (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Thus, diversity in patterns of economic 
organisation is likely to endure. 
Path dependence contributes to explain why countries experience different 
economic performance (Easterly, 2001), as well as the heterogeneity in the 
prevalent forms of business organisations. Indeed, while economic growth models 
predict that less developed countries should catch up with their richer counterparts, 
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the evidence shows that this has not happened, thus giving support to the path 
dependence conjecture (Gagliardi, 2008).14 Moreover, despite mainstream 
economic theory defends the view that only one firm type, the hierarchical one, can 
survive long-term capitalist competition, there is widespread empirical and anecdotal 
evidence showing that capitalist environments have been historically populated by 
different business types, among which democratic and participatory firms. 
The above point implies that path dependency may be relevant also in the 
evolution of organisational form (Langlois, 1988). In Chapter One it has been 
pointed out that Williamsons’ (1975, 1980, 1985) identification of existence with 
efficiency implies that since hierarchical structures prevail in real world economies, 
they are unequivocally superior to non-hierarchical structures. Flexible industrial 
specialisation and labour management are deemed to disappear because of their 
inefficiencies. On the contrary, path dependence suggests that less hierarchical 
organisational forms can also be viable in contexts where past conditions created 
the adequate climate for their development (Hodgson, 1999). 
A second argument that helps us to explain diversity in forms of capitalism is the 
imperfect nature of competition among institutions. By definition imperfect 
competition implies that multiple outcomes can be possible, and that the prevailing 
one is not necessarily the most desirable. Hence, imperfect institutional 
competition, both across and within socio-economic systems, means that different 
institutional arrangements can become established, and that none of these 
necessarily needs to represent a global optimum. Potentially, a situation could 
emerge in which in each system a distinct set of institutional arrangements is 
selected. Variety can be even greater if competition at the level of the sub-systems 
constituting each entity leads to the emergence of further institutional heterogeneity. 
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The counter argument to the above is that competition among alternative 
economic coordination and control systems inevitably selects the most effective 
one. This is the position of the mainstream economists earlier examined in Chapter 
One. The mechanist formula ‘competition = survival of the fittest’ inevitably 
encounters the scepticism of those, including the present writer, who acknowledge 
that competitive processes do not occur in an atomistic world. Instead, these 
processes are embedded in contexts populated by individuals and formed by a dense 
web of ideological, historical and cultural legacies. By influencing individuals’ 
mental maps, these legacies inevitably affect both the nature and the outcome of the 
competitive process. 
The third theoretical argument to explaining varieties of capitalism is 
institutional complementarity. Broadly speaking, the complementarity of 
institutional forms implies a functional interdependence of institutions (Höpner, 
2005a), affecting the performance of institutions across and within domains (Aoki, 
2001). If complementarity effects are at work, the performance of cultural, political 
and socio-economic institutions is context dependent, rather than being invariably 
conditioned by their intrinsic relative efficiency. This implies that a variety of 
institutional arrangements can prevail at various levels both across and within 
economies. Furthermore, also sub-optimal organisational arrangements can be 
sustained over time in some contexts (Pagano and Rowthorn, 1994; Aoki, 2001, 
2007; Boyer, 2005a). Hence, institutional complementarities contribute a great deal 
in maintaining and reproducing diversity both across and within socio-economic 
systems. Institutional complementarities also help to elucidate why sub-optimal (i.e. 
inefficient) institutions can persist in some economies, while ‘better’ ones are viable 
in others (Aoki, 2007). It is the very existence of complementarity that makes the 
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whole notion of distinct forms of capitalism plausible, since complementarity 
presumes that there are different ways to combine institutional elements 
successfully (Deeg, 2007). 
To recapitulate on the above final considerations, incorporating institutional 
complementarities in economic analysis allows us to explain why distinct systems 
of capitalism exist, and to appreciate the importance of diversity for the overall 
structural harmony and coherence of socio-economic systems.  
 
8 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has discussed the major approaches to the study of varieties of 
capitalism. A key point of interest has been to show that the research agenda has 
gradually shifted over time. Explanations that centred on a rather simplified view of 
the factors accounting for the co-existence of different forms of capitalism, have 
been superseded by accounts that attribute a prominent role to the various 
institutional structures prevailing in one economy, at any particular point in time, in 
determining and sustaining the observed varieties of capitalism. 
The chapter has first offered a brief review of the main traits of the comparative 
economic systems approach. This analytical framework aimed to differentiate one 
type of economy from another by formulating two general models of economic 
organisation (one based on the market logic, the other on central planning). These 
models then serve as benchmarks in the comparative analysis of actual economic 
systems. By doing so, the examination of the sources of variety has been 
downplayed by the attempt to determine how close/distant economic systems are 
from the pure ideal types. 
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Moving from this critique, the chapter has then presented the analysis developed 
by studies that have focused on institutional factors to approach varieties of 
capitalism. These studies explain the development of different modes of capitalism 
in different contexts in terms on those contexts. A major conclusion reached in this 
line of research is that in order to justify any claim of convergence, historical 
circumstances, institutional arrangements and individuals would have to be 
irrelevant to economic processes and outcomes (Whitley, 1999). These scholars 
have emphasised the value of diversity and plurality both within and across socio-
economic systems. This contrasts with the extolled virtues of convergence claimed 
by Marxian and mainstream economists which, as argued in Chapter One, are based 
on the notion of offsetting, negative feedback.  
With regard to the specific analytical perspectives adopted in developing the 
above research agenda, the chapter has suggested that these can be mapped in two 
broad categories. The first one, in the fashion of the Hall and Soskice (2001) game-
theoretic approach to varieties of capitalism, contends that the market/coordination 
dualism provides the basic framework for analysing the existing different 
configurations of economic systems. Institutions enter this framework for the 
support they provide to the relationships that firms develop to solve coordination 
problems. The main conclusion of this approach is that firms, hence countries, 
gravitate towards the mode of coordination for which there is institutional support. 
However, a critique that has been directed to this analysis of varieties of capitalism is 
that the dichotomy liberal market economies versus coordinated market economies is 
too simplistic, in the sense that it cannot allow for the variety of institutional 
arrangements prevailing in modern economies (Boyer, 2005b; Mjøset, 2006). 
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Turning to the second cluster of studies, the chapter has stressed that this poses a 
stronger emphasis on patterned diversity among business systems, and includes the 
research carried out by the French Régulation School (Aglietta, 1987; Boyer, 1999), 
as well as the comparative business systems framework proposed by Whitley (1998, 
1999). The main contribution of régulation theory is that, besides analysing the 
conditions that act ex post to ensure the viability and reproduction of an 
accumulation process (Boyer, 2005b), it also focuses on the endogenous dynamics 
driving changes in economies (Jessop, 1997). With regard to Whitley’s (1998, 
1999) comparative business systems approach, this regards economic relationships 
and activities as socially constructed and institutionally variable. A crucial point in 
this approach is that it considers differences in dominant institutions to develop 
interdependently with particular business system characteristics, in order to generate 
and reproduce distinctive forms of economic organisation. In other words, the 
establishment and change of different capitalisms are closely connected to 
variations in their institutional contexts.  
Drawing on the main lessons that can be learned from the institutionalist 
approaches commented throughout the chapter, it has been argued that three 
interrelated theoretical arguments contribute to explain the observed persistent 
diversity in forms of capitalism: path dependence, imperfect competition among 
institutions and institutional complementarities. It is to a closer inspection of the 
institutional complementarity approach that we now turn in the next chapter. 
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NOTES 
 
1 Countries attempting to replace directive planning with market institutions have been commonly 
termed as transitional economies.   
 
2 On the banks of the Rhine, in the spa town of Bad Godesberg, the German Social Democratic 
Party decided to commit to capitalism during the 1959 conference (Albert, 1993).  
 
3 Albert (1993) argues that setting an Anglo-Saxon model against a German-Japanese one would 
be misleading. First, the term ‘Anglo-Saxon’ would not be appropriate neither for Australia and 
New Zealand, which have a strong Labour tradition. Secondly, financial institutions in the French-
speaking Canadian province of Quebec adopted strategies distinguished from those of other 
Anglo-Saxon countries. Thirdly, pairing the United States and the United Kingdom would not 
account for the disparity existing between the United Kingdom long-established system of social 
welfare and the lack of a system of protection in the United States. As for the term ‘German-
Japanese’, although these two countries share a number of similar features, such as the methods of 
corporate financing and the social role of the company, several differences do exist between them. 
Among these, the strong Japanese industrial polarisation between large corporations and small 
sub-contractors is not as marked in Germany; also, the German system has not equivalent for the 
big Japanese business firm.  
 
4 Grounded theory is a qualitative research method developed by sociologists Barney Glaser and 
Anselm Strauss in the late 1960s. This research method focuses on data collection in the first stage 
of the research. The data are then codified, conceptualised and categorised. Only in the last stage a 
theory is derived.  
 
5 This is the approach adopted by régulation scholars, which will be discussed in the next section. 
 
6 General substantive theory proceeds only to the extent that the relevant context is included to 
define the scope of the generalisation. This is opposed to high level theory, which is not sensitive 
to context and is applicable to societal contexts widely separated over both time and space 
(Mjøset, 2006). 
 
7 Boyer (2002) points out that the Régulation School has been influenced by different approaches. 
The assumption that full employment and stable growth are the exception rather than the rule is 
taken from heterodox macroeconomics. From the Annales school comes the idea that, if every 
society has the economic context and crises corresponding to its structure, then it is important to 
analyse how the different stages of industrial capitalism affect economic cycles and major crises. 
From law and political science, régulation theory adopts the notion that institutional forms result 
from conflicts among social groups arbitrated by political and legal processes. The interest in long-
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term evolution stems from the Marxist theory, although régulation theory succeeded in freeing 
itself from a dogmatic relationship with Marxism (Nadel, 2002). As far as the antecedents of 
régulation theory are concerned, Maurice Baslé (2002) argues that the American institutionalism 
can be considered, to a certain extent, its precursor, while the role of German institutionalism is 
debatable.   
 
8 Boyer and Saillard (2002) recall that a mode of production can be defined as the social relations 
that govern the production and reproduction of the material conditions that are required for human 
life in society. 
 
9 Identifying regular patterns does not require the exclusion of crises. Indeed, the description of 
accumulation regimes includes their evolution, as well as potential crises (Boyer and Saillard, 
2002).   
 
10 Boyer and Saillard (2002) point out that there are different forms of crises. The first type of 
exogenously triggered crisis refers to shocks ‘from outside’, not originating in the mode of 
régulation. Régulation theory, however, focuses most of its attention on the other two types of 
crises. Endogenous (or cyclical) crises develop without any major modifications to existing 
institutional forms. These episodes derive from within the processes that determine the mode of 
régulation and are minor crises. In contrast, there are periods during which the compatibility of 
institutional forms and the economic dynamics are no longer guaranteed, and structural crises 
occur. These can originate from the mode of régulation or from the accumulation regime. Finally, 
a crisis in the dominant mode of production is the ultimate level of crisis, and it assumes that no 
accumulation regime can emerge. During such a period, poor or catastrophic economic 
performance presents long-term unfavourable tendencies, while the political process of reform is 
blocked or counterproductive.  
 
11 Namely, a combination of collective agreements on wage increases and an oligopolistic 
competition affected by capital concentration. Furthermore, monetary policy was aimed at 
managing credit in the hope of stabilising the accumulation process (Aglietta, 1987).  
 
12 Business systems can be defined as distinctive patterns of economic organisation that vary both 
in their degree and mode of authoritative coordination of economic activities, and in the 
organisation of (and interconnections between) owners, managers, experts, and other employees 
(Whitley, 1999). 
 
13 According to Whitley (1999), it is possible to identify at least three distinct aspects of firms’ 
capabilities and strategies that vary considerably across institutional contexts. These are: the role 
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of workforce skills; the development of collective competence concerned with efficiency or with 
innovation; the extent of flexibility and responsiveness to customer demands. 
 
14 To illustrate this argument, North (1990) argues that the divergences in the economic histories 
of South and North America may in large part be due to the differing initial institutional matrices 
they derived from Spain and Britain, respectively. Therefore, persistent inefficient equilibria may 
result from initial choices.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEMENTARITY 
APPROACH AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE 
FOR ECONOMICS 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Having identified in the previous chapter institutional complementarities as one of 
the factors contributing to explain the observed varieties of capitalism, we now 
discuss in detail the institutional complementarity approach, and its implications for 
economics. To this end, the aim of this chapter is to review the major research, both 
theoretical and empirical, so far carried out in this field. 
The institutional complementarity approach has recently been proposed in the 
economic literature dealing with the importance of institutions in the economy and 
the diversity of capitalisms, in order to capture a part of the stylised facts 
concerning the evolution of contemporary capitalism (Boyer, 2005a). Intuitively, 
the term ‘institutional complementarity’ refers to situations of interdependence 
among institutions implying that the functionality of an institutional form is 
conditioned by other institutions (Höpner, 2005a). 
By redirecting attention from the role played by single institutions, in influencing 
both short- and long-term economic performance, to interaction effects, the 
complementarity hypothesis extends the institutionalist approach. The relevance of 
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analysing the interactions occurring among institutions lies in the fact that, since 
each institution defines a set of constraints, incentives and possibilities determining 
agents’ strategies, the influence of an institution is reinforced when a 
complementary institution is present (Amable, 2000). This enhances the ability of 
actors to achieve their objectives (Deeg, 2007). 
Moreover, institutional complementarity as a tool for institutional analysis 
enables explanation of why there can be a variety of institutional arrangements 
across economies. This approach also helps also to elucidate why sub-optimal (i.e. 
inefficient) institutions can persist in some economies, while ‘better’ ones are viable 
in others (Aoki, 2007). As pointed out in Chapter Two, the existence of 
complementarity makes the notion of varieties of capitalism plausible, as 
complementarity signifies that there are different ways in which institutional 
elements can be combined successfully (Deeg, 2007). 
An important point which has to be taken into account is that the impact of a  
complementarity relationship among institutions is variable in the sense that it 
depends on the general context in which such a relationship is embedded (Boyer, 
2005a). Thus, a substantial theoretical consequence deriving from the notion of 
complementarity is that searching for ‘the one best way’ of organising the economic 
activity is misleading. Institutionally oriented political economy should instead 
focus on the overall design of institutional domains and production regimes 
(Höpner, 2005a). 
The above discussion suggests that institutional complementarities have important 
implications in terms of policy. Arguably, this policy relevance played a part in 
attracting the attention of a number of scholars, despite the relatively recent 
elaboration of the approach. Some studies aimed to analyse the persistent institutional 
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diversity between the United States and Japan, and still more between economies in 
transition (Aoki 1994, 2000, 2001). Other works focused on the United States and the 
European countries (Amable 2000; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Boyer, 2001). 
Although the idea of complementarity is widely accepted among scholars 
engaged in the debate on varieties of capitalism, and the relevance of this concept 
has been demonstrated in various studies, the use of the term ‘institutional 
complementarity’ is far from uniform. Also, scholars are still debating on the 
sources, extent and effects of complementarity, as no widespread consensus has yet 
emerged on the mechanisms through which different domains interact with each 
other and influence the economic performance (Höpner, 2005a). To clarify the 
nature of the mechanisms invoked in different studies, Robert Boyer (2005a) argues 
that it would be useful to survey the available research on institutional 
complementarity. This chapter offers such a review, therefore contributing to fill 
this gap currently existing in the literature. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows: Section 2 discusses the notion of 
institutional complementarity in order to clarify its meaning, and distinguish it from 
other concepts; Section 3 deals with the issue of measuring institutional 
complementarities; Section 4 presents the major theoretical literature; Section 5 
comments on the empirical evidence currently available; finally, Section 6 
recapitulates and draws some concluding remarks. 
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2 THE NOTION OF COMPLEMENTARITY: MEANING, ORIGINS AND 
APPLICATIONS 
 
Complementarity comes from the Latin complementum, meaning ‘that which 
complements’. A number of scientific fields contributed to shape the idea of 
complementarity between elements of systems. In all these research areas, 
complementarity indicates a constellation in which two, or more, elements need to 
be combined to generate a particular outcome. For instance, as Martin Höpner 
(2005a) points out, in Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s Theory of Colours (1810), 
complementary colours are colours that together add up to white light. In sociology 
and law, roles complement each other if someone’s duty is the other one’s right. In 
economics, complementary goods are goods that must be combined to produce a 
particular benefit. At the organisational level complementary elements in firm’s 
strategy increase output if they are combined (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995). 
Since our chief interest is on complementarity relationships among institutions, 
the remainder of the chapter will focus on the research that has been carried out in 
this area. However, it is first necessary to discuss the concept of institutional 
complementarity and its implications. This will be done in the next sub-section.  
 
2.1 The concept of institutional complementarity 
 
In institutional analysis the concept of complementarity refers to situations in which 
interdependence among institutions occurs, so that the functionality of an 
institutional form is conditioned by other institutions. Thus, institutional 
complementarity is a functional category related to the outcome generated by the 
interplay of institutions. More precisely, institutional complementarity implies that 
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the performance of a configuration increases when its elements assume specific 
properties (Höpner, 2005a). Hence, the presence of complementarities reinforces 
the influence of institutions. Since each institution defines a set of constraints, 
incentives and possibilities determining agents’ strategies, this enhances the ability 
of actors to meet their objectives (Amable, 2000; Deeg, 2007).  
In the social science literature, the term ‘complementarity’ was first used to 
describe the interrelations occurring among institutions by Ludwig Lachmann (1970). 
He argues that “forms of complementarity do exist in social life and are conspicuous 
in particular as regards institutions” (p. 7), so that any theory of institutions must be 
concerned with analysing those features of real world institutions that appear to 
display some degree of complementarity. Lachmann believes that the 
complementarity between the various institutions constituting an institutional order 
requires some degree of institutional heterogeneity, so as to guarantee the division of 
functions that must exist for the system to function as a whole. 
Lachmann (1970) focuses on comparing the degree of complementarity denoting 
the elements composing the legal system and the wider institutional order. He 
argues that the legal system is characterised by ‘gapless’ complementarity between 
its elements, in the sense that “a judge cannot refuse to give a decision on a case 
brought to him, on the grounds that he knows of no legal norm to apply to it. He 
always has to find one” (ibid: 76). Conversely, this ‘gapless’ complementarity is 
missing from the wider institutional order. Here, since some institutions require 
each other’s services (like post office and railways or airlines), there is some group 
complementarity. This results from the functional specialisation of individual 
institutions. However, no inter-group complementarity needs to exist and this 
creates gaps in the web of complementarities. 
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By implying that institutional elements can successfully combine in a number of 
different ways, complementarity as a tool for institutional analysis greatly 
contributes to elucidate many stylised facts about the evolution and diversity of 
institutional arrangements – both across and within economies. In particular, 
institutional complementarities explain that most benchmarking experiments do not 
deliver the expected results, since the web of past interdependency between 
institutions hinders the adoption of new ones (Boyer, 2005a). This explains, for 
instance, the difficulties experienced by the former socialist East European 
countries when they tried to adopt and adapt to market mechanisms. In fact, the web 
of past interdependency between labour institutions, credit management and State 
interventions hindered the adoption of the new market-oriented institutions 
(Delorme, 1996; Chavance et al, 1999). The above arguments would seem to 
undermine the shock approach to economic reforms adopted in the former Soviet 
Union while vindicating China’s gradualist approach. In addition, the existence of 
complementarities explains why a sub-optimal overall institutional arrangement can 
persist in an economy, while a better one is viable in other socio-economic systems 
(Aoki, 2007).  
As regards the limitations of the complementarity concept, Höpner (2005b) 
points out that it does not inform on whether complementarity derives from 
similarity or from heterogeneity,1 and does not offer clear predictions in regard to 
institutional change. Moreover, complementarity is an abstract concept that 
describes one possible functional feature of institutional interaction. It follows that 
its sources and consequences need to be specified by empirical research conducted 
on the institutions prevailing in a given space and time. 
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Proximate but different concepts try to capture the interactions occurring 
between two or more institutions. It is then important to clarify and distinguish them 
from the notion of institutional complementarity. A relevant contribution in this 
direction has been offered by Boyer (2005a). He argues that complementarity 
requires the conjunction of two institutions to be Pareto improving compared to the 
performance that would be observed should only one of the two entities be in place. 
Thus, institutions E  and 'E  are complementary if the performance R  resulting 
from their conjunction is superior to the performance of each institution considered 
separately: 
 
( ) ( )EREER >',    and   ( ) ( )'', EREER > .                                                (1)       
 
According to this definition, it is incorrect to regard complementarity as a synonym 
for supermodularity, as the latter is a more demanding criterion, requiring that the 
conjunction of two elements is Pareto improving with respect to any other mix of 
elements.2 Another notion frequently confused with complementarity is 
compatibility. The latter means that two elements can be jointly observed in current 
societies. Proving their complementarity requires assessing the related impact of 
these elements upon a measure of performance (Boyer, 2005a).3 A strengthening of 
the concept of complementarity (and supermodularity) is the notion of hierarchy: it 
implies causality between two entities, in the sense that an entity absolutely needs 
the presence of another entity in order to be sustainable or viable. Coherence is 
another notion still and means that two institutions can easily coexist since the 
fitness of each institution is improved by the existence of the other.4 Related to 
coherence is institutional isomorphism, occurring when two entities are equivalent 
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according to a general common principle that defines a relation of equivalence. The 
concept of clustering, then, is purely descriptive, as it describes the fact that two or 
several institutions are frequently observed simultaneously when some systematic 
comparisons are carried over. Finally, the notion of co-evolution implies that the 
joint occurrence of two institutions might be the unintended outcome of a selection 
process, or a learning mechanism, operating via the succession of stochastic shocks 
and possibly major events such as crises. 
The general point emerging from the discussion of the above concepts is the 
various forms of institutional linkages must be analysed distinct from one another 
(Deeg, 2007). Aoki (2007) points out that in linked games agents typically 
coordinate their individual strategic choices across domains, and generate a single 
institution therein. Instead, in the case of institutional complementarities, agents 
regard (even unconsciously) an institution prevailing in a certain domain as a 
parameter, and based on this choose strategies in their own domains. In these cases, 
Aoki argues, the institutions that evolve in each domain may become 
interdependent and mutually reinforcing (i.e. complementary). These mutually 
reinforcing effects of compatible incentive structures emerging in different sub-
systems of an economy are considered by Richard Deeg (2007) as a particular form 
of complementarity, which he calls synergy.5 A second type of complementarity, in 
the form supplementarity, occurs instead when an institution makes up for the 
deficiencies of another one, thus increasing the returns that actors derive from the 
first institution (Crouch 2005a, 2005b; Deeg, 2007). 
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3 DETECTING INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEMENTARITIES 
 
Investigating institutional complementarities is essentially an empirical issue; 
however, this is not an easy task, since the detection of complementarity depends 
upon a number of issues. First, it is closely related to the theory of 
complementarities that is adopted, as this specifies the mechanisms actually 
creating complementarity. Then, since complementarity cannot be measured 
directly, it is necessary to rely on causal inference. To claim the existence of a 
complementarity relation, it is necessary to put forward the counterfactual argument 
that in the absence of the presumed complementary institution, the returns to actors 
(or efficiency gains) would, ceteris paribus, be lower (Deeg, 2007). 
A further relevant issue in the empirical investigation of institutional 
complementarities regards the level of analysis that is chosen. Complementarities 
operate at different levels, going from the macroeconomy to individual 
organisations, and small groups of actors operating in separate domains.6 By and 
large, empirical studies have so far attempted to measure complementarities at the 
macro level. Although these are noteworthy efforts, they cannot be regarded 
completely satisfactory for a number of reasons (Deeg, 2007). 
First, some studies (e.g. Paunescu and Schneider, 2004; Castles et al, 2006) 
show that several of the institutions examined, for instance in works as Peter Hall 
and Daniel Gingerich (2004), have changed quite substantially in several advanced 
economies. According to the varieties of capitalism theory of complementarities, 
this change should result in declining performance. However, there is no evidence 
supporting this claim. Secondly, macro level complementarities might be sustained 
over time by institutional changes occurring at the micro level. The macro approach 
generally cannot account for these possible changes. Nor can it capture whether 
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existing microeconomic institutions have been replaced by new ones, still 
generating macro complementarities. A further gap in the macro approach concerns 
the knowledge about sectoral differences in complementarity. Indeed, within an 
economy some sectors may gain from complementarities while others may not. The 
macro level approach informs us about the sum of complementarities across all 
firms/sectors, not their distribution (Deeg, 2007). 
Scholars supporting the usefulness of micro level investigations argue in favour 
of sectoral analysis, as there is substantial evidence showing that patterns of sectoral 
organisation and institutions often deviate from national patterns (Casper and 
Whitley, 2004; Crouch 2005b; Deeg, 2007).7 A further advantage of the micro-based 
approach is that it is potentially more tractable to assess the complementarities 
generated by a set of institutions for specific actors (Deeg and Jackson, 2007). In this 
context, firms become the evident candidate, even though other collective actors 
could also be the focus of study (Deeg, 2007). The work by Paul Milgrom and John 
Roberts (1995) provided a theoretical basis for explaining the existence of firm level 
complementarities. However, no methods for quantifying the strength of such 
complementarities were suggested. One approach to the quantitative estimation of 
firm specific complementarities is regression analysis between firm level 
performance and institutional variables. This is the methodology that is adopted in 
the empirical chapters of this thesis (namely, Chapter Six and Seven). 
Defining an appropriate measure of performance is a major issue arising in the 
detection of complementarities (Schmidt and Hackethal, 2002; Boyer, 2005a), since 
it is possible to use disparate performance indicators at different levels of the 
economy. For instance, productivity gains, innovation (e.g. patents) or GDP growth 
are possible indicators for macro level analysis. On the other hand, at the micro 
70 
level (thus for instance at firm or sectoral level), profitability, revenue growth, and 
similar measures of performance are all suitable indicators (Deeg, 2007). 
The choice of an appropriate performance indicator is closely related to the issue 
of identifying the methodology that best suits the case under investigation. Indeed, 
depending upon both the level of complementarity that the researched aims to 
measure and the definition of complementarity adopted, some methods may present 
certain advantages over others. The extant literature, discussed in the next sections, 
has used a wide range of methodologies, ranging from game-theoretic models, to 
case studies, econometric analysis, and comparative methods. This variety of 
methodologies reflects the complexity of the complementarity concept. 
 
4 THE THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONAL 
COMPLEMENTARITIES 
 
Analytical formalisations of the institutional complementarity hypothesis are 
relatively recent. One of the earliest contributions can be traced back to Ugo Pagano 
(1991, 1992, 1993) and was further developed in Ugo Pagano and Robert Rowthorn 
(1994). They proposed a model analysing property rights and the nature of 
technology. Although the authors use the term ‘organisational equilibrium’, this is 
equivalent to the notion of institutional complementarity (Aoki, 2001). An 
organisational equilibrium occurs when an institution of production is defined by a 
system of property rights, P, and a technology, T, such that T is the technology that 
maximises profits under the property rights system P, and P is the property rights 
system that maximises ownership rent given the structure of resources T employed in 
the firm. Thus, the conditions for the existence of an organisational equilibrium can 
be interpreted as a Nash equilibrium. Since agency costs impede the achievement of 
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any first best solution, efficiency can only refer to second best outcomes. This partial 
efficiency may clearly prevent the achievement of overall efficiency. For the latter 
to be realised, a change of organisational equilibrium would be needed.8 However, 
the self-enforcing characteristics of an institution may hold despite its inefficiency. 
Thus, even sub-optimal organisational equilibria can persist over time. Furthermore, 
Pagano and Rowthorn (1994) show that multiple organisational equilibria exist. 
These equilibria are historically dependent and self-sustaining since they reproduce 
a specific initial set of property rights or technological conditions (Pagano, 1993). 
This suggests that “history matters in the sense that organisational equilibria may 
depend on initial conditions having self-generating and self-reinforcing properties 
which cause their institutional stability. Or, in other words, past history rather than 
ahistorical efficiency may determine which particular organisational equilibrium 
exists” (Pagano, 1993, p. 94). 
The self-enforcing interactions between property rights and technology discussed 
above, may help to explain the diversity of production institutions that is observed 
in socio-economic systems – even when the analysis is restricted to similarly 
advanced capitalist economies. This diversity in prevailing ownership structures 
may originate from context-specific institutional shocks that give rise to different 
self-enforcing relations between property rights and technology, and generate new 
self-sustaining ownership systems (Pagano, 1993; Pagano and Rowthorn, 1994). 
Pagano (1993) and Pagano and Rowthorn (1994) remark that their analysis offers 
an argument in favour of policies aiming to extend democracy to economic life. 
Indeed, hierarchical organisations where capital owners and managers retain all the 
rights may be institutionally stable, but inefficient. In such a case, economic 
democracy would be more efficient on purely economic grounds. However, the self-
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sustaining characteristics of capitalist institutions (namely, easy monitoring of 
workers, and a tendency to under-invest in both firm-specific and general human 
skills) may impede the achievement of this organisational equilibrium. Therefore, a 
policy active in sustaining economic democracy would be desirable.  
A further development of the model proposed by Pagano (1993) and Pagano and 
Rowthorn (1994) has been offered by Ugo Pagano and Maria Alessandra Rossi 
(2004). They analysed a case of institutional complementarity between the 
development of individual capabilities and intellectual property. According to the 
Grossman-Hart-Moore framework, the nature of technology available to a society at 
any given point of time determines the efficient property rights structure.9 However, 
Pagano and Rossi (2004) contend that when transaction costs are present, property 
rights cannot be attributed to the ‘efficient owner’. In this scenario the logic is 
reversed: the owners of intellectual property rights tend to develop more capabilities 
in the production of new intellectual property rights.  
Thus, the existing allocation of property rights over intellectual assets may 
persistently influence the direction of technological development. As a result, once 
a particular property rights system is in place, the choice of technology will 
reinforce the convenience of keeping the initial ownership system in place, rather 
than upsetting it. This occurs due to the self-reinforcing properties of the possible 
equilibria. A major implication is that some individuals may benefit from situations 
where an initial distribution of rights over initial assets favours the realisation of 
specific investments. In turn this reinforces their convenience to maintain that 
ownership system. In contrast, other individuals may be trapped in situations where 
the lack of property rights diminishes the convenience to undertake specific 
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investments, and the lack of investments diminishes the convenience to acquire 
rights over intellectual and physical assets (Pagano and Rossi, 2004). 
A general model of institutional complementarity has been proposed by Aoki 
(2001). He argues that the relationships among various market governance 
mechanisms in one economy, at one point in time, may be complementary in the 
sense that “the effectiveness (or the presence) of one exchange (property rights) 
governance mechanism can be reinforced, either directly or indirectly, by the 
presence of a particular mechanism in the same or embedding domain” (ibid: 87). 
Aoki shows that in the presence of synchronic institutional complementarities the 
prevailing institutional arrangements are not necessarily Pareto improving, as they 
may be Pareto sub-optimal, as well as Pareto non-rankable.10 This is so because 
institutional complementarity is a dynamic approach, admitting multiple equilibria 
(Pagano and Rowthorn, 1994; Schmidt and Hackethal, 2002). 
Aoki’s model draws on the theory of supermodular games developed by Donald 
Topkis (1978, 1998) and Milgrom and Roberts (1980). It includes two domains, α  
and β , that do not directly interact, two sets of agents, µ  and σ , and two payoff 
functions, u  and v .11 The model assumes that an institution present in one domain 
will exogenously influence the outcome achieved in the other domain by changing 
its institutional environment. In domain α  agents need to choose an endogenous 
rule from either #ϑ  or ##ϑ , while in domain β  agents choose a rule from either *λ  
or **λ . In each domain a rule becomes institutionalised when agents implement it as 
an equilibrium choice. The following conditions are also assumed to hold for all i  
and j : 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )**##**#*##*# ;;;; λϑλϑλϑλϑ uuuu −≥− 12;                                      (2) 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )#*#**##*##** ;;;; ϑλϑλϑλϑλ vvvv −≥− 13.             (3) 
 
Given this set-up, Aoki (2001) argues that, if for the agents participating in one or 
both domains, the payoff deriving from one rule is not strictly greater than the 
payoff associated to the other rule – regardless of the rule that is chosen in the other 
domain – (i.e. no rule dominates) then in each domain agents need to take into 
account what rule is institutionalised in the other.14 Therefore, there are two Nash 
equilibria in pure strategies, ( )*# ;λϑ  and ( )**## ;λϑ . These imply that #ϑ  and *λ , as 
well as ##ϑ  and **λ , complement each other. 
Beside synchronic complementarities Aoki (2001, 2007) also analyses 
diachronic institutional complementarities, which occur from the dynamic 
interaction among complementary domains. In this case the attention is centred on 
the effect produced by a parametric change – such as a technological innovation, a 
new statutory law, or a policy reform – on the game forms of complementary 
domains. The dynamic version of the concept of static institutional complementarity 
has been formulated by Milgrom et al. (1991) in the ‘momentum theorem’. One 
version of it holds that “even if the initial level of human competence in domain X 
that is conducive to the support of potential institution x’ is low, the presence of 
complementary institutions in other domains may amplify the impact of a policy 
intended to induce x’, so that, once momentum is initiated, x’ may gradually evolve as 
a viable institution” (Aoki, 2001, pp. 267-269).  
Another possible version of the ‘momentum theorem’ suggested by Aoki (2007) 
is as follows. Assume that changes in the parameters of a game form (e.g. the 
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introduction of a new public policy, a change in legal rule, the accumulation of 
competence etc.) occur in a domain. However, their initial impact in isolation is too 
small. Assume now that similar parametric changes also occur in a complementary 
domain. Then, although an institutional change may not immediately occur in either 
domain, if parametric changes are sustained subsequently in both domains, their 
cumulative impact on the strategic choices that are endogenous to each domain, 
combined with the mutually reinforcing impact of evolving strategic choices across 
domains, can eventually be conducive to the co-evolution of new institutions in 
both domains.  
Institutional complementarities in their dynamic version are, thus, a possible 
mechanism of endogenous institutional change. They capture the role of polity in 
the process of institutional change. The latter can take place only in a gradual way 
and through interactions with changes occurring elsewhere, sometimes producing 
an unintended institutional outcome (Aoki, 2007). That the complementarity theory 
is also a theory of institutional change is a view shared by Hall and Soskice (2001). 
They argue that nations with a particular coordination mechanism in one sphere of 
the economy should develop complementary practices also in other spheres, as this 
would enable reaching an equilibrium point with maximum gains. Nonetheless, 
Deeg (2007) points out that although the concept of complementarity has been 
increasingly used in explanations of institutions’ resistance to change, and of why 
introducing new institutions into a system can produce unintended effects or failure 
to attain the planned outcome, institutional change does happen. In his view, this 
means that, given the existence of complementarities, the process of change must be 
shaped in some way by them. So that, a well developed theory of complementarity 
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should also be able to generate predictions about patterns of institutional change in 
national economies. 
Werner Hölzl (2006) claims that while game-theoretic models of institutional 
complementarity are appropriate for the analysis of micro level institutional 
complementarities, their macro level implications are better illustrated with 
complex system models. In his view such models capture the uncertainty 
characterising the functional relationships between elements. Hölzl (2006) suggests 
that Stuart Kauffman’s (1993) NK model would be a better way of formalising 
complementarity, since this would allow to take into account the structure of 
interdependence between elements of a complex system.15 
By analysing a complex decision space with high uncertainty about 
interdependencies at the macro level, the NK model well reflects the problem that is 
faced by economic actors and policy makers within the system. Moreover, in this 
model the local optimum that is reached depends on the starting position, and the 
achievement of a local optimum prevents agents from exploring other points. These 
features enable showing that the existence of complementarity relations is 
conducive to path-dependence and lock-in. Therefore, the non-convergence 
hypothesis of economic systems finds a theoretical foundation in the institutional 
complementarity theory (Hölzl, 2006). 
Using a NK model to represent financial systems and analyse the issue of their 
convergence and non-convergence, Hölzl (2006) shows that there are three local 
optima: bank-based system, market-based system, and network-based system. A 
key property of the NK model is that the number of local equilibria is positively 
related both to the number of elements N and the interdependence parameter K. 
This suggests that, if financial systems are complex systems with a number of 
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institutions that exhibit complementarity, more than one stable constellation should 
be observed.  
 
5 THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON INSTITUTIONAL 
COMPLEMENTARITIES 
 
The analytical framework provided by the institutional complementarity theory has 
been applied across a wide range of institutional spheres and levels. The discovery 
of complementarity has major implications, both theoretical and practical: it 
suggests that looking only at the impact of isolated institutions may be misleading, 
and brings implications for institutional change, as well as for policy reform. 
Empirical studies on models of capitalism focus on interaction effects among 
institutions within production regimes. Corporate governance and industrial relations 
are of these sets of interacting production regime institutions. In this field of 
empirical analysis, Aoki (1994) explores, by means of a game-theoretic model, the 
way in which a conspicuous presence of partnership/team elements in the internal 
structure of the firm modifies the nature of the hierarchical control by stockholders.16 
More precisely, the aim of his work is to unravel in the Japanese context the 
complementary relationship characterising contingent company monitoring by main 
banks and team-oriented lifetime employment (Aoki, 1994, 2000). 
Aoki (1994) designs a model of governance structure which may be able to 
effectively control the free-riding problem in team production in a second-best 
manner.17 The second-best solution is achieved by designing a nexus of contracts 
(T-nexus, i.e. team-controlling) among the workers (team members), the manager (a 
quasi-member of the team), general investors and an intermediary monitoring agent 
(the main bank). This nexus specifies ex-ante the rights to ex-post control of the 
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team output between the internal manager and the monitoring agent, contingent 
upon the output state.18 The T-nexus of contracts combines the feature of sharing 
among team members in the upper output region, that of income insurance in the 
intermediate rescue region, and that of penalties in the lowest output region, where 
the monitor liquidates the firm and each internal member suffers a dead-weight loss. 
By using a method of comparative static analysis due to Meyer et al. (1992), 
Aoki shows that the derived corporate governance cannot be introduced or 
maintained in either a piecemeal or an autonomous way. Its effectiveness must be 
supported by complementary institutional arrangements. In the context of the 
Japanese economy, the co-emergence of the main bank system, having the role of 
unique monitoring agent, and the imperfect labour market in the high growth period 
of the Japanese economy was not accidental.19 In fact, these arrangements realised a 
system of complementary institutions that are effective in controlling internal moral 
hazard problems, thus enhancing the productivity of team-oriented production. 
More precisely, the emergence of the main bank system in Japan was related to the 
strong team nature characterising the internal organisation of the Japanese firm. On 
the other hand, team oriented organisations were incentive wise supported by the 
main bank system and the imperfect labour market.20 There were mutually 
reinforcing effects.  
Amable et al. (2005) argue that a relevant field of applicability of the 
institutional complementarity theory concerns the analysis of industrial relations, 
since this approach allows a theoretically grounded interpretation of the persistent 
diversity of industrial relations models. The authors propose a stylised model of an 
economy with two strategic actors, a labour union and firm’s management, whose 
long-term objectives are the discounted sum of wages and profits, respectively.21 A 
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taxonomy of four different types of industrial relations is then identified according 
to the union’s relative strength and the type of strategy followed by each side, under 
the influence of external creditors.22 This taxonomy is then interpreted in terms of 
the institutional complementarity approach of which, according to these authors, 
two definitions can be conceived. In a first meaning, close to Boyer’s (2005a) 
definition (presented in sub-section 2.1), two institutional forms are complementary 
when they push the economy towards a local optimum. Therefore, if a firm’s 
survival probability is chosen as a measure of performance, then strong and 
influential financial markets are complementary to a weak union. On the other 
hand, less influential financial markets are complementary to cooperative relations 
between union and management. In fact, both configurations lead to a higher 
survival probability for the firm. With respect to the second definition – close to 
Aoki’s (2001) conceptualisation – this refers to the concept of dynamic stability and 
identifies a complementary relation when the existence of one institution reinforces 
the existence of the other, without the need to refer to a concept of systemic 
performance. Given that in this definition the focus is on dynamic stability, weak 
financial markets are once again complementary to cooperative strategies, since 
strong financial markets have a destabilising effect. 
Antonio Nicita and Ugo Pagano (2004) apply the concept of institutional 
complementarity to the relationship intervening between corporate governance and 
corporate finance. The authors explain the emergence and persistence of diversity in 
corporate models in terms of the emergence of institutional complementarities 
between the technological structure of the firm and its financial structure. They 
argue that the presence of institutional complementarities among corporate 
governance domains pushes towards self-reinforcing (unique or multiple) equilibria 
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shaped by local historical conditions. Then, Nicita and Pagano (2004) apply the 
notion of institutional complementarity in a model analysing the trade-off between 
equity and debt financing in corporate governance. It is shown that, while 
Williamson’s (1988) transaction costs approach considers the choices in the 
financial domain as an endogenous adaptation to a given technological domain, an 
opposite direction of causality may also hold: technological choices may be an 
endogenous adaptation to given financial choices. Moreover, when both the 
directions of causality hold, some self-enforcing equilibria across the two domains 
can prevail. The authors conclude that this result provides some insights against the 
tendency towards convergence proposed by corporate governance models. 
Andreas Hackethal and Reinhard Schmidt (2000) analyse cross-country 
differences in financial systems by making use of the complementarity concept. In 
their work two elements of a system are complementary if there is potential for a 
higher value of one element to increase the marginal value contribution of the other 
element. If this potential is fully exploited, a system can be regarded as coherent. So 
that, there can be more than one coherent system comprising the same set of 
complementary elements, but with clearly distinct values of these elements. Real-
world financial systems are considered by Hackethal and Schmidt (2000) as 
consisting of three sub-systems: enterprise financing, corporate governance, and 
corporate strategy. The paper shows that: each of the three sub-systems is composed 
of complementary elements; the sub-systems are complementary to one another, and 
they are largely coherent in the German, British and United States financial systems. 
Schmidt and Hackethal (2002) analyse the German, British and French financial 
systems over the years 1980-1998 and find few, if any, signs of convergence at a 
fundamental or structural level. In particular, the German financial system still 
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appears to be bank-dominated, while the British system is capital market-
dominated. Moreover, during the period investigated, the French system underwent 
the most far-reaching changes, hence today’s difficulty in classifying it. The authors 
explain these findings in terms of strong path dependencies, which are an outgrowth 
of relationships of complementarity between the individual system components. 
Along a similar research line, Jean-Paul Pollin and Anne-Gaël Vaubourg (2005) 
use the concept of institutional complementarity to address the convergence issue of 
financial structures and European corporate governance systems towards a unique 
model. Resorting to theoretical arguments, as well as to empirical evidence, these 
scholars argue that a move towards convergence is undermined by the diversity of 
European governance systems and by the existence of institutional complementarities. 
More precisely, institutional complementarities suggest that persistence insures the 
coherence of each national corporate governance system. Therefore, trying to build 
a unique corporate governance space in Europe could be harmful for the 
performance of European economies (Pollin and Vaubourg, 2005). 
Donatella Gatti (2000) develops a theoretical analysis of training regimes as 
outcomes of a complementarity between firm and non-firm institutional factors, 
determining both firms’ and workers’ incentives as regards skills. This scholar 
distinguishes between firm specific and standardised training, and then argues that 
knowledge embeddedness within firms determines firms’ preferences concerning 
training. Labour market institutionalisation provides instead the framework for 
workers’ preferences. Given this set-up, an incentive compatibility problem 
between firms and workers arises. The former prefer firm specific training, which 
allows them to prevent external poaching. In contrast, the latter prefer standardised 
training, which enables them to transfer their skills from firm to firm. Applying a 
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criterion of coherence between firms’ and workers’ incentives, Gatti (2000) 
identifies two configurations of institutional complementarities. The first one 
supports a standardised training regime, and occurs between individual knowledge 
within firms and highly institutionalised labour markets. The second one reflects a 
firm specific training scheme and emerges between collective knowledge and 
loosely institutionalised labour markets. 
Basili et al. (2004) proposed a principal-agent model to investigate the 
conditions which make the use of trust beneficial for the parties involved in a 
transaction. The authors show that since trust generates costs, the willingness to 
reciprocate does not suffice by itself to resort to trust. Instead, the presence of 
complementary institutions induces cooperation between individuals. Hence, 
institutional complementarities are a mechanism to foster the choice of trust (rather 
than contracts) in the governance of transactions. 
In the analysis of welfare regimes, Francesca Bettio and Janneke Plantenga 
(2004) investigate the different social and economic consequences generated by the 
different models of care pursued by European countries. The basic argument 
underlying this work is that since there is a strong link between a country’s care 
system and the female labour market, different care strategies generate different 
incentive structures for the economic organisation of the family. Analysing data on 
female labour participation, Bettio and Plantenga (2004) find empirical evidence 
confirming the intuition that, by impacting on the working-time regime of the 
family, a care regime with well developed formal care strategies, as the one 
characterising the Nordic countries, is complementary to a labour market structure 
in which women have an active role.23 
83 
Amable and Gatti (2006) investigate the interlinks between product and labour 
market reforms by using a dynamic efficiency wage model, where firms compete 
according to monopolistic competition and redundancy payments are paid to laid-
off workers. Previous literature on this topic focused on the (supposed) benefits 
from a joint deregulation in both product and labour markets. In contrast, this work 
explains that market regulation may yield a positive impact on aggregate 
employment performance. The model shows that product market deregulation 
yields an implicit labour reform. In fact, firms respond to productivity shocks by 
adjusting employment. Since this has an adverse effect on workers’ incentives, 
higher real wages follow. This may lead to aggregate employment losses. Hence, to 
offset the possible detrimental effects of a more intense labour turnover generated 
by deregulation of the product market, policies increasing job security may be 
necessary. The analysis of policy complementarity conducted by Amable and Gatti 
(2006) shows that a complementarity effect may emerge between regulations in 
both product and labour markets, both interacting to ensure more stable labour 
relations. Conversely, joint deregulation policies have conflicting effects on 
aggregate employment. The authors suggest that this could explain why European 
countries that engaged in large-scale deregulation reforms have not experienced the 
expected substantial increases in aggregate employment levels.   
In the strategic management literature Choi et al. (2008) analyse the impact of 
knowledge management (KM) strategies on organisational performance by drawing 
on the framework of complementarity analysis adopted in economics. Management 
research suggest that KM strategies can be categorised according to the focus and 
source dimensions. In the focus dimension it is possible to have: explicit-oriented 
strategies, attempting to increase organisational efficiency by codifying and re-
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using knowledge mainly through IT; tacit-oriented strategies, which enable 
transmission of tacit knowledge through person-to-person contact and socialisation. 
Passing to the source dimension, KM strategies can be classified as internal- and 
external-oriented. The first focuses on generating and sharing knowledge within the 
firm. The second, instead, attempts to bring knowledge into the firm from outside 
sources. The motivation of Choi et al.’s (2008) work is grounded on the 
consideration that it is still not well understood how different KM strategies affect 
organisational performance. To shed light on this issue, the authors analyse data 
gathered from 115 Korean firms through a questionnaire-based survey. They find a 
complementarity relationship between external-oriented and internal-oriented 
knowledge management strategies. Indeed, implementing both strategies would 
allow firms to achieve higher performance than if they adopted any one of them. 
The study also finds complementarity between KM focus and KM source, in the 
sense that organisational performance is improved by focusing on both tacit-
internal-oriented strategy and explicit-external-oriented strategy.  
In regard to quantitative empirical research on the issue of institutional 
complementarities, only a few studies have been so far proposed. Among these, 
Peter Hall and Robert Franzese (1998) deal with the relationship between monetary 
policy institutions and wage coordination.24 They use data covering OECD 
countries for the period 1955-90, and find that where wage bargaining is more 
coordinated, the signalling process between the bank and economic actors is likely 
to be more effective. Thus, increasing the independence of the central bank can 
lower the long-run inflation rate at relatively low employment costs. In contrast, 
where wage bargaining is less coordinated, increases in central bank independence 
may lower inflation rate only at the cost of substantially higher unemployment 
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rates. Thus, it is possible to conclude that an independent central bank is 
complementary to coordination in wage bargaining.25 
Christopher Way (2000) analyses the effects of central bank organisation and 
government partisanship on macroeconomic outcomes. He argues that since the 
ability of governments to influence the macroeconomy varies with central bank 
organisation, the effectiveness of partisan policies varies as well. Likewise, the 
benefits and costs of having an independent central bank hinge on a country’s 
political climate. The results of the econometric investigation, carried out on pooled 
time series data covering 16 countries over the years from 1961 to 1991, show that 
the effects of granting independence to a central bank are conditional on the 
partisanship of government. In fact, independent central banks produce sharply 
lower inflation rates where Left cabinets are prevalent, but at the cost of increasing 
unemployment. Instead, where Right governments prevail, increasing central bank 
autonomy produces little benefit in reduced inflation, but contributes to lower 
unemployment.  
Ekkehard Ernst (2003) analyses the interrelations that may exist between 
institutional arrangements on financial and labour markets, and the effect these may 
produce on macroeconomic outcomes. The study uses data on output growth in 27 
manufacturing industries in 19 OECD countries over the period 1979-1995. The 
empirical evidence provides strong support in favour of the hypothesis of 
institutional complementarities between specific configurations of financial and 
industrial relations. These explain a relevant part of within industry variation among 
countries.26 More specifically, there is evidence that concentrated ownership 
structures and unionised industrial relations are complementary in promoting 
growth in industries with high skill levels, while individually these characteristics 
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fail to produce the necessary incentives for investment. Moreover, concentration in 
ownership structures and employment protection are favourable to growth in bank 
financed industries. Finally, ownership dispersion and labour market flexibility 
foster growth in equity financed industries. An important implication of these 
results is that policy modifications intervening in a market must offer incentives in 
line with those provided by institutional arrangements prevailing in other markets. 
In the varieties of capitalism literature, Hall and Gingerich (2004) test the 
hypothesis that institutional complementarities occur across sub-spheres of the 
macroeconomy.27 By distinguishing the structure of labour relations and corporate 
governance prevailing in coordinated market economies and liberal market 
economies, the authors argue that if the institutionalised practices typical of each of 
these two typologies are complementary, then they should exert an impact on 
economic growth.28 To test their institutional complementarity hypothesis, Hall and 
Gingerich (2004) employ multiplicative interaction effects between variables 
proxying for institutions operating in the spheres of corporate governance and 
labour relations. Since these interaction terms are found to significantly exert a 
positive impact on growth, the authors conclude that this is empirical evidence in 
favour of the existence of complementarities between the two spheres considered. 
According to Höpner (2005a), both Ernst (2003) and Hall and Gingerich (2004) 
go beyond arguments of institutional clustering and test whether the outcomes 
produced by coherent configurations is superior to the effects generated by 
incoherent ones. This implies that complementarity results from coherence. Indeed,  
a first indication of complementarity between particular institutions of corporate 
governance and industrial relations is provided by international comparisons 
showing that countries with organised labour market institutions tend to have a high 
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degree of corporate governance organisation and vice versa. However, this sort of 
institutional clustering is more an indication of compatibility, rather than a proof of 
complementarity. 
 
6 CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this chapter has been to review the complementarity approach, as a tool 
for institutional analysis. Recognising the existence of interaction effects among 
institutions has a number of implications. A first one is that, since institutions define 
constraints, incentives and possibilities determining agents’ strategies, the presence 
of complementarity among institutions can enhance the ability of actors to 
accomplish their purposes (Deeg, 2007). Furthermore, and more importantly, the 
self-enforcing equilibria generated by the presence of institutional 
complementarities contribute to explain the persistent variety of institutional 
arrangements across economies. In this sense, it is possible to argue that the concept 
of institutional complementarity makes the notion of distinct models of capitalism 
plausible, since complementarity entails that there are a number of different ways to 
combine institutional elements successfully (Aoki, 2007; Deeg, 2007). A substantial 
theoretical consequence deriving from the notion of institutional complementarity is 
that the search for ‘one best way’ of organising the economic activity becomes 
misleading. Rather, institutionally oriented research has to focus on the overall 
design of institutional domains and production regimes.  
The theoretical studies proposed on the institutional complementarity issue (e.g. 
Pagano and Rowthorn, 1994; Aoki, 2001; 2007), as well as the available empirical 
research, clearly suggest that there is substantial evidence showing that 
complementarities deeply impact on economic performance at various levels. These 
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range from the macroeconomy, to individual organisations, and small groups of 
actors operating in different domains (Aoki, 1994; Hall and Franzese, 1998; Gatti, 
2000; Way, 2000; Schmidt and Hackethal, 2002; Hall and Gingerich, 2004, among 
others). This implies that taking into account the issue of institutional 
complementarity has consequences not only for research in economics, but also in 
terms of policy recommendations. It becomes, indeed, prominent to study the 
effects of interacting institutions, rather than simply recognising that institutions 
matter. As far as policy reform is concerned, the main message is that any initiative 
aimed at introducing a structural reform should consider the coherence and logic of 
the whole institutional structure, since the web of past interdependencies among 
institutions is likely to hinder the effective adoption of new ones. This implies that 
benchmarking in institutional reform is a dangerous experiment. 
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NOTES 
 
1 Although Lachmann (1970) stresses that complementarity requires some heterogeneity, he does 
not deny the need for some homogeneity in other respects. 
 
2 Nevertheless, both complementarity and supermodularity require the choice of a performance 
criterion and the ability to compare various systems in order to check the basic property (Boyer, 2005a). 
 
3 More precisely, need first to compute the equilibria when the two institutions are considered 
separately. Second, it is necessary to compute the new equilibrium when both institutions are 
considered simultaneously. Third, a welfare function has to be adopted in order to compare the 
equilibria, and the two institutions will be said complementary if their joint presence delivers a 
better outcome than each of the separate institutions. 
 
4 In this sense, coherence is more than compatibility. However, it is less than complementarity, as 
coherence does not refer to the joint performance of institutions. 
 
5 Regarding the earlier history of the synergy concept, the American sociologist Lester Frank 
Ward (1903) defined it as ‘the systematic and organic working together of the antithetical forces of 
nature’ (p. 171). This meaning is very close to that given to the term ‘symbiosis’ by Heinrich 
Anton de Bary, a German mycologist, whom defined it, in his 1879 monograph Die Erscheinung 
der Symbios, as ‘the living together of unlike organisms’. Igor Ansoff’s (1965) work on corporate 
strategy conceptualises synergy as the occurrence of joint effects of fit between the firm and its 
new product-market entries. Synergy effects can produce a combined return on the firm’s 
resources greater than the sum of its parts through increased volume of sales revenue, decreased 
operating costs, or decreased investment requirements. 
 
6 The gains generated by some forms of complementarity can be expected to be strong for a 
narrow group of actors, and to produce weaker benefits for the economy as a whole (Hall and 
Gingerich, 2004; Deeg, 2007). 
 
7 Despite this evidence, however, much of the comparative institutional political economy 
literature still downplays sectoral variations in favour of national differences (Deeg, 2007). 
 
8 This inefficiency is linked to factor substitution: the most efficient potential owners are 
substituted by the least efficient potential owners because, ceteris paribus, the latter are cheaper 
than the former when they do not own the firm (Pagano and Rowthorn, 1994). 
 
9 Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990) and Hart (1995) developed the property 
rights approach to organisations. This approach focuses on the importance of asset ownership for 
the investments made in bilateral trade relationships.  
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10 This conclusion distinguishes the work of Pagano (1993), Pagano and Rowthorn (1994), Aoki 
(2001, 2007) and Pagano and Rossi (2004) from Boyer (2005a), who (as discussed in sub-section 
2.1) claims that complementarity leads to a Pareto improved institutional performance. 
 
11 All agents in each domain have an identical payoff function defined on their own binary choice sets. 
 
12 Inequality (2) implies that the incremental benefit from choosing #ϑ  rather than ##ϑ , 
increases in domain α  for all the players when the institutional environment *λ  rather than **λ  
prevails in domain β . Then, #ϑ and *λ  complement each other. 
 
13 Inequality (3) implies that the incremental benefit from choosing **λ  rather than *λ , increases 
in domain β  for all the players when ##ϑ  rather than #ϑ prevails in domain α . Then, **λ and 
##ϑ  complement each other. 
 
14 It is worth remarking that conditions (2) and (3) do not exclude the possibility that for the 
agents participating in one or both domains, the payoff associated with one rule strictly dominates 
the payoff from the other rule, regardless of the rule that is chosen in the other domain. Aoki 
argues that if a similar situation does occur, then the preferred rule will be implemented 
autonomously in each domain. In this case, the equilibrium of the system, and thus the prevailing 
institutional arrangement, is determined by preference (technology). 
 
15 Kaufmann’s (1993) NK model, originally developed for the study of biological evolution of 
complex organisms, uses computer simulations to model problems of evolutionary adaptation in 
fitness landscapes. The model has been subsequently applied in evolutionary economics to analyse 
a number of issues, such as those related to firm strategy (e.g. Levinthal, 1997; Riksin, 2000) and 
production technologies (Kaufmann et al, 2000). 
 
16 In the analysis, Aoki (1994) follows Holmstrom’s (1982) approach in allowing for an external 
agent only partially able to monitor. Thus, rather than being able to observe the individual actions 
of team members, it is assumed that the principal can only monitor the joint outcome of team 
members and can exercise the threat of a severe penalty against an underperforming team. 
 
17 This is a major difference with Holmstrom’s (1982) work, which presents a first-best solution. 
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18 According to Aoki (1994), the T-nexus defines a less hierarchical control structure of the firm 
than the conventional principal-agent model of the firm. Since this governance scheme is 
contingent on the output state, Aoki calls it contingent governance. 
 
19 The model presented by Aoki (1994) provides insights into the workings of the Japanese main 
bank system. Between the 1950s and 1970s, when the main bank system was having its heyday, 
most Japanese corporations relied on bank borrowing as their major external funding source. Firms 
developed diversified debt relationships with multiple banks, but maintained a unique long-term 
relationship with single commercial banks. These banks, called main banks, not only supplied the 
largest share of credit to their client firms, but also assumed exclusive responsibility for 
monitoring them. Stylised facts regarding the ex post monitoring role of the main bank are 
strikingly similar to the function of the monitor in the model. 
 
20 Regarding the evolution of the contingent governance structure in Japan, Aoki (1994) argues 
that the Japanese firm has developed a type of internal organisation which facilitates lateral 
coordination among different task units on the basis of information sharing, joint responsibilities 
and help. One possible consequence of the development of such an internal organisation has been 
the manifestation of a strong team nature. If so, the model proposed suggests that the contingent 
governance has provided a most appropriate ex-post monitoring device. Further, the probability of 
upward mobility of workers across Japanese firms has been very low. When massive discharges of 
workers became inevitable because of corporate failure, their relocation often became the 
responsibility of the main bank. This mechanism has strengthened the incentive effectiveness of 
the contingent governance structure vis-à-vis workers and managers. 
 
21 Amable et al. (2005) argue that the type of financial relationship between the firm and the 
capital owner, or the financial market, will set a certain constraint on firm’s profitability, which 
will partly determine firm’s survival probability. This will in turn shape both management and 
union strategies, hence influencing the outcome of the bargaining between these two actors. The 
mechanism linking the financial constraint to wage bargaining is based on the implied time 
horizon taken into account by each bargaining side: the shorter the time horizon, the stronger the 
pressure, and the less important will be firm’s viability for the union’s wage negotiation strategy. 
 
22 The categorised industrial relations are as follows. ‘Contestation’ associates a weak union with 
short-term strategies and emerges when external creditors (non-stakeholders) exert a high pressure on 
management for short-term financial result. ‘Pluralism’, in which the trade union is the stronger 
partner in leading bargaining, so that a strong influence of financial markets implies a stress on short-
term results. ‘Neo-corporatism of type 1’, in which - due to only a moderate influence of external 
creditors - long-term strategies are adopted by both the weak labor union and the firm’s management. 
This implies that the survival probability of the firm is high. Finally, ‘neo-corporatism of type 2’, in 
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which the labour union is strong enough and an increase in external creditors’ pressure would lead 
firms’ management to break cooperation. 
 
23 The authors identify four main models of care, hence four clusters of countries. The first one, 
characterising Italy, Greece and Spain, delegates all the management of care to the family. Also 
the second model (UK and the Netherlands) largely relies on informal care. However, in this 
model there is a wider collective interference in services for elderly people. In the third model 
(Austria and Germany) prevails a publicly facilitated private care model, where the costs 
associated to informal care strategies are partly compensated by collective arrangements. The 
fourth model (Belgium and France) has well developed formal care strategies. Finally, the last 
model (the Nordic countries) provides moderate to high levels of all formal care resources. 
 
24 Wage coordination refers to the degree to which trade unions and employer organisations actively 
coordinate the determination of wage settlements across the economy. This wage bargaining system 
is also known as centralised. It is opposed to de-centralised systems in which industry wide 
employment categories determining equal pay for equal skills do not exist (Hancé et al, 2007). 
 
25 Hall and Franzese (1998) never use in their work the term ‘institutional complementarity’. 
However, their results can be interpreted as presenting evidence of a complementarity relationship. 
 
26 This test is implemented by estimating a multiplicative interaction model. This uses interaction 
terms between variables accounting for specific institutional arrangements prevailing on financial 
and labour markets. 
 
27 According to Hall and Gingerich (2004), one set of institutional practices is complementary to 
another when each raises the returns available from the other. 
 
28 Hall and Gingerich (2004) argue that in coordinated market economies institutional practices in 
the sphere of corporate governance that encourage cross-shareholding and concentrate control in 
the hands of management, enhance the efficiency of institutional practices in the sphere of labour 
relations providing high levels of employment security, long job tenures and bargaining in wage-
setting. In liberal market economies, instead, firms are more dependent on dispersed equity 
markets and confront regulations that give more power to shareholders than to stakeholders; 
moreover, the autonomy of the firm and its managers is more dependent on current profitability. 
Here, labour markets allowing for a high labour turnover and competitive wage-setting are more 
efficient because they permit managers to adjust labour in response to fluctuations in current 
profitability. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE COOPERATIVE FIRM IN THE ECONOMIC 
LITERATURE: A CRITICAL EVALUTATION 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In previous chapters we have shown that economists’ weltanschaung has had major 
implications not just in terms of their analyses, but also as regards policy 
recommendations. In this chapter we go one step further and examine the economic 
analysis of the cooperative firm. Given the broad scope of the chapter, we regard 
the cooperative firm as a democratic organisational structure in which membership 
is voluntary, the users (workers, suppliers, customers) are the owners of the firm, 
and they hold both control and return rights. This definition enables taking into 
account the variety of actually existing cooperative firms (e.g. producer 
cooperatives, consumer cooperatives, service cooperatives, credit cooperatives, 
agricultural cooperatives, and so on). At the same time it also serves the chief 
interest of this research work, which is to look at the cooperative firm as an 
organisational structure, rather than at the specific forms it can assume.  
The cooperative firm has been much disputed in the economic literature, on both 
theoretical and empirical grounds. As a result of the particular standpoints adopted, 
scholars have reached strikingly different conclusions on the performance and 
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viability of cooperatives, hence their desirability in economic systems. Thus, the 
issues involved in this controversy particularly lend themselves to make the core 
argument of the present research work. 
Broadly speaking, it is possible to identify two main approaches to the study of 
the cooperative firm, basically expressing two contrasting views. The first one 
considers the cooperative as a sort of compensation for what the capitalist firm 
cannot achieve or guarantee (Zamagni, 2005). This is the mainstream interpretation, 
which evaluates the cooperative as a marginal and inefficient business structure, 
experiencing severe difficulties in capitalist environments because of a variety of 
problems, mainly of technological, managerial and financial nature (Ward, 1958; 
Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Williamson, 1975, 1985; Jensen and Meckling, 1979). 
The basic argument is that, since non-hierarchical work modes face transaction cost 
disabilities, they exhibit the worst performance attributes compared to alternative 
modes (Williamson, 1980). 
Conversely, the second line of study, belonging to the heterodox school, regards 
the cooperative as a more advanced organisational form in developed socio-
economic systems, in the sense that it allows to mediate between two different roles 
of labour. The first one as a productive factor, the second one as an opportunity to 
fulfil oneself. In this view, the cooperative represents the typology towards which 
the capitalist firm should converge in the long-run (Zamagni, 2005). 
On ethical grounds, supporting the case for the democratic firm means defending 
the argument that enough firms ought to be democratically run so that all those 
wishing to work in a democratic environment had a reasonable opportunity of doing 
so. There is reason to believe that in a suitable institutional setting this would have 
positive effects on productivity (Bowles and Gintis, 1994a). It has, indeed, been 
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argued that cooperatives can be efficient in mediating transactions between 
interdependent individuals since they rely to a great extent on socialisation as the 
principal mechanism of mediation and control (Bowles and Gintis, 1976). 
Therefore, once a set of complementary institutions are in place, cooperatives may 
even outperform capitalist firms. In fact, supportive institutions reduce agency costs 
between ownership and management, encourage mutual monitoring and smooth the 
incentive problem of free-riding by team members (Staber, 1989; Bartlett et al, 
1992; Bonin et al, 1993; Smith, 2001; Bayo-Moriones et al, 2002). 
Cooperative firms spread in different countries following different patterns of 
organisation and growth. The importance of studying this firm level institution goes 
beyond its economic significance.1 Cooperatives have also social relevance: 
through private initiative and mutual aid, they alleviate poverty and promote the 
social stability and development of local communities (Kalmi, 2007). 
By discussing the major theoretical and empirical contributions proposed in the 
literature on the cooperative firm,2 the chapter will point out the inconsistencies 
existing between the conclusions reached by mainstream and heterodox studies.3  
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the short-term analysis; 
Section 3 discusses the monitoring activity, as it relates to cooperatives’ property 
rights structure; Section 4 analyses the issue of financing; Section 5 comments the 
views on cooperatives’ relative population density; finally, Section 6 concludes. 
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2 THE SHORT-TERM EQUILIBRIUM: WARD’S MODEL AND ITS 
EXTENSIONS 
 
The debate on the behaviour of cooperative firms originates with Benjamin Ward’s 
(1958) seminal work on the type of labour-managed firm that developed in 
Yugoslavia in the 1950s. The single input model is based on the following 
assumptions: the firm operates under perfect competition; there is no uncertainty 
over prices; decision making regards the short-term and is static in nature; each 
worker maximises his own income; the services available to the firm are labour and 
a fixed plant; dividends are equally distributed among workers; finally, the 
production function exhibits marginal decreasing returns to labour. Given these 
hypotheses, the model predicts that wages per worker are maximised if at the 
chosen output level the marginal revenue per worker equals the marginal cost per 
worker. Secondly, a change in the fixed costs leads to a change in output in the 
same direction. Thirdly, a change in price leads to a change in output in the opposite 
direction, implying that the firm faces a negatively sloped supply curve. Finally, the 
equilibrium output is lower than for capitalist firms. These results imply that in the 
short-term the cooperative firm is not able to guarantee the best allocation of 
resources, since the forces that would push labour towards the more productive 
activities are not present in it (Jossa and Cuomo, 1997).  
Jaroslav Vanek (1970) analyses the short- and long-run behaviour of the labour-
managed economy under perfect competition. He argues that the labour-managed 
economy is not only highly efficient in absolute terms, but also more efficient than 
other existing economic systems in terms of both allocative and distributive 
efficiency. Although the system would achieve a long-run Pareto optimal 
equilibrium solution, the short-run solution is in several respects close to Ward’s. 
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Vanek’s principal short-run static result is that the equilibrium can be either below 
or above the optimum operation, but most firms would operate at less than optimal 
capacity. Moreover, compared to an otherwise identical capitalist firm, the labour-
managed firm will always have a smaller size and a higher capital-labour ratio, 
whenever the capitalist firm operates with positive profits.4  
In the long-run, for given factor proportions, a fully competitive labour-managed 
firm operates at maximum factor productivity. Vanek also shows that when the 
technology is subject to constant returns to scale, the long-run equilibrium of the 
labour-managed firm is indeterminate. This indeterminacy can give the firm the 
opportunity to follow other objectives, such as maximising local employment.  
With regard to the case of monopoly, oligopoly and monopolistic competition, 
still in the context of static equilibria, the most important conclusion is that 
whenever the labour-managed firm has any monopoly power, its equilibrium must 
be in the range of the production function where it is subject to increasing returns to 
scale. That is, falling short of the optimal scale of operation. 
As far as the supply and demand for labour are concerned, Vanek’s (1970) labour-
managed system does not contain a conventional labour market. Instead, the firm has 
a single demand point – i.e. a unique configuration of income per labourer and 
amount of labour required. If that point is consistent with the labour availability that 
the firm faces, the equilibrium of the firm will be consistent with the demand point. 
Moving to Vanek’s (1970) comparative statics analysis, the short-run behaviour of 
a labour-managed firm producing a single product is such that the supply elasticity 
will be negative or zero. Thus, with a fixed capital stock, the firm will reduce or keep 
unchanged its output when the price of the good increases. For the multi-product 
firm, the tendency toward negative supply elasticity will generally be more than offset 
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by the tendency to substitute in production a more expensive product for one which is 
relatively cheaper. Thus the elasticities of supply will be positive. 
To recapitulate, Vanek’s general conclusion is that the labour-managed firm is 
characterised by short-run supply elasticities lower than those that would be 
associated with a comparable capitalist firm.  
Subsequent literature contested Ward’s and Vanek’s conclusions arguing that the 
negative slope of the supply curve derives from the assumptions underlying their 
models (Jarsulic, 1980). These contributions also claim that if workers get more 
satisfaction from working in a cooperative than in a capitalist firm, then – using the 
Paretian criterion of economic welfare – the cooperative firm may be superior, even 
if Ward’s perverse results were to hold (Pagano, 1985). 
According to Evsey Domar (1966), Ward is unrealistic because it presupposes 
the possibility of variation in the number of members in the short-term, without 
considering supply conditions in the labour market. By introducing the labour 
supply curve, Domar (1966) shows that the solution of the model has fewer 
employees than in Ward, and the behaviour of the firm is no longer anomalous: an 
increase in product price leads to an increase in employment and production. 
Moreover, an increase in the cost of fixed capital reduces both employment and 
production, and the equilibrium average income of partners is less than the marginal 
product of labour. This latter result implies that in case of labour shortage it is 
necessary to discriminate among workers, considering some as partners and others 
as wage workers. However, the introduction of wage labour would transform the 
cooperative into a capitalist enterprise (Jossa and Cuomo, 1997). 
A step forward towards greater realism of Ward’s model has been to include 
work intensity in the model, so as to consider the effort needed to maximise 
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individual income. In works as Amartya Sen (1966), Jaroslav Vanek (1970), 
Matthew Berman (1977), Katrina Berman and Matthew Berman (1978), and Murat 
Sertel (1982), the introduction of this maximand removes the atypical supply curve 
and enables showing that the self-managed firm does not reverse resources. In these 
models, each member chooses work effort, then it has to be decided whether 
remuneration should be egalitarian or based on allocated labour (Sen, 1966). An 
egalitarian compensation complies with the solidaristic principles of self-
management. However, it can introduce incentive problems when dissociated from 
an egalitarian division of labour. In such case, each member has less interest in 
increasing his effort, since the additional product will be divided with the other 
partners. The opposite problem arises when remuneration is based on effective 
labour: in order to increase their quota of income, partners would be willing to 
extend their working hours beyond the point where the marginal disutility of work 
equals its marginal product. This would determine a sub-optimal allocation of 
resources (Berman, 1977). Sen (1966) shows that these problems may be solved, 
arriving at an efficient solution, if members reach an agreement on both working 
hours and form of remuneration. 
Ward’s model has been criticised also by James Meade (1972). He argues that it 
is not correct to compare a cooperative firm (having an egalitarian constraint) with a 
capitalist firm (which, to expand its structure, discriminates between partners). For 
Meade the appropriate comparison would be between the self-managed firm and a 
hypothetical egalitarian capitalist maximising income per machine. In this firm the 
owners of capital start the activity bringing together machines owned by them and 
employing labour at the market wage.5 However, capitalism is non-egalitarian and 
so, in order to compare it with self-management, also the latter must be non-
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egalitarian. In Meade’s inegalitarian cooperative, each partner holds a certain 
number of securities and wants to maximise the return on each share. Since 
securities are assigned on the basis of individual abilities and period of membership 
within the firm, the more qualified and experienced partners will receive higher 
dividends. However, the perfect mobility of labour between cooperatives allows to 
transfer resources where they are better remunerated, thus guaranteeing full 
allocative efficiency even in the short-term. 
Passing to other extensions of Ward’s model, some contributions included the 
employment level in the objective function, in association with dividends’ 
maximisation (Law, 1977), or as an independent argument (Levin, 1984). The 
underlying rationale is that, contrary to the capitalist firm, the cooperative aims to 
defend the level of employment. Another problem with Ward’s model, as pointed 
out by Bruno Jossa and Gaetano Cuomo (1997), is that it implicitly assumes that in 
the event of an increase in product price, it is possible to fire some workers, so as to 
increase the income of the remaining ones. However, the mutual aid concept, 
foundation of the cooperative logic, totally contrasts with this behavioural 
assumption. Among the studies that attempted to remedy this flaw, Anthony Brewer 
and Martin Browning (1982) show that it is still possible to increase the average 
income of all partners by excluding those who can obtain elsewhere a remuneration 
higher than the one attainable within the firm. Furthermore, Sertel (1982) suggests 
to prohibit the exclusion of a member without his will, and to do not allow 
individuals to leave the firm without the other members’ approval. 
Ward’s theorisation has been questioned also by Hodgson (1999). He points out 
that social relations and technology are not separable; however, the model wrongly 
assumed that the production function does not change shape when cooperative 
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relations replace capitalist ones. Instead, taking into account the collective 
knowledge embedded within the firm, and the synergies that accrue from working 
together, it is no longer reasonable to assume decreasing marginal returns from 
labour. This hypothesis does not suit a knowledge-intensive system (Hodgson, 
1999). Assuming increasing returns from the labour input, Hodgson shows that no 
behavioural difference emerges between the profit maximising capitalist and the 
average net income maximising cooperative. This suggests that there is no a priori 
reason to regard cooperatives as less efficient than capitalist firms. 
The literature so far discussed has been tested by several empirical studies, 
though the theory is still overdeveloped compared to the extant empirical works 
(Bonin et al, 1993). Among these, Stephen Smith (1984) tests if dividend 
maximisation describes the objectives of U.S. plywood cooperatives. He estimates 
the parameters of a Cobb-Douglass utility function having income and employment 
as arguments. The results reject the null that employment does not matter for 
cooperatives, implying that dividend-maximisation is not the only objective for 
these firms. Furthermore, by calculating short-run marginal products of labour 
based on the coefficients obtained from the estimation of Cobb-Douglass, CES and 
translog production functions, Katrina Berman and Matthew Berman (1989) do not 
find evidence of an inefficient allocation of labour in plywood cooperatives. 
A direct test of the predicted downward slope of cooperatives’ supply curve is 
offered by Ben Craig and John Pencavel (1992). They estimate supply responses of 
plywood cooperatives, and show that cooperatives’ supply elasticity is significantly 
positive. Thus, the evidence does not lend support to the notion of a negatively 
sloped supply curve. Moreover, following a change in output and input prices, both 
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the number of hours worked and employment tend to be more stable in cooperatives 
than in capitalist firms. 
The hypotheses derived from the dividend-maximising model are rejected also 
by Niels Mygind (1987) and Bodil Thordarson (1987). The former author works on 
Danish data and concludes that cooperatives do not behave differently from 
capitalist firms with respect to employment and earnings. Thordarson uses data on 
Swedish cooperative and capitalist firms and finds no differences in employment 
levels and employment volatility between firm types. Along the same line, Derek 
Jones and Jeffrey Pliskin (1989) find that for British firms (operating in clothing, 
footwear and printing industries) an increase in the degree of profit sharing leads to 
an increase in employment.6 
Prasnikar et al. (1994) test the predictions of the Ward-Domar-Vanek model on 
Yugoslav firm-level data from the 1970s and 1980s. They find that the perverse 
behaviour is not supported by the evidence: the perverse employment, hence output, 
responses to output price and fixed cost variations are rejected with panel data from 
147 firms. Furthermore, firms set employment in between the level of the Ward-
Domar-Vanek firm and the capitalist profit maximising level.  
To summarise the empirical research above discussed, its common trait is the 
lack of evidence in support of the short-run perverse behaviour of cooperatives 
postulated by the mainstream theoretical literature. However, despite this evidence 
to the contrary, the idea of the general inferiority of the cooperative firm still retains 
a tenacious hold (Hodgson, 1999). This calls for further inquiry and for the 
elaboration of what Stefano Zamagni (2005) calls a ‘civil-economic theory of the 
cooperative enterprise’. 
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3 THE MONITORING ACTIVITY IN THE COOPERATIVE FIRM 
 
According to Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz (1972), their theory of the firm 
can explain why capitalist firms tend to prevail over cooperatives. Their central idea 
is that since the entrepreneur monitors the activities of team members, he must be 
rewarded for this job with an income related to the functioning of that team. If profit 
is not assigned to the controller, but is divided in a given measure among all 
workers, these latter will have more incentives to carry out their jobs well, while the 
controller will have less interest in performing his task. Alchian and Demsetz 
(1972) argue that in cooperatives it is likely that the reduction in productivity 
arising from the weakening in control will outweigh the productivity increase 
determined by workers’ greater incentives.7 
The analysis of Alchian and Demsetz (1972), and of studies as Robert Carson 
(1977), and Michael Jensen and William Meckling (1979), have been recently 
questioned by that strand of new institutional economics concerned with production 
and monitoring incentives. A first objection put forward is that when monitoring is 
entrusted to all workers, as is the case in cooperatives, no one has a particular 
interest in performing that function well. However, at the same time, since each 
partner is both controller and residual claimant, all members have an interest in 
monitoring others (Miller, 1993). So that, there is no particular reason to believe 
that a single monitor, having a substantial incentive to control, will perform better 
than many controllers with smaller incentives (Jossa and Cuomo, 1997). In other 
words, since cooperatives rely on the fact that the residual claimants are the 
workers, these firms are able to overcome the difficulties related to the incomplete 
nature of the job-contract. Hence, they can reach a degree of efficiency in the 
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productive activity which is not attainable by the capitalist firm. This is what 
Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis (1993) call the direct residual claimancy effect. 
Secondly, it has been argued that in cooperatives workers’ effort is greater since, 
being also owners, they feel responsible for the firm (Putterman, 1984), and also 
because they identify themselves with the firm (Gui, 1993). On both these grounds, 
because of a participation effect, more effort will be put in a given task in the 
cooperative firm (Bowles and Gintis, 1993). Thus, cooperatives may be more 
efficient than capitalist firms. 
Thirdly, Jossa and Cuomo (1997) remarked that those who decide jointly feel 
more responsible for the common decisions, and have a sense of loyalty towards the 
other workers. This loyalty effect (Jossa and Cuomo, 1997) induces them to work 
harder (Horvat, 1982a; Oakeshott, 1982). To illustrate this point, Jossa and Cuomo 
analyse a cooperative which entrusts the monitoring task to one of its members. 
They argue that since the member-manager-supervisor is chosen by the majority of 
other members, this agent is in a position similar to the manager of a corporation. 
Therefore, the argument of Demsetz (1988), according to which the manager of a 
corporation cannot have a lot of on-the-job consumption, applies also to this type of 
cooperative. However, in cooperatives shirking is considered a reprehensible 
behaviour as it damages the collective. Hence, in this firm monitoring is likely to be 
performed better than in the corporation and thus the cooperative, rather than being 
invariably less efficient, may actually be more efficient. 
Fourthly, Benedetto Gui (1993) pointed out that workers in a cooperative can 
perform effective reciprocal monitoring, as they have costless access to information 
on the job activities. This enables them to easily discover who works with effort and 
who does not. In consequence of the resulting saving of resources, cooperatives can 
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increase efficiency more than capitalist firms. The existence of this reciprocal 
monitoring effect (Bowles and Gintis, 1993) appears to be confirmed by empirical 
research (e.g. Fitzroy and Kraft, 1986).8 
A fifth objection to the analysis of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) is that if 
cooperators nominate a controller, and separate ownership from control, they may 
do so effectively. This is confirmed, for instance, by the Israeli Kibbutz and the 
Spanish Mondragòn experience (Putterman, 1984; Elster and Moene, 1989). 
Indeed, nothing impedes cooperators to fire the non-performing controller. 
Furthermore, competitive mechanisms in the market for managers impact on the 
efficiency of these agents (Jossa and Cuomo, 1997). Consequently, there is no a 
priori reason to believe that a cooperative must be less efficient because the 
manager is on a fixed salary, and even less so if the manager has a share in the 
earnings of the firm (Fitzroy and Kraft, 1987). 
To recapitulate, the general conclusion shared by the institutionalist studies 
discussed in this section is that free-riding does not seem to be a serious concern in 
cooperatives. The main reason for this is that workers are both co-owners and 
residual claimants, and so they have more interest in the fortunes of the firm. Hence 
a greater incentive to work with effort (Stiglitz, 1993). In other words, the 
democratic firm is able to balance between income and effort (Vanek, 1970) and 
attains a relative advantage in extracting productive effort from workers (Dow, 
1993; Bowles and Gintis, 1994b). In this sense, the labour-managed firm appears to 
be the best form of productive organisation from the point of view of the incentives 
it gives to its members (Vanek, 1970).  
Passing to the empirical studies on the impact of the cooperative structure on 
incentives and productivity, these explore the relationship between productivity and 
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worker participation.9 Ben-Ner et al. (1994) reviewed the evidence on the 
productivity effects of employee participation. They concluded that there is 
widespread support for the claim that “productivity is enhanced in firms where there 
are arrangements that link participation in control and participation in economic 
returns” (ibid: 209). 
The main result linking the works of Jones and Backus (1977), Jones (1982), 
Jacques Defourny et al. (1985), and Jones and Svejnar (1985) is that employee 
participation does affect productivity. However, the impact of participatory forms 
varies across countries and industries. Profit sharing is the most significant 
participatory variable for French and Italian cooperatives, while this result is not 
uniformly valid for Sweden and the U.K. Moreover, participation in decision rights 
and employee ownership increases the productivity of Italian and French 
cooperatives, but not of U.K. ones. 
The efficiency of Polish producer cooperatives has been investigated by Jones 
(1985), using an enterprise level dataset on producer cooperatives for the period 
1976-1980 and various internal cooperative documents that refer mainly to 1960-
1978.10 This study, focusing on firms operating in clothing, printing and 
construction, shows that income distribution has much smaller dispersion between 
cooperatives than between State-owned firms. Also, during 1960-1980 the technical 
efficiency of cooperatives was at least as good as Polish State-owned firms. Indeed, 
allowing for the poorer quality of cooperatives’ factors of production (the use of 
second-hand supplies and of older technologies by firms that are smaller than non-
participatory firms in similar industries), it is probable that during 1960-1980 
cooperatives were technically more efficient than other firms. 
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As far as studies comparing productivity in cooperative and capitalist firms are 
concerned, these find mixed evidence. Barbara Lee (1988) documents no 
differences both in productivity and in production function coefficients’ estimates. 
Saul Estrin (1991a) shows that Italian cooperatives have lower productivity than 
capitalist firms; however using a different measure of labour input no statistically 
significant differences emerge between cooperative and capitalist firms. Moreover, 
Defourny (1992) finds that medium sized French cooperatives are more productive 
than conventional firms, while the opposite holds for smaller firms. 
The conflicting results reached by this strand of empirical literature suggest that 
an important issue research should address is why differing institutional settings 
conduce to varying productivity effects (Bonin et al, 1993). 
To briefly recapitulate the general point emerging from the above discussion, the 
issues related to motivation, incentives, discipline and opportunism are central to 
the evaluation of the governance of the cooperative firm (Bowles and Gintis, 
1994a). Once these issues are incorporated in the analysis of firm behaviour and 
performance, cooperatives do not seem to suffer any of the diseconomies claimed 
by the conventional literature. If anything, the democratic firm would appear to be a 
superior organisational form.  
 
4 THE LONG-TERM BEHAVIOUR: THE ISSUE OF CAPITAL 
ACCUMULATION 
 
Part of the literature discussed in the previous sections claims an anomalous 
behaviour of the cooperative firm in the short-term. Studies on the democratic firm 
identify further problems when, moving from the short to the long-run, the issue of 
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capital accumulation is introduced. Indeed, according to the conventional literature, 
questioned by the heterodox school, cooperatives have a tendency to underinvest. 
This phenomenon, arising from problems related to both internal and external 
financing channels, will be examined in the following sub-sections. 
 
4.1 Internal financing and the underinvestment phenomenon 
 
The issue of internal financing was firstly analysed by Eirik Furubotn and Svetozar 
Pejovich (1970a, 1970b, 1972, 1973) and Vanek (1970).11 The traditional literature 
relates cooperatives’ tendency to underinvest to their property rights structure and 
the limited time horizon of partners. The intuition for this conclusion goes as 
follows. The institutional characteristics of the cooperative firm are such that 
property rights are restricted to the right of use of capital. This implies that partners 
who leave the firm cannot obtain a refund of the profit devoted in the past to self-
financing (Furubotn and Pejovich, 1970a). Consequently, and also due to the non-
transferability of ownership rights, members lack incentives to invest in the firm. 
Therefore, cooperatives are likely to have a shorter lifespan and operate in the 
inefficient, increasing return to scale zone of their production functions, or at least 
to exhibit higher scale elasticities than capitalist firms (Vanek, 1977). 
The underinvestment phenomenon, often referred to as the Furubotn-Pejovich 
effect (or horizon problem) concerns the impossibility for the partners to recoup, in 
certain cases, the self-financed capital invested in the firm.12 The above authors 
assume that at the end of each year, partners have to decide collectively about the 
destination of profit. In particular, they must fix the quantity of income withdrawn 
for dividends and the level of self-financing.13 For the investment to be made, it is 
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necessary that a majority of partners think they will stay with the firm for a number 
of years sufficient to recover the profits not withdrawn for reasons of self-financing. 
The relevant single time horizon is that of the median member: if his time horizon is 
such that the expected tenure within the firm is shorter than the duration of the 
investment, the median member will constrain the others. The investment of one 
monetary unit will only be realised if the discounted stream of future annual returns 
generated by the investment equals the amount of the investment. 
According to Marc Jarsulic (1980), the error in claiming – as both Ward (1958)  
and Vanek (1970, 1975, 1977) did – that cooperatives make inefficient financing 
decisions, lies in having assumed that the value of capital per worker can be 
measured independently of the income distribution. Jarsulic proves that the 
cooperative firm may choose the same technique that would be chosen in a 
capitalist firm, given the prevailing wage. This technique has a capital-labour ratio 
at least as great as that of capitalist firms. 
Patrick Rey and Jean Tirole (2006) argue that coops, in their purest form, are 
fragile institutions.14 They contend that the free-riding of new members on the 
investment of established partners induces underinvestment. In the worst scenario, it 
even prevents the firm from being established. Nonetheless, Rey and Tirole claim that 
even if cooperatives were viable, they would be vulnerable to the attacks by capitalist 
firms or discriminatory cooperatives, which can lure potential members through the 
promise of future profits. 
Some scholars claimed that the problems faced by self-financed cooperatives can 
be solved if the position of partner can be sold (Carson, 1977; Berman, 1982; Sertel, 
1982; Mygind, 1986). In this case, it would be in the interest of all workers to 
maximise both firm income and capital value. Indeed, the firm producing more is 
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worth more, and the more the firm is worth, the more valuable is the quota of it that 
each worker disposes. 
Marc Fleurbaey (1993) argues that even if there were a market for the position of 
partner, internal financing would not be advisable. The reason for this is that it 
would increases riskiness, since members would have to invest their own savings in 
the firm. However, according to Jossa and Cuomo (1997) this difficulty could be 
resolved even without resorting to the selling of membership. Since underinvestment 
arises because those who are thinking of shortly leaving the firm are not willing to 
invest in it, a way to solve this problem is to allow leaving members to take their 
savings with them. 
 
4.2 External financing 
 
A corollary of the problems related to the self-financing of cooperative firms is that 
workers will prefer external sources of funding, as these allow matching the cost of 
financing to the temporal path of the returns from an investment project (Pejovich, 
1973; Furubotn, 1974). Cooperatives funding themselves with loan capital, and 
consequently distinguishing between incomes from work and incomes from capital 
or property, are regarded by Jossa (2005) as truly socialist firms. His argument is 
that in this case Vanek’s (1977) description of firms run by workers as ‘their own 
capitalists’ will no longer apply to them.15 
Vanek (1977) claims that external financing is vital to cooperative firms.16 
According to Vanek, cooperatives should hire capital, paying external financiers a 
scarcity rent, and then appropriate all net income. However, Gintis (1989) notes that 
the optimal size requires a level of finance beyond the means of workers. It has 
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been argued that problems of access to external finance play a major role in 
hindering the creation and expansion of democratic firms, thus affecting their 
relative performance. Limited access to finance restricts workers’ opportunities to 
supersede wage-labour and capitalist social relations of production. Financing 
problems also explain why most cooperatives operate in labour-intensive industries 
(Doucouliagos, 1990). However, according to Williamson (1985), financial 
disadvantages as a result of pure commercial considerations are not likely to be a 
significant long-term factor, in that firms with a solid record will receive finance.  
As stressed, among others, by Jacques Drèze (1993), Louis Putterman (1993) 
and Gregory Dow (2003), cooperatives’ property rights structure, combined with 
the asymmetric information problems that debt financing involves, result in higher 
costs of capital and/or credit rationing for these firms. A number of writers (Horvat, 
1982b; Ireland and Law, 1982; Bowles and Gintis, 1986; Ben-Ner, 1988a,b; Gintis, 
1989, 1990) pointed out that, in terms of borrowing funds, cooperative firms are 
financially disadvantaged compared to their capitalist counterparts because this 
organisational form is relatively unknown to financiers, and hence bears them 
greater risks. In fact, being an unfamiliar type of organisation, cooperatives may be 
perceived as being riskier than capitalist firms and, consequently, satisfying capital 
requirements may be costlier for them (Putterman, 1982). The cost of borrowing is 
further increased by the fact that workers’ limited wealth – and consequent risk 
aversion and liquidity constraints – bound the personal collateral available for 
obtaining loans (Ben-Ner, 1988a) and this creates a problem in terms of guarantees 
offered to third parties financing the firm (Jossa and Cuomo, 1997). Bowles and 
Gintis (1994c) show that the level of workers’ wealth and the incidence of 
democratic firms are jointly determined. They argue that this suggests that an 
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observed distribution of workers among types of firms does not support inferences 
about the efficiency, or the competitive viability, of alternative organisational 
forms. Moreover, in terms of policy, reforms that aim to support a greater level of 
wealth for the less wealthy class would also support a larger fraction of workers in 
democratic firms. 
Ekkehart Schlicht and Carl Christian von Weizsäcker (1977) identify a 
commitment problem of cooperators, which in their view is the root of the financial 
constraints faced by cooperatives. These authors argue that in its essence the 
commitment problem arises from the fact that cooperative members are more likely 
than the partners of a capitalist firm to leave the company if its profitability 
deteriorates. Hence, they may lack effort to operate successfully if in risky 
situations substantial parts of the losses can be get rid off by bankruptcy, unless 
there are norms imposed from outside, or mechanisms to check the mobility of 
labour, or it is possible to sell the position of member.  
In the extreme case analysed by Rey and Tirole (2006), cooperatives do not have 
external finance at all. The authors claim that debt finance makes the firm sensitive 
to runs by partners, since the desertion by some members increases the assessment 
imposed on remaining ones, who then have a strong incentive to leave. Nonetheless, 
outside equity finance raises control issues because outside financers are concerned 
with the possibility that partners distribute themselves less verifiable dividends. To 
show why this can discourage external investors to finance a cooperative, Rey and 
Tirole consider a two-period scenario. In the first period cooperators can contract 
with outside investors on current access prices and investment decisions. In the 
second period users will set the access price so as to cover operating costs, but have 
no incentives to generate extra revenue to pay-back external investors. Anticipating 
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this, outside investors will not lend at the outset. In their view this implies that 
cooperatives will find it difficult to attract financing without giving investors some 
control rights over pricing decisions. 
In regard to the actual sources of external financing, bank credit has typically 
been the main channel for cooperatives. Pejovich (1992) analyses the advantages and 
disadvantages of using this channel to secure financial resources. The cost incurred 
by the worker-member is a series of payments to the bank over a given period of 
time. The benefit is the claim on the returns generated by the investment undertaken 
during the time he stays with the firm. According to Pejovich, two critical variables 
determining the availability of bank loans are cooperators’ time horizon and the 
length of bank credit. Firm members would prefer to obtain bank loans when the 
length of the loan is longer than their time horizon with the firm. Instead, banks 
would prefer to extend loans in the opposite case. Consequently, cooperatives might 
not be able to obtain bank credit due to the mismatch between members’ time 
horizon and the length of the loan. Pejovich (1992) argues that these two behavioural 
variables are created by the structure of property rights in labour-managed firms. 
They are the key to explain the inefficiency of investment decisions by labour-
managed firms. This inefficiency could be avoided only if the prevailing incentives 
and transaction costs pushed the employees towards equalising the length of bank 
credit with the expected life of the capital goods to be purchased with that credit.17 
Drèze (1993) and Fleurbaey (1993) suggest that a solution to the difficulties 
faced by cooperatives in obtaining external loans could be to insure against 
uncertainty by creating a central insurance institution. This would stabilise workers’ 
incomes and subsidise them in periods of crisis. Such a mechanism would endow 
cooperators with higher collateral, which could be used as a guarantee for the loans 
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requested. Gui (1994) remarks that existing financial intermediaries should provide 
forms of credit alternative to equity and loans, such as quasi-equity. An even better 
solution would be, in his view, the establishment of special financial bodies tailored 
to the specific needs of cooperative firms, promoted by public authorities or 
cooperative associations.  
 
4.3 Empirical studies on the financing of cooperative firms 
 
Given the underinvestment theme in the theoretical literature, several hypotheses 
have been tested by empirical contributions. Working on British cooperatives, 
Derek Jones and David Backus (1977) test Vanek’s hypothesis that cooperatives 
operate in the region of increasing returns. When estimations are carried out on the 
entire sample, no evidence of increasing returns is found. In contrast, when the 
sample is split into the sub-samples of large and small firms, small cooperatives 
seem to operate under increasing returns. A test of Vanek’s hypothesis is offered 
also by Donald George (1982), who finds that Danish cooperatives operate in the 
region of constant returns to scale. 
Passing to the empirical studies on the Furubotn-Pejovich effect, the existing 
evidence is mixed. Among the contributions that do not find evidence of 
underinvestment, Jones and Backus (1977) test whether cooperatives using a high 
percentage of internal funding tend to underinvest. If the underinvestment 
hypothesis were true, cooperatives using more internal financing should have a 
lower capital-labour ratio. Results from this investigation, however, do not support 
this hypothesis. Estrin and Jones (1988) analyse French cooperatives and 
distinguish between factors thought to influence investment in capitalist firms (e.g. 
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expected product demand) and factors stressed in theories of cooperatives (e.g. the 
extent of collective ownership, the availability of external finance, worker 
participation in decision making and members’ time horizon). The empirical 
evidence shows no significant difference between determinants of investments in 
cooperative and capitalist firms, except for the availability of external financing. 
Furthermore, Henk Thomas (1982) finds that capital-labour ratios are not lower, 
and have instead risen faster, among the Spanish Mondragòn group of cooperatives 
than in comparable capitalist Spanish firms, probably thanks to the support of the 
Caja Laboral Popular bank. 
In contrast to these results, other studies find evidence of a tendency towards 
underinvestment in cooperatives. Among them, George (1982) works on data on 
Danish bakeries and construction firms and shows that cooperatives have lower 
capital-labour ratios than capitalist firms. The same result is found also for Italian 
construction and manufacturing cooperatives (Zevi, 1982; Bartlett et al, 1992), and 
for British footwear and clothing cooperatives (Jones and Backus, 1977). 
To conclude, the discrepancies emerged between the theoretical and most of the 
empirical studies analysing the financing of cooperatives, imply that whether 
finance represents an obstacle for these firms still remains an unsettled issue. This 
calls for further investigation. 
 
5 THE POPULATION DENSITY OF COOPERATIVE FIRMS 
BETWEEN (IN)EFFICIENCY CLAIMS AND CONTEXT 
DEPENDENCE 
 
Economists have analysed the relative population density of the democratic firm 
from different standpoints. Once again, the debate reaches strikingly controversial 
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conclusions. Williamson (1975, 1980, 1985) claims that since hierarchical firms 
predominate in today’s competitive environment, then these firms must be more 
efficient than non-hierarchical ones and better suited to survival. His argument is 
based on the contention that because the competitive process led to the selection of 
hierarchical firms, then this implies that capitalist firms must be more efficient than 
their democratic counterparts. Non-hierarchical modes “are merely of ephemeral 
duration” (Williamson, 1980, p. 35). 
Williamson argues that the historical evidence lends supports to his view. 
However, this claim is only based on the observation that hierarchical firms 
outnumber non-hierarchical organisations. In contrast to this scanty evidence, the 
ample empirical research on cooperatives earlier discussed in this chapter reveals 
that cooperatives exhibit a healthy, and in some cases even prosperous, profile of 
economic performance. 
In line with Williamson, Jensen and Meckling (1979) argue in their discussion of 
industrial democracy: “The fact that this system seldom arises out of voluntary 
arrangements among individuals strongly suggests that co-determination or 
industrial democracy is less efficient than the alternatives which grow up and 
survive in a competitive environment” (ibid: 473). Thus both Williamson, and 
Jensen and Meckling equalise survival with efficiency and condemn non-
hierarchical firms to disappearance on the ground of their supposed inefficiency. 
Also Henry Hansmann (1988) adopts the efficiency perspective to explore the 
economic factors responsible for the different patterns of ownership that are 
observable in various countries. In proposing his theory of ownership Hansmann 
(1988) focuses on analysing the costs that ownership involves and that can be 
different for different classes of patrons (i.e. the persons that transact with a firm). 
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He divides these costs in costs of marketing contracting (i.e. market power and 
asymmetric information) and costs of ownership (i.e. monitoring, collective 
decision making and risk bearing). He contends that the above costs are the main 
determinant of the relative efficiency of alternative assignments of ownership, and 
that efficiency will be best served if ownership is conferred to the patrons that allow 
to minimise the total transaction costs. 
Grounding the analysis on the above arguments Hansmann (1988) concludes 
that, by achieving a relative homogeneity of interests among patrons, investor-
owned firms dominate in market economies for two reasons. First, they enable 
minimisation of the contracting costs for capital, which are often relatively higher 
than the contracting costs for other inputs and products. Second, investors are the 
group of patrons best suited to exercise effective control. Hence alternative forms of 
ownership can arise only when the above conditions fail. 
In contrast to the above writers, Chris Doucouliagos (1990) argues that capitalist 
firms outnumber cooperatives because of difficulties that coops face in operating 
within capitalist economies, and because of ideological bias against them, rather 
than for their alleged inefficiency. He points out that the analysis of the relative 
efficiency of cooperative and capitalist firms is confined to the neoclassical 
quantitative notion of Pareto efficiency. However, this does not address qualitative 
efficiency which, in his view, is central to the comparative analysis of cooperatives 
vis-à-vis other forms.  
Doucouliagos (1990) further contends that “the success of a particular type of 
firm, be it capitalist or labour-managed, is a function of the type of economic 
system in which it is operating” (ibid: 48). Hence, the specific features denoting the 
environment in which firms are embedded, rather than strict efficiency 
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considerations per se, determine the relative performance of firms. Doucouliagos 
(1990) identifies in the constrained access to labour, management services and 
finance the main sources of the disadvantage that cooperative firms experience in 
capitalist economies. Furthermore, cultural and social backgrounds also have a deep 
influence on workers’ willingness to establish cooperatives.  
Also Hodgson (1993, 1994) questions the efficiency argument á la Williamson. 
He argues that the appeal to evolutionary selection made by Williamson and 
followers is not well founded because the more efficient firms are not always 
selected in a competitive and evolutionary process. Also inefficient structures 
survive. He clarifies that “the selection of the ‘fitter’ in evolution is not simply 
relative to the less successful but is dependent upon the general circumstances and 
environment in which selection takes place” (Hodgson, 1994, p. 100). He further 
argues that “the ‘fitter’ are only fit in the context of a given environment, and 
sometimes the ‘unfit’ can be rapidly transformed into the ‘fit’, and vice versa – note 
the dinosaur – if these environmental circumstances change” (ibid: 100). 
Thus, the greater density of capitalist firms does not necessarily imply greater 
efficiency. It may just mean that cooperatives are less likely to emerge. By resorting 
to the concept of frequency dependency used in biology, Hodgson (1993) shows 
that if, for whatever reason, the birth of hierarchical firms is favoured, they may 
grow (in size or number) and prevail over democratic firms, regardless of the 
relative efficiencies.18  
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6 CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this chapter has been to examine the major literature analysing the 
cooperative firm in order to point out the nodal points emerging from the debate. 
The discussion carried out has shown a contraposition between the results reached 
by mainstream scholars and those claimed by the heterodox school. It is possible to 
conclude that this disagreement occurs with regard to any of the particular issues 
addressed. 
More precisely, as far as the short-term analysis is concerned, the traditional 
approach originating with Ward (1958) claims a perverse behaviour of 
cooperatives: they maximise income per worker, face a negatively sloped supply 
curve, in equilibrium produce less than capitalist firms, and allocate labour 
inefficiently. These conclusions have been questioned by subsequent studies, which 
tried to increase the realism of the model (Domar, 1966; Meade, 1972; Hodgson, 
1999). Nonetheless, the extant empirical evidence clearly shows the flaws of the 
traditional short-term analysis: there is no evidence of a short-run inefficient 
allocation of labour in cooperatives (Berman and Berman, 1989); the notion of a 
negatively sloped supply curve is rejected (Craig and Pencavel, 1992) and dividend 
maximisation is not the only objective for cooperatives (Smith, 1984). 
With regard to issue of monitoring, the theory of the firm of Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972) implies that cooperatives are less productive than capitalist firms, 
since residual rights are shared among workers, rather than being assigned to the 
controller. This conclusion has been contested by institutionalist studies concerned 
with production and monitoring incentives, which show both theoretically (Miller, 
1993; Stiglitz, 1993) and empirically (Lee, 1988; Defourny, 1992) that cooperatives 
tend to be at least as productive as other firms. 
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Insofar as the studies that focused on capital accumulation are concerned, the 
conventional wisdom argues that, due to their property rights structure, internally 
financed cooperatives underinvest (Furubotn and Pejovich, 1970a, 1970b; Vanek, 
1970). At the same time, accessing external finance also entails problems for 
cooperatives, resulting in higher costs of capital and credit rationing (Putterman, 
1982). However, most of the empirical literature does not find evidence of 
underinvestment in cooperatives (Jones and Backus, 1977; Estrin and Jones, 1988). 
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, the evidence contradicts mainstream 
theoretical predictions: cooperatives still represent (at least in some countries) a 
long lasting and significant phenomenon (Stiglitz, 2004). This suggests that the 
financing issues have been governed and concretely tackled in some way. Where 
this has not occurred, it hindered the development of cooperatives (Zevi, 2005).  
The general conclusion that can be drawn from the literature analysed in this 
chapter is that the traditional approach to cooperatives is in most cases at odds with 
stylised empirical facts (Kalmi, 2007). A severe limitation of the mainstream theory 
is that this approach is essentially static, so that its claims may be flawed by this 
‘immobility’. We share the view of Bowles and Gintis (1994a), who argued that the 
conventional literature on democratic firms has suffered from severe 
methodological lacunae. In putting forward this claim we contend that, beside the 
undeniable limitations of the formal analysis, the main problem with the traditional 
economic analysis of cooperative firms is to have treated the environment as fixed. 
In other words, the analysis is insensitive to contexts. 
By ignoring social, cultural and institutional contexts, mainstream economic 
theory has once again neglected to recognise that history matters. A number of 
writers have noted that the development of economic democracy requires a 
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favourable climate and the creation of support organisations (Zwerdling, 1980; 
Horvat, 1982a; Gunn, 1984). That is, organizations that support the creation and 
development of cooperative firms; coordinate their activities; help integrate them 
into a group or sector, and provide finance (Doucouliagos, 1990). 
The role of the broad institutional context for the performance of cooperative 
firms will be further explored in the next chapter.  
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NOTES 
 
1 The concept of institution has been given different meanings in the literature. The notion this work 
adopts is the one proposed by Hodgson (2006), in which institutions are systems of established and 
prevalent social rules that structure social interactions, thus including organisations as a special type of 
institutions. 
 
2 The empirical studies that investigated the behaviour and performance of cooperative firms are 
numerous and have addressed a set of related research questions. Applying meta-analysis to 
combine the results of these studies would seem a natural choice. However in the present case the 
meaningful applicability of meta-analysis is limited by the fact that different studies have 
measured a common variable using different proxies. This heterogeneity in variable measurement 
would affect the reliability of the results obtained from meta-analysis.  
 
3 Kalmi (2007) concludes that cooperatives do not receive much attention in current mainstream 
economics mainly due to the paradigm shift from nineteenth and early twentieth century 
institutionalism to neoclassical analysis. 
 
4 The opposite conclusion holds when the capitalist firm operates at a loss (a situation applicable 
only in the short-run). 
 
5 Such a firm is egalitarian since there is no discrimination among partners: the division of income per 
machine is carried out in the same way as the division of income per worker in the cooperative. 
 
6 Profit sharing is measured as the percentage of total worker remuneration that is distributed as a 
profit share. 
 
7 Yet, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) do not exclude that profit sharing may sometimes be 
advantageous, particularly in the case of small firms, where it is easier to have efficient reciprocal 
control among participants. 
 
8 Arguably, the reciprocal monitoring effect also leads to a reduction in asymmetric information. 
 
9 These studies broadly define worker participation so as to include decision making rights, profit 
sharing and employee ownership. 
 
10 The dataset comes from the Central Union of Work Cooperatives (CZSP) in Poland. The CZSP 
comprises about 1,500 producer cooperatives which employ about 800,000 workers, of whom 
about 200,000 are disabled. 
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11 According to Vanek (1970) the first contribution on this issue has been offered by Pejovich in 
November 1968 at the Meeting of the Southern Economic Association.. 
 
12 The horizon problem was originally formulated by Jensen and Meckling (1979). 
 
13 This decision is equivalent to the choice of allocating saving between the financing of firm’s 
assets and the outside investment in government bonds or bank saving accounts. 
 
14 The authors model the purest form of cooperative as non-discriminatory: there is no entry fee, no 
redemption rights and all users pay the same amount for the right to use the output produced by the 
cooperative. In contrast, in a discriminatory cooperative newcomers must pay an entry fee. 
 
15 Jossa (2005) rejects the view that Marx refused cooperation as a production mode. Analysing 
some of Marx’s writing, Jossa (2005) argues that Marx regarded a system of cooperatives as a 
production mode superior to capitalism. 
 
16 Having access to external finance enables the owners of a firm to broaden their investment 
portfolio and/or diversify risk. It may also help to bring in the firm financial management skills 
that would otherwise be lacking. 
 
17 The bundle of rights which sets the labour-managed firm apart from other business types is 
summarised by Pejovich (1992) as follows: the employees govern the firm; the employees have 
claims on the firm’s cash flows; the above employees’ rights are not transferable, and are 
contingent on their employment with that firm; the firm has not ownership of its capital assets. 
This bundle of rights creates some negative incentives and positive transaction costs that are 
responsible for the inefficiency of investment decisions by labour-managed firms (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1979 and Pejovich, 1990, in Pejovich, 1992). 
 
18 In biology frequency dependence describes situations where selection coefficients are 
dependent on population density, such that there is a feedback relationship between a unit and its 
environment. In the context of real economies, frequency dependence implies that the low density 
of cooperative firms should not be taken to mean that either individual firms of this type, or an 
industry dominated by them, is necessarily less efficient (Hodgson, 1993, 1994). 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
THE DEMOCRATIC FIRM AND THE WIDER 
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The pessimistic theoretical predictions of the conventional economic theory on 
democratic firms discussed in the previous chapter do not seem to offer a realistic 
account. Indeed research on cooperatives shows that their performance is strongly 
influenced by the political and socio-economic conditions that prevail in the socio-
economic environment in which these firms operate. However, differences in the 
history of the cooperative movement of diverse countries, combined with 
differences in legal frameworks, make it difficult to draw general conclusions when 
trying to evaluate the effectiveness and performance of cooperative firms as an 
organisational form across countries. 
This chapter aims to explore the above context dependency argument by 
presenting anecdotal evidence on the role of political, cultural and socio-economic 
factors surrounding the historical development of the cooperative sector in different 
countries. Wherever available, figures on some performance indicators will also be 
provided. However, due to differences in the coverage of the data sources used, as 
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well as in the country-specific legal frameworks regulating the cooperative legal 
structure, the data are not directly comparable across countries. 
The chapter briefly touches in the next section on the origins of the cooperative 
ideology and on economists’ attitude towards it. Section 3 discusses the pre- and 
post-privatisation experience of Central and Eastern European countries. Section 4 
looks at the United Kingdom case. Section 5 presents the experience of Belgium, 
Denmark and the Netherlands. Section 6 comments on the features of the Japanese 
cooperative sector. Section 7 explores the main traits of the French case. Section 8 
discusses the cooperative movement in Italy. Section 9 presents cooperation in 
Spain. Section 10 illustrates the US experience. The concluding part of the chapter 
draws on the evidence previously discussed in order to evaluate the relevance of the 
context dependence claim in regard to cooperative firms and their performance.  
 
2 ORIGINS OF THE COOPERATIVE IDEOLOGY AND ECONOMISTS’ 
ATTITUDE 
 
The idea of cooperation as a means of escaping the undesirable consequences of 
capitalism and industrialisation started to be propagated in the early years of the 
nineteenth century. In his 1813 work A New View of Society, Robert Owen (1771-
1858) was among the first to praise the value of a system run on a cooperative basis. 
French socialists Henri de Saint Simon (1760-1825), Charles Fourier (1772-1837), 
Philippe Buchez (1796-1866), Pierre Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865) and Louis Blanc 
(1811-1882) were other early proponents of the idea that production should be 
organised through a system of permanent cooperative associations (Tombs, 1984). 
126 
Writing in 1848 John Stuart Mill (1806-1973) rejected the Communistic doctrine 
and praised Henri de Saint Simon and Fourier: “The two elaborate forms of non-
communistic Socialism known as St. Simonism and Fourierism are totally free from 
the objections usually urged against Communism … they may just be counted 
among the most remarkable productions of the past and present age” (Mill, 1987: 
212). Mill argued that the Saint Simonian scheme was valuable because it did not 
contemplate an equal distribution of product and proposed that each individual 
should be occupied according to personal vocation or skills. In regard to Fourierism, 
Mill considered it as “the most skilfully combined, and with the greatest foresight of 
objections, of all the forms of Socialism” (ibid: 212). In Mill’s view, Fourierism 
greatest merit was the suggestion that the distribution of the product of cooperative 
associations should be carried out by first assigning a certain minimum for the 
subsistence of every member, and then to share the remainder in pre-determined 
proportions among labour, capital and talent (Mill, 1987).  
Hodgson (1999) points out that for Marx worker cooperatives had an ideological 
and demonstrative value within capitalism and he supported them for that reason. 
Such cooperatives showed that the workers were capable of managing production 
without capitalists. However, Marx did not see the establishment of producer 
cooperatives alongside other forms of collective productive organisation under 
future socialism. During the 1864 First International, Marx and his followers 
proposed that worker cooperatives would become part of nationalised industries 
(Hodgson, 1999). Hence Marxists were sceptical about the viability of cooperative 
firms under communism.  
Also Alfred Marshall praised cooperation when in his 1881 Principles of 
Economics he wrote: “If competition is contrasted with energetic co-operation in 
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unselfish work for the public good, then even the best forms of competition are 
relatively evil; while its harsher and meaner forms are hateful” (Marshall, 1962: 7). 
He argued that in a cooperative society the employees “have fairly good means of 
judging whether the higher work of engineering the business is conducted honestly 
and efficiently” (ibid: 254) and that  
 
“they render unnecessary some of the minor work of superintendence that is 
required in other establishments; for their own pecuniary interests and the pride 
they take in the success of their own business make each of them averse to any 
shirking of work either by himself or by his fellow-workmen” (ibid: 255).  
 
Although Marshall envisaged in the lack of managerial skills the main problem faced 
by cooperative firms at the time of his writing, he was hopeful that cooperative 
societies could become successful, as the following extract testifies: “it may be 
hoped that the diffusion of a better knowledge of the true principles of co-operation, 
and the increase of general education, are every day fitting a larger number of co-
operators for the complex problems of business management” (ibid: 255-256). 
 
3 THE DEMOCRATIC FIRM IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 
 
This section illustrates the main stages of the historical development of democratic 
firms in Central and Eastern Europe, where the cooperative movement started to 
develop in the second half of the nineteenth century. Both the pre- and post-
privatisation periods are considered.  
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3.1 The ex-Yugoslav experience 
 
Since the early 1950s ex-Yugoslavia deviated from the centralised communism of 
the Stalinist type and replaced vertical command planning with horizontal relations 
between more autonomous enterprises through a regulated market (Estrin, 1991b). 
Federal and republican plans no longer prescribed output norms for firms and 
industries. Furthermore, the country began experimenting with the introduction of 
democratic practices in the workplace by establishing the self-management of its 
industrial enterprises (Ward, 1958; Ramachandran et al, 1979). The cardinal 
principle was that employees had to have a role in the decision-making structures of 
their enterprises (Estrin, 1991b).  
According to Janez Prasnikar and Jan Svenjar (1991), the Yugoslav experience 
with workers’ self-management can be broadly divided in four periods: the 
introduction of self-management (1952-1960), when central planning was still 
influential; the period of market self-management (1961-1970), when significant 
decentralisation and introduction of market forces took place; the period of 
integrally planned self-management (1971-1988), with more emphasis on 
bargaining among economic units with varying degrees of political and economic 
power; the post-1988 system aimed at reintroducing markets and private property, 
and delimit the self-management rights of workers.  
As mentioned above, workers’ management was introduced in the early 1950s 
and provided for an elected council of workers in the firm that had to serve a 
general policy making function. The council had to approve both the independent 
plan of the firm and the wage schedule. Differential wages within the firm were 
subject to the constraint that no wage rate could be set below the State minimum 
wage. The council was also empowered to issue directives on the execution of the 
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plan and the management of the firm. Day-to-day supervision of operations was 
entrusted to the management board, a sub-committee of the workers’ council 
(Ward, 1958). Furthermore, the 1952 reform permitted workers to appropriate any 
surplus normally allocated to owners and to make accumulation decisions, but 
retain no individual marketable rights over the assets (Estrin, 1991b). 
Observers of the Yugoslavian experience tend to agree that the actual 
distribution of power in self-managed firms was more hierarchical than a pure self-
managed model would suggest (Rus, 1978; Vejnovic, 1978; Prasnikar and Svenjar, 
1991). Mark Shaffer (1994) argues that levels of participation were in practice low 
or non-existent despite worker participation was extolled. The institutions that 
should have suggested that some kind of participation existed (e.g. workers’ 
councils), typically had little or no influence on power. The main reason for their 
existence was to provide ideological support for the economic and political system. 
Indeed the State reserved the right to intervene directly to alter any decisions that it 
did not approve (Ward, 1958). 
Furthermore, the legal and institutional settings provided negative incentives in 
terms of promoting the efficiency of labour-managed firms. For instance, until the 
late 1980s individuals were not legally allowed to start self-managed firms. In 
addition, to prevent unemployment the authorities tended to rehabilitate, rather than 
liquidate, unsuccessful self-managed firms (Ramachandran et al, 1979; Prasnikar 
and Svenjar, 1991). 
When ex-Yugoslavia introduced the market socialism reforms of the period 
1961-1970, the possibility for the emergence of genuine worker participation was 
allowed. The reforms instituted worker councils in State-owned enterprises, which 
however had power only in limited spheres, such as wage determination and 
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employment decisions. Similar changes occurred also in Hungary and Poland. 
However, the councils had not considerable authority in the above countries 
(Shaffer, 1994).  
In the period 1971-1988 reforms represented a move back from allocation by 
markets, which was replaced by bargaining between enterprise management, local 
government officials and bankers. In that phase firms were broken into units within 
plants. These units, called Basic Organisations of Associated Labour (BOAL 
henceforth), had their own self-management apparatus (Estrin, 1991b).  
In 1980 the self-managed sector produced more than 85% of gross national 
product and employed almost six million people, who were organised in 20,064 
BOAL, 14,039 working organisations with BOAL and 4,157 working organisations 
without BOAL (Prasnikar, 1994). Throughout the 1980s problems emerged in terms 
of declining labour productivity, low capital productivity and absence of financial 
discipline of firms (Lydall, 1984; 1989, in Estrin, 1991b). Estrin (1991b) argued 
that probably the causes of these problems were: the breaking up of firms into 
BOAL, which transformed managers into functionaries and levied workers from 
any responsibility for poor choices; the absence of decentralised capital market 
institutions to be associated with self-managed enterprises. 
Shaffer (1994) evaluates the ex-Yugoslav experience with self-management 
arguing that it seems to have been genuinely popular among workers. It also 
contributed positively to the legitimacy of the political system and of the Yugoslav 
State. From 1988 ex-Yugoslavia embarked on reforms which implied abandoning 
their unique system and moving towards Western-type capitalism. Ethnic tensions 
then overshadowed economic issues (Estrin, 1991b). 
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3.2 Cooperative firms in Poland 
 
The first three Polish cooperatives were organised in 1876 and soon afterwards a 
remarkable network became established (Fallenbuchl, 1978). During the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century the movement played a significant role not 
only in economic terms but also from a social and political point of view. It was 
accepted by the dominant institutions for two main reasons. First, people found in 
its ideology a hold in their struggle for economic, cultural and political self-
determination. Second, the movement had the support of the church and of the 
nationalistic organisations, which made determined efforts to promote it (Pluta, 
1978). Parish priests had an important role in the development of cooperatives, 
especially in rural areas. Moreover, the support for the movement was not limited to 
any particular political camp. Indeed a number of Socialists, as well as of Christian 
Democrats were cooperative activists before World War I (Fallenbuchl, 1978). 
Despite the above, in practice the authorities treated cooperatives as essentially 
no different from State-owned enterprises. Their activity was integrated into the 
economic planning hierarchy and was directed by the national cooperative 
organisations (Shaffer, 1994). Nonetheless, in all periods of economic development 
in socialist Poland, the State authorities appreciated and supported the activities of 
workers’ cooperatives, and attempted to direct these activities toward the productive 
sectors that were regarded as especially important. In regard to worker cooperatives, 
they had an important role for the employment of economically handicapped 
groups, such as work and war invalids, as well as of people (mainly women) that 
could not leave their homes (Gajda, 1978).  
During the interwar period cooperatives were used to reduce the impact of the 
great depression. Workers coops were involved in setting up small industrial plants, 
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while agricultural cooperatives were intended to protect the welfare of the rural 
population (Fallenbuchl, 1978).  
After World War II, the cooperative sector played an important role in the 
reconstruction. The following period was that of the sovietisation of the Polish State 
and economy, the collectivisation drive, and the establishment of the centralised 
model of planning. Cooperatives were regarded as a tool for the liquidation of the 
private property, particularly during the collectivisation drive in agriculture in the 
early 1950s (Fallenbuchl, 1978). Hence, agricultural cooperatives increased from 
243 in 1949 to 10,510 in 1956, and membership passed from 23,300 in 1950 to 
205,200 in 1955. In industry part of the small industrial firms were forced into 
cooperatives, with the result that the cooperative sector expanded from 6.2 percent 
in 1949 to 10.5 percent in 1950 (Fallenbuchl, 1978). 
The cooperative sector declined from 1956 when de-collectivisation started,1 but 
regained consistency starting from 1960, following the introduction of a policy of 
incentives and fiscal measures. In the 1960s the development of worker 
cooperatives was directed toward provisioning local markets, using local labour and 
raw materials. Instead, in the 1970s the role of worker cooperatives was oriented to 
service provision (Gajda, 1978).2  
 
3.3 The effects of privatisation 
 
The transformation process that began in 1989 brought a number of significant 
changes for democratic firms. When the transition of Central and Eastern European 
countries began, firms were suddenly given substantial autonomy and became 
subject to the competing property rights of four groups of actors: nominal owners; 
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management; workers, and the State. Where the interests of workers dominated, 
firms became worker-controlled (Shaffer, 1994). In regard to the effects produced 
by the transformation process of former socialist states in the ex-Yugoslav 
republics, a negative stand towards economic democracy was observed after the 
abolition of self-managed socialism and the new interest towards the increase in 
productivity (Prasnikar, 1994).  
Observers suggest that the most remarkable case of the emergence of worker 
control is the Polish one. Shaffer (1994) argues that the main difference between 
Polish and Yugoslavian firms was the external environment: Polish State-owned 
enterprises were genuinely independent from the political authorities and operated 
in a financial environment in which the government did not finance firms that had 
defaulted. Instead, it has been pointed out earlier in this chapter that this was not the 
case for Yugoslavian firms. It is worth noting that as of 31 December 2001, 411,700 
persons were employed in the Polish cooperative sector, which represented 2.9% of 
total employment. This figure was down from 642,000 at the end of 1995 
(Lowitzsch and Woodward, 2006). 
When the privatisation process started in Central and Eastern Europe, firms 
could be bought by: outside owners; the general public; the management and the 
workers. In this process, Polish cooperatives began to be treated as part of the 
private sector. Shaffer argued in 1994: ‘the economic outlook for the producer co-
operatives is not good. Industrial cooperatives in Poland have done worse during 
the transition than the State sector in terms of both output and employment’ (ibid: 
324). A declining performance characterised also coops in other countries. For 
instance, GDP in the Hungarian cooperative sector fell by 41 per cent between 1990 
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and 1992, and employment in cooperatives fell by 48 per cent in the same period 
(Valentinyi, 1993, in Shaffer, 1994). 
In a recent work Mygind (2008) evaluates the impact of the privatisation process 
on employee ownership. He points out that after a first initial strong positive 
impact, this wave lost soon its momentum, and today profit sharing and worker 
cooperatives are not widespread in Eastern Europe.  
Mygind (2008) argues that there were special conditions in the above mentioned 
privatisation models in the initial period of the transition process that favoured 
employee ownership in some countries. In Lithuania, Poland, Romania and 
Slovenia employees were given the possibility to takeover the majority of shares at 
low prices. In Bulgaria, Estonia, Croatia, Latvia and Hungary employee ownership 
was established in some sectors, especially in small companies and in the very early 
stages of transition. Instead, in the Czech Republic and Slovakia practically no 
worker-owned firms were started up. 
In regard to Croatia and Slovenia, Mygind (2008) claims that the experience 
with workers’ self-management from the old Yugoslavia is probably the main 
reason why employee ownership is still relatively more stable in these countries. In 
most of the other countries managers dominated the employee companies from the 
start and took over the majority of ownership. In later rounds, most of these 
companies were taken over by outside owners, often foreign ones. 
The evidence does not point to lower efficiency in employee owned firms. 
However, in most countries neither the institutions and the level of incomes nor the 
goals of the workers were ready for this type of ownership requiring a degree of 
involvement from the employees from both a financial and a mental point of view 
(Mygind, 2008). 
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4 THE CHANGING FORTUNES OF THE UK COOPERATIVE SECTOR 
 
The origins of the cooperative sector in the British economy can be traced back to 
1844 when the first producer cooperative was established in Rochdale.3 
Cooperatives were granted legal status and limited liability by the Industrial and 
Provident Societies Act of 1852 and 1862, and some two hundred were formed in 
the years up to 1880. With a few exceptions their life spans were short and the 
twentieth century saw numbers reduce to just 19 in 1975 (Estrin and Pérotin, 1987). 
It has been argued that one reason for this decline is that the British financial 
environment has been restrictive on coops’ ability to raise finance (Oakeshott, 1978; 
Logan and Gregory, 1981). Keith Jefferis and Nigel Mason (1990) point out that in 
the United Kingdom cooperative firms face particularly severe problems with 
regard to finance availability at start-up and in their early years. These firms have 
low levels of capitalisation, an almost total lack of resources from commercial 
sources, and strongly rely on members’ loans. 
However, the mid 1970s marked a turning point in the fortunes of the 
cooperative sector. The event that set off this change was a substantially increased 
availability of finance from public sources in the decade from 1976 to 1986. This 
institutional change enabled cooperative firms to break out the previous situation. 
Their number began to grow rapidly, reaching 330 in 1980 and 1,400 in 1985.4 The 
explanation of such an extraordinary growth probably lies in a combination of 
factors.5 That was a period of high unemployment; moreover the dominant 
“educational, social and moral standards … [may have led] some workers to seek 
from democratic forms of enterprise organization the satisfaction from the 
workplace that traditional firms are unable to offer” (Estrin, 1985: 363). However, it 
has been pointed out that the most important factor sustaining the observed rapid 
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development of the cooperative sector was the provision of institutional support 
from the Industrial Common Ownership Movement, instituted in 1971, and the Co-
operative Development Agency, founded in 1978 (Estrin and Pérotin, 1987; Jefferis 
and Mason, 1990). Following the establishment of these institutional bodies, a 
major transformation in coops’ financial environment occurred in those years, with 
an increasing amount of funds being provided by the local and central government. 
Finance from public sources was allocated to cooperatives based on the assessment 
of their commercial viability. However, the criteria used to conduct the assessment, 
as well as the credit terms offered, were substantially more sympathetic and 
generous than those offered by banks (Jefferis and Mason, 1990). 
By alleviating the initial problem of undercapitalisation, more cooperatives could 
become successfully established without some of the financial constraints 
previously faced, and could eventually raise loans from banks. This change 
represented an intervention in the workings of the credit markets that provided 
cooperatives a further option for raising finance, beyond the limited resources of 
members and sympathisers, and the inadequate terms offered by commercial banks. 
The available data on the cooperative sector undoubtedly support the claim that the 
above institutional changes contributed to the massive expansion of the sector between 
1980 and 1986. Jan Podivinsky and Geoff Stewart (2007) report data on annual 
registrations of cooperative firms by industrial sector (Standard Industrial 
Classification – SIC 1980) drawn from the Worker Co-operative Database. The 
figures reveal that over the ten year period 1976-1985, registrations increased by more 
than 13%. Looking at the general pattern of entry in the United Kingdom, measured 
by Value Added Tax (VAT) registrations, a comparison of the first half of the period 
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(1976-1980) with the second one (1981-1985) reveals a growth rate of more than 
300% for coops, compared with just 11% in VAT registrations for other firms. 
Considering the significance of the above figures, it is striking that after 1986 the 
funding introduced in the previous decade started to gradually vanish. This occurred 
despite the fact that the new range of financial sources was being widely used by 
new and expanding cooperatives.6 This adversely impacted the cooperative sector 
and the observed formation rate of coops declined since then. The 2004 figure for 
the contribution of UK cooperatives to employment was 0.66% (Unioncamere, 
2004). Hence the United Kingdom case appears to be emblematic for the impact 
that a changing institutional environment can exert on the fortunes of the 
democratic firm. 
 
5 THE EXPERIENCE OF BELGIUM, DENMARK AND THE 
NETHERLANDS 
 
Despite the early inception of the Belgium cooperative movement (the first 
cooperative was founded in 1848),7 the sector has never reached a considerable 
dimension in this country. Indeed according to a 1998 report of the International 
Cooperative Alliance (ICA),8 only 1,553 cooperative firms were present in Belgium 
in 1996. It has been argued that one reason for this limited diffusion is that the 
cooperative legislation is drawn in a fairly broad sense. Hence, there is not always a 
clear-cut distinction between the discipline of coops and that reserved to other small 
and medium enterprises (Thomas, 1990). Insofar as the financial structure and 
performance of Belgian cooperative firms is concerned, a study by Jean-Luc Geron 
(1990) compares data on coops with industry norms, and shows that shortage of 
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equity finance is only one among a number of other difficulties – such as the 
restriction of cooperatives to some industrial sectors, and a more general shortage of 
start-up finance for small firms.  
Also in the Netherlands cooperatives started to appear in the nineteenth century, 
and as early of 1855 a specific cooperative legislation was adopted. The movement 
had a steady diffusion in a number of sectors, such as credit, retail, insurance, 
housing, manufacture and agriculture. Analysing the performance of a variety of 
enterprises with different degrees of self-management, and drawing also on reviews 
of other studies and anecdotal evidence, Henk Voets (1990) argues that in the 
Netherlands cooperatives perform as well as other business structures, although the 
sector is not particularly significant in numbers. Moreover, these firms do not seem 
to have particular difficulties in accessing finance.9 
Turning to discuss the Denmark case, this is a peculiar one since no specific 
legal framework for cooperative firms has been adopted. Legislation is, basically, in 
terms of traditional ownership structures (Shaffer, 1999; Unioncamere, 2004). Thus, 
although there is some special legislation for consumer cooperatives, the law in 
some cases discriminates against the sector and in other cases does not take into 
account the special needs of cooperative firms (Mygind, 1990). 
It could be for the absence of specific regulations that Denmark has few 
cooperatives of any kind, and data on the performance of those few (reported in 
Mygind, 1990) show that financing issues constitute one of the important obstacles 
to an increase in the number of democratic firms.10 The most important financial 
obstacle is identified in the special need of starting capital, combined with the fact 
that there are no special financial institutions supporting cooperative firms. Hence 
Mygind (1990) concludes that any weaknesses of the cooperative sector, compared 
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to industry norms, are mainly due to lack of start-up capital, rather than particular 
difficulties with their financial structure. His argument is that without dedicated 
financial institutions, Danish cooperatives have to use the ordinary banking system. 
The attitude of banking institutions towards employee owned firms is difficult to 
measure. On one hand, since employee ownership is so rare in Denmark, banks lack 
knowledge about cooperatives. On the other hand, there have been cases of banks 
discriminating against employee owned firms because of the ownership structure 
(Mygind, 1988, 1990). Mygind (1990) claims that the lack of knowledge on 
cooperative firms, not only on the part of financial institutions but also among 
potential entrepreneurs and workers, represents an important obstacle to their 
development in Denmark. 
The three cases discussed in this section provide further anecdotal evidence 
supporting the claim that the presence of dedicated institutions represents an 
important factor contributing to the development of the democratic firm. Indeed, the 
absence of a specific institutional framework for Belgian and Danish cooperatives 
had a negative impact on the significance and performance of their cooperative 
sectors. In contrast, the Netherlands experience, where specific coop legislation 
exists since the nineteenth century, shows that cooperatives’ performance does not 
suffer any particular deficit compared to conventional firms. 
 
6 THE JAPANESE COOPERATIVE SECTOR 
 
The modern history of the Japanese cooperative sector began in the second half of 
the nineteenth century in the silk and tea retail industries, and in the rural 
purchasing sector. After the 1906 Japanese-Russian war the government put 
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substantial effort into the development of cooperatives, mainly agricultural ones. In 
1921 the Industry Cooperative Law was revised and the Central Industry 
Cooperative Bank was established in 1923. Following the 1930 agricultural 
recession, the Government set up the five-year Industry Cooperative Development 
Plan and encouraged farmers to join a cooperative (Shaffer, 1999). 
In 1938 cooperatives faced a turning point: the government brought them into a 
non-democratic organisation, the Agricultural Association. Only after World War II 
the governance of the Association became more democratic. In 1947 the Agricultural 
Cooperative Law was passed. The aim was to encourage the creation of local 
cooperatives by increasing the provision of financial support from the government. 
This regulatory reform allowed a rapid expansion of the cooperative sector and led to 
the creation of forestry, fishery and consumer cooperatives, as well as of credit 
unions. From the 1960s onwards, cooperatives’ development followed the growth 
pattern of the Japanese economy: a rapid expansion first, followed by stagnation after 
the 1973 oil shock (Japanese Joint Committee on Cooperatives, 1992). 
Nowadays the sector is especially strong in agriculture and related industries, in 
the retail distribution of food, medical care, insurance, housing, universities and in 
the financial industry. Mark Klinedinst and Hitomi Sato (1994) report that in the 
1990s more than 30 million people were members in cooperatives, and that the 
strongest organisations were those operating in the agricultural sector. One factor 
accounting for the good performance of agricultural cooperatives is the financial 
support they still obtain through the so-called ‘system loan’: the government lends 
them funds at interest rates that are lower than those charged to conventional firms. 
Typical system loans are the Agricultural Financial Institution Funds and the 
Agricultural Cooperative Modernization Funds. These funds, tied to the 
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government’s agricultural and financial policies, beside providing financial 
resources to cooperatives, also advise them on how to best use the loans (Klinedinst 
and Sato, 1994).  
 
7 COOPERATION IN FRANCE 
 
France has a relatively well developed cooperative sector, which had its genesis in 
the intellectual tradition of Fourier and Buchez. The movement had a continuous 
presence since its inception in the mid nineteenth century, and worker cooperatives 
(sociétés coopératives de production or SCOPs) often show remarkable longevity 
(Batstone, 1982). The French cooperative history is associated with numerous State 
interventions. As early of 1867 a legal form for cooperatives was established; a 
number of laws were approved in subsequent decades to give specific status and 
privileges to worker cooperatives (Thomas and Defourny, 1990).11  
The oldest SCOP currently trading was created in 1882, and 16 of today's 
cooperatives were created before World War I (Pérotin, 2006). This longevity may 
be explained by the fact that, as for Spanish and Italian cooperatives, also French 
SCOPs are less exposed to the main exit processes identified in the literature – 
namely self-extinction due to underinvestment and degeneration to the capitalist 
structure (Pérotin, 1999). Evidence in favour of this argument is offered by Jacques 
Defourny (1990), who uses data on a large sample of French cooperatives to analyse 
specific aspects of their performance. The research does not find support for the 
theoretically predicted tendency of cooperatives to underinvest. The performance 
profile of more mature cooperatives is very similar to that of capitalist firms operating 
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in similar industrial sectors. Moreover new cooperatives that invest less than 
conventional firms do so due to lack of capital and the need to build up reserves.  
As far as the consistency and composition of the cooperative sector is concerned, 
a 2001 Eurostat report counted 22,147 cooperatives in 1998, accounting for 0.64% 
of total French firms. The study shows that cooperatives were more numerous in the 
sectors of real estate, renting and business activities, agriculture, hunting and 
forestry. In terms of number of employees, in 1998 French cooperatives represented 
1% of total employment, of which the most important part was in the sectors of 
financial intermediation (7.30%), agriculture, hunting and forestry (4.86%), and 
wholesale and retail trade (2.12%). Producer cooperatives represent a very small 
proportion of all French firms, with around 1,700 firms employing about 36,000 
people out of a total of 2.5 million firms. Nonetheless, the movement is sizeable by 
the standards of several industrialised countries (Pérotin, 2006). 
The data above presented show that, despite its longevity, the French cooperative 
sector does not hold a very high share in the economy. It seems that problems with 
firm creation, rather than exit, may explain the limited incidence of cooperative 
firms even in countries where issues related to their structural viability have been 
resolved (Pérotin, 2006). 
 
8 THE ITALIAN CASE 
 
Italy has the largest cooperative sector in Western Europe and there is specific 
regulation governing it. At the end of 2005 there were 70,400 cooperative firms, 
providing 4.7% of total employment, against a European average of about 2.5% 
(Unioncamere, 2006). From a geographical point of view, the contribution of 
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cooperatives to employment and value added is greater in the South (5% and 4.7%, 
respectively) and in the North-Eastern regions – 6.9% and 5.5% (Unioncamere, 
2006). Looking at some figures on the longevity of coops, 2% of those active in 
2005 were established before 1940, while this figure is 0.1% for other business 
types (Unioncamere, 2006). This seems to suggest that, on average, Italian 
cooperatives survive longer than conventional firms. The few statistics presented 
illustrate that cooperation is an important and still vital component of the Italian 
economic system. It seems reasonable to argue that the factors accounting for this 
‘success’ must be somehow rooted in the history of the cooperative movement and 
the wider institutional environment in which it developed. 
Conventionally, the origin of the Italian cooperative movement is dated back to 
1854, when the first cooperative was established in Turin. The first producer 
cooperative was founded in Savona in 1856, while the first credit cooperative was 
established in Lodi in 1864. An important event in the history of the movement was 
the creation of the National League of Cooperatives and Mutuals (Lega Nazionale 
delle Cooperative e Mutue) in 1886. In the first quarter of the twentieth century, the 
cooperative sector grew considerably and several laws were approved in order to 
stimulate the creation of cooperative consortia. In 1913 Luigi Luzzatti founded the 
National Credit Institute for the cooperative movement and in 1919 the Italian 
Cooperative Confederation (Confederazione Cooperativa Italiana) was established 
(Zangheri et al, 1987). 
During World War I the government promoted the expansion of cooperatives 
since they were considered important to cushion the social costs of the war. In those 
years coops experimented a phase of development in several sectors. The scenario 
changed in the early 1920s, when the recession negatively affected the national 
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economy, hence also the cooperative sector. Those were also the early years of the 
fascist movement. Mussolini soon realised that the cooperative organisations 
represented a bridge between the civil society and mass groups. For this reason, 
breaking those links became an absolute priority for fascists (Fabbri, 1979). 
However, later under the regime the cooperative movement started to be regarded 
as an instrument to gain consensus among the masses. For this reason the regime 
attempted to transform the cooperative identity into a model more consonant with 
the fascist ideology. To this end, both the National League of Cooperatives and 
Mutuals and the Italian Cooperative Confederation were dissolved, and replaced by 
a fascist organisation (Fornasari and Zamagni, 1997). 
The collapse of fascism and the end of World War II represented a central 
turning point for cooperatives and their organisations since they could regain the 
lost independence and autonomy. The cooperative movement benefited also from a 
favourable institutional framework: the new Republican Constitution recognised the 
social function of cooperation, and assigned its promotion and development to the 
State. In 1947 an important legislative intervention was the Basevi Law. This law 
established the principles of democracy and solidarity on which the creation of 
cooperatives would have had to be grounded; it also set clauses to verify the 
compliance with the mutual aid principle (Canosa, 1978). 
During the 1950s and 1960s, the expansion of the cooperative sector was 
sizeable. This growth was related to the favourable economic conjuncture of those 
years (known as the years of the ‘Italian miracle’), but it also benefited from the 
more mature entrepreneurial culture that started to spread among cooperatives and 
from an increased awareness of their potential (Bianco, 1975). The 1970s represent 
an important decade in the history of the Italian cooperative movement. Despite that 
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period being one of crisis, not only economic but also political, due to terrorist 
activity, cooperatives experienced a rapid and sustained development, especially in 
the late 1970s. This expansion continued in the 1980s, when social cooperation 
started to bloom and managerial expertise developed also in the cooperative sector 
(Sapelli, 1981; Zamagni, 2006). 
In the 1990s the hot topic for cooperatives was that of capital acquisition. With 
the growing financialisation of the economy, the cooperative movement revealed an 
increasing need of financial resources, and coops’ under-capitalisation became an 
issue for concern (Fici, 2004). In a 1990 paper, Alberto Zevi argued that despite the 
many pro-cooperative State measures such as tax incentives, and various financial 
initiatives undertaken by the cooperative movement, there is still shortage of the 
finance required to stimulate the growth of cooperative firms. To stimulate the 
capitalisation of cooperative firms through the conferment of funds by third parties, 
the 59/1992 Law introduced the figure of financial backer member (i.e. socio 
sovventore) – a category of partners having the role of financiers, but not engaging 
in the mutualistic exchange. The reform established that, beside the right to vote in 
the company meetings, these financiers could also receive a remuneration higher 
(maximum +2%) than the one assigned to cooperator members. Commentators 
argued that the 1992 law did not achieve the intended outcomes in terms of the 
amount of financial resources that have been mobilised (La Loggia Albanese, 2003; 
Salani, 2005; Zevi, 2005).  
In the early 2000s the Italian corporate law has been reformed and new 
regulations have been introduced for cooperative firms. Among the most important 
changes that the reform brought about is the possibility for cooperatives to access a 
wider range of financial instruments. Whether or not the new regulations will have 
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positive effects for the capitalisation of cooperative firms is an issue that only future 
research can assess. 
 
9 SPAIN: A SUCCESS STORY 
 
Spain has a relatively large cooperative sector, though it is concentrated in certain 
regions. Specific legislation is intended to promote and regulate the cooperative 
sector. For instance, a variety of instruments have been designed in order to assist the 
financing of Spanish cooperatives, including obligatory collective reserves and non-
working financing members. In addition, legal restrictions have been set out to 
preserve the cooperative nature of the enterprise, while allowing the greatest possible 
access to funds of all types. The importance of these various sources of finance lies 
in the fact that each of them will have a specific weight at different stages of 
development of the firm, thus sustaining investment and growth (Morales, 1990). 
In the Spanish case a fascinating and well known experience is that of 
Mondragón cooperatives, in the Basque region of Spain. This is often quoted in the 
literature as one of the most successful cooperative practices in the Western world. 
Henk Thomas (1982), Keith Bradley and Alan Gelb (1983), William White and 
Kathleen White (1988), and Stephen Smith (2001) identify the following main 
stages in the history of Mondragón cooperatives 
Mondragón’s story began thanks to Jose Maria Arizmendi, a priest that after the 
civil war started in 1943 a democratically-managed Polytechnic School, as a way to 
raise again the city by making the most of the local youth. Arizmendi was familiar 
with the ideas of Owen and the principles adopted by the Rochdale Pioneers.12 He 
had a profound influence on five of his pupils, who became engineers and started in 
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1956 their own factory, Ulgor, producing paraffin heaters and cookers. In the 
following years several other local cooperatives were developing, all facing the 
same problems: insufficient access to capital; exclusion from the Spanish Social 
Security System, and limited technological base. The solution to the first two 
problems was found in a cooperative savings bank, the Caja Laboral Popular, 
founded in 1959. The Caja had among its members not only the manufacturing 
cooperatives, but also members of the local community. It is for this reason that it 
has been termed a second degree cooperative. The bank initially took responsibility 
also for social security needs; then, in 1970 this function was taken over by another 
second degree cooperative, named Lagun Aro. As far as the expansion of the 
technological base is concerned – the third challenge experienced by early 
cooperatives – this goal was accomplished by founding Alecoop, a factory with a 
training school. In the 1980s the various cooperatives joined together in the 
Mondragón Corporación Cooperativa. For the period from 1988 to 2008, data on 
the performance of the group show that: industrial sales grew from 890 to 6,511 
million of Euro; retail sales passed from 310 to 9,073 million of Euro; employment 
grew from 20,818 to 92,772 employees; resources administered by the Caja 
Laboral Popular grew from 1,328 to 13,988 million of Euro (Mondragón 
Corporación Cooperativa, 2009). 
A consensus has emerged among the scholars that have analysed the Mondragón 
case in considering the cooperative bank Caja the driving force towards success. 
Commentators as Oakeshott (1978) and Fairclough (1987) concluded that the 
availability of specialised sources of finance, through the valuable interventionist 
role of the Caja, was a major factor accounting for the success of these Spanish 
coops. Indeed at an early stage in the group’s history, the Caja Laboral Popular 
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was set up with the explicit purpose of providing external funds to cooperative 
firms (Thomas and Logan, 1982). 
Podivinsky and Stewart (2007) recall that in his analysis of labour-managed firms’ 
financing, Vanek (1977) argued that to solve the issue of poor performance of this 
sector a non-profit agency, the ‘National Labor-Management Agency’, needed to be 
created. This should have provided external finance to labour-managed firms (but 
without any associated rights of control). The experience of the Mondragón group of 
cooperatives in the Spanish Basque region is interesting in this regard. 
To recapitulate, in the Spanish case the linkage between a bank and producer 
cooperatives has been a highly innovative choice that provided cooperative firms 
with the financial means necessary to satisfy their credit requirements. This link, of 
course along with other factors, has led Mondragón to become what could be called 
a ‘good practice’ in cooperation.  
 
10 THE U.S. EXPERIENCE 
 
Another country where dedicated financial institutions proved to be of extreme 
importance for cooperatives, especially for agricultural ones, is the United States. 
As Kimberly Zeuli and Robert Cropp (2004) report,13 the Farm Credit System – a 
nationwide network of cooperative financial institutions and service organisations – 
provides loans, crop insurance and other financial services to farmers, 
agribusinesses, agricultural cooperatives and rural utility cooperatives.14 Within the 
Farm Credit System, CoBank is the national bank charged with providing credit to 
cooperatives. This is an independent financial institution which has the 
development of new cooperatives as part of its charter. CoBank was created in 1989 
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as a result of the consolidation of 11 out of the original 13 Banks for Cooperatives, 
established by the Farm Credit Act of 1933. In 1999 CoBank merged with the St. 
Paul Bank for Cooperatives and became the national leader in cooperative lending. 
Other financial institutions serving cooperatives include the National Rural 
Utilities Cooperative Finance Corporation, which loans funds to rural, electric and 
telephone cooperatives since 1969, and the National Cooperative Bank, providing 
loans to housing, consumer, and other non-agricultural cooperatives. The various 
Banks for Cooperatives (and in particular CoBank) have been the primary source of 
credit for U.S. cooperatives, as the banking industry has been reluctant to lend to 
these firms (Hazen, 2003). In contrast, the Banks for Cooperatives had a 
fundamental understanding of the cooperative philosophy, and this allowed them to 
provide a source of specialised expertise which sustained the development of 
cooperatives (Kenkel, 2005).  
A particularly successful cooperative experience in the U.S. is found within the 
State of Minnesota. The Minnesota Association of Cooperatives indicated several 
reasons explaining why this State succeeded in developing and operating 
cooperatives. Specifically, leadership, legislative support, and ‘believers’ are cited 
as three keys to this success. Among the ‘believers’ forming part of the support 
network, institutions as the St. Paul Bank of Cooperatives, the National Cooperative 
Bank, the Rural Finance Authority, and many other banks have set the stage for a 
financial framework supportive of cooperative development (Waner, 2000). 
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11 CONCLUSION 
 
The anecdotal evidence presented in this chapter gives a rather mixed picture of the 
cross-country performance of cooperative firms. The discussion carried out shows 
the existence of variety in the types of cooperatives existing in different countries, 
as well as in legal, financial and historical contexts. Furthermore, different problems 
seem to have emerged at various stages of development of the cooperative sector. 
In some countries, despite its early inception, the cooperative movement has 
experienced varying fortunes over time, and today occupies a marginal position in 
the economic system. Considering for instance the UK case, it has been shown that 
coops’ performance has followed changing patterns, and this has affected the 
relative significance of the sector in the national economy. The history of the British 
experience reveals that the changes occurred in the institutional context had a 
profound impact on cooperatives. These firms have been very sensitive to 
contextual conditions. In particular, following the structural change that in the 
second half of the 1970s allowed coops to access a wide range of public sources of 
financing, the cooperative sector expanded considerably, outperforming the creation 
rate of capitalist firms. When the financial environment became less ‘friendly’ 
towards coops, they have declined both in terms of numbers and economic impact. 
It can be argued that the pattern of evolution followed by the British capitalist 
system, and the consequent changes that occurred in the institutional framework, 
have been inhospitable to the flourishing of the cooperative economy. 
A different conclusion can instead be drawn by other cases that have been 
examined in this chapter, among which France, Spain and Italy. These countries 
have been able to promote and sustain cooperative development, by implementing a 
number of institutional reforms in the workings of their financial systems, and also 
151 
in other spheres, so as to deal with coops’ needs and peculiarities. However, while 
in France and Spain the development of the cooperative sector has been 
concentrated in particular geographical and sectoral areas, the Italian case appears 
to be particularly significant not only for the current size of the cooperative sector – 
the largest in Western Europe – but also in terms of its cultural embeddedness 
within society, as well as its wide diffusion in the national territory and across 
economic sectors. 
The above stylised facts on the evolution of the cooperative sector in 
contemporary capitalist systems suggest that history, and economic development, 
do not follow a unidimensional pattern. In other words, the theoretically predicted 
inefficiency of cooperative firms does not hold invariably in different institutional 
contexts. In fact, reality is multifaceted, with cooperatives performing well in some 
economic systems and not in others. Coops seem to be very sensitive to the 
prevailing institutional arrangements; where these create a climate that is hospitable 
to them (or at least not disfavouring), democratic firms tend to perform at least as 
well as capitalist firms. Hence, economic analysis should not disregard the role and 
impact of context dependence mechanisms. 
In regard to coops’ financing requirements, there is evidence showing that the 
financial regime operating in the (local or national) economy has a major impact on 
the performance of cooperatives. Where coops have access to external sources of 
financing, primarily in the form of bank loans, their performance profile does not 
seem to show particular problems. The Spanish Mondragón case is emblematic of 
how the availability of a specialised source of financing can foster coops’ 
development. This evidence on the importance of financial institutions to foster the 
economic performance of cooperative firms can be interpreted as indicating a 
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relationship of institutional complementarity: the effectiveness, hence the viability 
of coops is influenced, among other things, by the behaviour of financial 
institutions. This proposition will be empirically investigated in the next chapters 
with reference to the Italian case.   
It is worth clarifying at this stage that there may be other relevant institutional 
complementarities between cooperative firms’ performance and the wider legal, 
political and cultural environment. It would be worthwhile investigating other 
possible relationships of institutional complementarity and the impact these have on 
the Italian cooperative sector. However the need to focus the analysis developed in 
this thesis imposes leaving these other avenues to future research. 
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NOTES 
 
1 The number of production cooperatives collapsed from 10,510 to 1,803 and the membership 
from 205,200 to 31,600 in 1956 and 25,000 in 1957. In industry there was a slight increase in the 
share of both the private and cooperative sectors, at the expense of the State sector. In retail trade, 
instead, there was a significant decline of the cooperative sector (Fallenbuchl, 1978). 
 
2 Jozef Gajda (1978) reports the following figures taken from Poland’s 1977 statistical yearbook: 
there were 899 cooperative societies in 1960, while this figure was 2,103 in 1976. 
 
3 On the history of the British producer cooperative movement see Estrin (1985), and Estrin and 
Pérotin (1987).  
 
4 The 1985 total of 1,400 is a Co-operative Development Agency figure cited by Estrin and 
Pérotin (1987). Calculations by Hobbs and Jefferis (1990) put the total at just under 800. The 
disparity reflects differences in the definition of ‘worker cooperative’ and in the method used to 
compile the data.  
 
5 In those years the cooperative sector expanded also elsewhere in Europe and in the U.S. (see 
Estrin, 1985). 
 
6 Jefferis and Mason (1990) argue that there a number of reasons why the provision of finance 
from public sources has not been sustained, and these are largely due to the wider political process. 
 
7 On this point see Shaffer (1999). 
 
8 The report was commissioned by the European Union. 
 
9 The EUROSTAT (2001) report on EU cooperatives shows that 4,106 coops existed in the 
Netherlands in 1986. ICA data present a figure of 2,492 for 1997.    
 
10 A theoretical analysis of the factors constraining Danish cooperatives can be found in Mygind 
(1988). 
 
11 On this point, Bradley (1994) argues that Napoleon conceded to cooperatives’ demands to win 
the support of the working class. According to Bradley, Napoleon believed that he could have 
appeased workers’ potential militancy by encouraging cooperative societies. This could contribute 
to explain why numerous worker cooperatives were established in France in the building industry 
under Napoleon’s public works projects. 
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12 The Rochdale Pioneers was a trade-unionist Christian socialist group which, influenced by 
Owen, founded the first cooperative in Britain in 1844. 
 
13 Their work is a revision of Marvin’s (1980) book on the cooperative experience in the U.S. 
 
14 The Farm Credit System was created by the Congress in 1916. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
BANKING MARKET STRUCTURE, CREATION 
AND ACTIVITY OF FIRMS: EARLY EVIDENCE FOR 
COOPERATIVES IN THE ITALIAN CASE 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The economic literature discussed in Chapter Four has shown that the cooperative 
firm has been analysed, on both theoretical and empirical grounds, with respect to a 
number of different but related issues. Among these, we have seen that the role of 
external sources of financing, and especially bank credit, has been regarded a 
critical factor influencing the creation, functioning and survival of cooperatives 
(Ben-Ner, 1988a, b). It has been argued that their property rights structure creates a 
number of issues in the relationship with external financers, due to the problem of 
guarantees offered to third parties financing the firm (Jossa and Cuomo, 1997). 
Indeed, workers’ typically limited wealth, and consequent risk aversion and 
liquidity constraints, bound the personal collateral available for obtaining loans 
(Ben-Ner, 1988a). Moreover, the so-called cooperatives’ vaguely defined property 
rights (Cook, 1995) create a commitment problem of members (Schlicht and von 
Weizäcker, 1977), which makes agency problems in credit markets more severe for 
these firms than for other enterprises (Vitaliano, 1983; Drèze, 1993; Dow, 2003). 
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Therefore, although the banking system represents also for other firms an important 
channel of resources acquisition, it seems reasonable to argue that the structure of 
the financial sector can have particularly relevant implications for cooperatives. 
This chapter empirically investigates whether, ceteris paribus, the structure of 
the local banking market – an important feature of the institutional environment 
embedding entrepreneurship – influences differently the financing of cooperatives, 
as compared to the effects produced for other business types, in relation to both firm 
creation and entrepreneurial activity. This is not a trivial issue since the economic 
literature analysing the effects of bank market power has not provided yet a 
univocal answer to the question of how competition among banks affects the 
availability of credit to firms, hence indirectly their formation and functioning. 
The structure-conduct-performance (SCP) scheme claims that, as for other 
economic sectors, lower competition in the banking industry leads to welfare losses 
(Pagano, 1993; Guzman, 2000). Yet, the studies belonging to the information-
based-approach show that, in general terms, the implications of banking market 
structure can be different from those predicted by the traditional SCP framework, 
and that the effects on firms’ financing are also related to the possibility of setting in 
and maintaining lending relationships (e.g. Petersen and Rajan, 1995). In light of 
the above considerations, analysing the impact of bank market power on firms’ 
financing, hence on entrepreneurship, by distinguishing among different business 
structures, assumes relevance since cooperative firms’ institutional characteristics 
may impact on the establishment and/or maintenance of lending relationships. 
By discerning among cooperatives and other firms, and between creation and 
activity, this chapter enriches the existing literature in several respects. First, it 
contributes to explore the link between the behaviour of banking institutions and 
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cooperative firms’ performance, which is a highly disputed issue. Indeed, although 
the difficulties that cooperators might face in obtaining and providing financial 
capital have been used as an argument against the viability of these firms (Blair et 
al, 2000), Chapters Four and Five have shown that research on cooperatives 
suggests that their performance is highly dependent on the type of financial and 
cultural climate prevailing in the local and national economy (Horvat, 1975; 
Doucouliagos, 1990; Thomas and Defourny, 1990). 
Secondly, although other contributions studied the impact of bank competition on 
entrepreneurship (Black and Strahan, 2002; Bonaccorsi Di Patti and Dell’Ariccia, 
2004), they have not accounted for the possibility that the impact of differences in 
credit market structure on firms’ financing may vary among business types.  
The present research, and this is its third distinctive feature, aims to evaluate the 
results of the econometric investigation by means of the institutional 
complementarities approach, earlier explored in Chapter Three. In perhaps the most 
extensive treatment so far existing on this issue, Aoki (2001) claims that the 
relationships among the characteristics of various market governance mechanisms 
prevailing in one economy, at any particular point in time, may be complementary 
in the sense that the effectiveness (or the presence) of one governance mechanism 
can be reinforced - either directly or indirectly - by the presence of a particular 
arrangement in the same or embedding domain. So that, in terms of the concept à la 
Aoki (2001), this work intends to (indirectly) assess whether the institutional 
counterpart complementary to the creation and activity of different business 
structures is a local banking market characterised by a higher or lower degree of 
competition. 
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To carry out the investigation the research uses data on firms operating in 27 
industries in the 103 Italian provinces during the period 1998-2003. The analysis is 
developed at the province level since the Italian Antitrust Authority defines the 
administrative province as the relevant local market in banking. Until 1990 also the 
Bank of Italy used this definition to decide whether to authorise new branches 
openings (Guiso et al, 2004a). The structure of the Italian banking industry differs 
substantially across local markets. This provides cross-sectional variability within a 
single institutional framework. Given this regulatory uniformity, there is no need to 
control for different regimes (Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia, 2004). Building 
upon several other works on competition in banking, bank market power is 
measured by using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index on deposits. Two models are 
then estimated: one for firm birth, the other for firm activity. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 presents a review 
of the major literature on the economic effects of bank competition, as well as a 
more in-depth exploration of some of the issues related to the financing of 
cooperative firms (earlier touched upon in Chapter Four); Section 3 illustrates the 
econometric specifications and the methodology adopted; Section 4 describes the 
data; Section 5 comments on the results obtained and the robustness checks 
performed; finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 BANKING MARKET STRUCTURE AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP: A 
BRIEF LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In recent years newly created firms received considerable attention in the economic 
literature, especially as regards small and medium sized ones. It has indeed been 
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argued that since a significant proportion of employment is created by new firms, 
which often bring productive innovation, it is essential to understand the factors 
promoting or mitigating entrepreneurial activity (Lee et al, 2004; see Georgellis, 
Sessions and Tsitsianis, 2005 for an excellent review on longitudinal dynamics).  
A first line of research focuses on the personal characteristics of entrepreneurs 
(e.g. Blanchflower and Oswald, 1990; Chell et al, 1991), whereas a second line of 
study explains firm start-up and activity focusing on environmental and institutional 
characteristics. In this latter strand of analysis capital availability has been 
considered an important issue. In fact, since entrepreneurship may be limited by 
liquidity constraints (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989), the financial resources that 
potential entrepreneurs have to finance their business are expected to influence firm 
creation and activity. However, while numerous studies have shown that 
entrepreneurship is bounded by liquidity constraints (e.g. Storey, 1982; Garofoli, 
1994; Keeble and Walter, 1994, Fotopoulos and Spence, 1999; Guiso et al, 2004a), 
fewer works investigated how, by influencing credit availability, the structure of the 
financial sector affects entrepreneurial activity (Black and Strahan, 2002). This 
issue forms part of the wider debate on the economic effects of bank competition 
that has lately attracted the attention of many scholars. The conclusions so far 
reached in this dispute are not univocal, on both theoretical and empirical grounds. 
The conventional structure-conduct-performance (SCP) scheme argues that 
restraining competition in the banking industry produces welfare losses, since banks 
enjoying market power can lower the amount of credit granted and charge higher 
interest rates on loans (Pagano, 1993; Guzman, 2000; Cetorelli, 2001). Among the 
studies providing empirical support to this approach, Sandra Black and Philip 
Strahan (2002) show that the late 1970s U.S. branching and interstate banking 
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reform, which fostered competition in the credit sector by removing restrictions on 
branching, has been beneficial to entrepreneurship. Indeed, the rate of new 
incorporations in local markets increased significantly when States opened to 
external competition. In line with this conclusion, also Strahan (2002) and Nicola 
Cetorelli (2004) document a positive link between bank competition and 
entrepreneurship.  
The Black and Strahan (2002) model has been questioned by Howard Wall 
(2004), who shows that when the effects of U.S. deregulation are allowed to differ 
across regions, entrepreneurship is inversely related to increased banking 
competition in some regions, and positively associated in others. Recent studies 
proposed within the information-based-approach question the supposedly 
beneficial impact of bank competition on the economy. Broadly speaking, these 
works place the emphasis on problems of asymmetric information in lending 
relationships and show that, by favouring the set in of lending relationships, market 
power in banking allows firms to obtain better financing terms. 
Within the information-based-approach, Mitchell Petersen and Raghuram Rajan 
(1995) prove, in what is the most widely cited work within this line of study, that 
where banks hold relatively high market power, young firms may receive more 
loans and at more favourable terms. The reason for this is that, although unknown 
young firms should face higher cost of credit and receive lower amount of loans, as 
a result of being riskier borrowers, banks enjoying market power may adopt the 
following lending strategy to young businesses. They may initially charge lower 
loan interest rates in order to establish a lending relationship, and then increase 
interest rates to extract rent from eventually successful firms. Basically, in 
implementing this strategy, banks aim to maintain lending relationships in the 
162 
future. However, this is less likely to occur where firms can be driven out by 
competitors. In fact, in more competitive credit markets banks have less incentive to 
pay the initial cost of lending at lower rates to riskier borrowers. As a result, the 
latter could actually receive a lower amount of credit at higher rates. Nonetheless, 
Arnoud Boot and Anjan Thakor (2000) argue that “(i) there is more transaction 
lending at lower levels of interbank competition than at higher levels; (ii) increased 
interbank competition will increase relationship lending, but each loan will have 
less added value for borrowers” (ibid: 708). 
In support to the information-based-approach, Emilia Bonaccorsi di Patti and 
Giovanni Dell’Ariccia (2004) find that bank market power is beneficial to firm birth 
only up to a certain point, after which it exerts a negative impact. Rebecca Zarutskie 
(2006) traces the firm-level effects of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, a major U.S. banking market deregulation which 
increased competition in credit markets. The author finds that, by increasing 
financial constraints, the deregulation had an adverse effect on the entrepreneurial 
activity of newly formed businesses. Sherill Shaffer (1998) shows that funds’ 
allocative efficiency is negatively influenced by increased banking competition. 
This is because the probability that low-quality applicants receive credit is higher as 
the number of banks in the market increases, when banks have imperfect screening 
models and are not able to distinguish new borrowers from those that have already 
been rejected by other intermediaries. In line with this result is the work by Melanie 
Cao and Shouyong Shi (2001), which claims that the amount of loans is smaller and 
loan rates higher in markets where there are many competing banks, as competition 
would reduce the number of banks that perform screening and compete in credit 
supply. Moreover, Robert Marquez (2002) shows that borrower-specific 
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information becomes more disperse in more competitive credit markets. This is 
because in such markets each bank has information on a smaller pool of borrowers 
and this leads to less efficient screening and higher interest rates. 
Yet, beside the above studies, other works reach different conclusions. Xiaofen 
Chen (2007) finds that increased banking competition improved loans quality in 
EU-15 countries, after the Second European Banking Directive has been 
introduced.1 Marianne Bertrand et al. (2007) document that, in the French case, 
following the deregulation process that started in 1985 (which promoted, among 
other things, a more vigorous banking competition) banks improved their 
monitoring and/or screening functions and this had a positive effect on 
entrepreneurship. Moreover, Luigi Benfratello et al. (2008) argue that higher 
competition can lead banks to introduce better practices in screening, selecting, 
evaluating and monitoring firms since, as Chen (2005) claims, when facing 
competitive pressures they are more likely to choose screening activity instead of 
collateral requirements. 
In between the two lines of research above discussed, other studies claim that 
market power in banking may have both positive and negative effects on the 
economy, making it difficult to establish which one predominates (e.g. Cetorelli, 
1997; Cetorelli and Peretto, 2000). This result is supported empirically by works as 
Cetorelli and Strahan (2006), finding that, depending on the degree of bank 
competition, some firms benefit while others lose. Also, Cetorelli (2003) shows that 
increased banking competition influences industries’ life-cycle dynamics by 
promoting job creation and growth at the start-up phase and in the early stages of 
entry. Yet, banking competition accelerates the exit of more mature establishments. 
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The studies surveyed indicate unsettlement in both the theoretical and empirical 
literature as to the impact of banking market structure on entrepreneurs’ access to 
credit, hence on entrepreneurial activity. This calls for further research and the 
present work aims to bring a new contribution on the topic by looking at the effects 
that differences in the structure of local credit markets can exert on the creation and 
activity of cooperative and non-cooperative firms. 
 
2.1 Cooperative firms and the relationship with external financiers: Theory 
and evidence 
 
Distinguishing firms according to their institutional form is a non-trivial issue. In 
fact, in Chapter Four it has been shown that the availability of external sources of 
financing, and especially bank credit, has been regarded a critical factor influencing 
the creation, functioning and survival of cooperatives (Ben-Ner, 1988a, b). In this 
section, we take a closer look at some of the issues related to the external financing 
of cooperative firms in order to point out how these relate to the research question 
addressed in the present chapter. 
We have already seen in Chapter Four that it is widely accepted by scholars that 
internal financing is neither sustainable nor efficient – due to the bias toward short-
term investment and/or underinvestment created by the horizon problem2 (Furubotn 
and Pejovich, 1970a, b). So that external financing is the main channel of resources’ 
acquisition for cooperatives (Mygind, 1990). In his analysis on the financing of 
cooperative firms, Vanek (1975) points out that to avoid the problem created by 
self-financing, a cooperative economy needs a banking system providing the 
required funds. However, as discussed in Chapter Four, the institutional 
characteristics of cooperative firms are held to create a number of issues in the 
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relationship with external financers. By leading to agency problems in credit 
markets, cooperatives’ vaguely defined property rights (Cook, 1995) imply that 
these firms are likely to face higher costs of capital and/or credit rationing 
(Vitaliano, 1983; Drèze, 1993; Putterman, 1993; Dow, 2003), and this limits their 
extension in market economies (Enberg, 1993). 
To recapitulate here the main points discussed in Chapter Four, a first issue that 
has been stressed in the debate on the external financing of cooperative firms is that, 
by creating a problem in terms of guarantees offered to third parties financing the 
firm (Jossa and Cuomo, 1997), workers’ limited wealth can constrain the amount of 
debt that can be raised and increase the cost of borrowing (Ben-Ner, 1988a). 
According to Putterman (1993), workers’ limited wealth, and the high cost to them 
of not diversifying risk,3 explain why cooperative firms are relatively rare as an 
organisational form. 
A further issue that contributes to render the bank-firm link more complex for 
cooperatives than for other business structures is the so-called commitment problem 
of members (Schlicht and von Weizäcker, 1977). This entails that if capital is 
externally financed, then partners may lack effort to operate successfully if in risky 
situations substantial parts of the losses can be get rid off by bankruptcy. From the 
bank’s viewpoint this implies that lending to a firm of yet unknown future 
profitability may be much riskier in the case of a cooperative firm, since decisions 
tend to be short-sighted. 
An additional impediment to the financing of cooperatives, hence to their 
creation and development, results from their relative rarity as an organisational form 
(Ben-Ner, 1988b). This increases establishment costs for two main reasons. First, 
the issues mentioned above imply that acquisition of information about coops on 
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the part of financial intermediaries is costlier than information on capitalist firms. 
Secondly, since financial expertise on cooperatives is relatively scarcer and more 
expensive, potential lenders may restrict loans and/or require higher interest rates 
for funding firms with unknown track records (Jefferis and Mason, 1990). In other 
words, “capital may be more costly [or less available] for cooperatives than for 
other firms because, being an unfamiliar type of organization, they may be 
perceived as riskier organizations than capitalist firms” (Ben-Ner, 1998a, p. 290).4  
Further to the issues so far discussed, another set of arguments should be 
considered. Cooperatives are not profit-oriented and, for financial intermediaries, 
this poses the problem of how to evaluate the performance of these firms. 
Conventional economic indicators of performance and efficiency provide an 
incomplete basis for comparing cooperative and capitalist firms, since these 
enterprises tend to operate under, at least partially, different sets of objectives 
(Bartlett et al, 1992). It can be argued that the major discriminant between 
cooperative and capitalist firms lies in the role ascribed to capital. In the former, 
capital is an instrument necessary to realise the ultimate aim of those who decide to 
join in a cooperative, be this the satisfaction of a need, the procurement of a job, and 
so on. By contrast, in the latter capital is both instrument and ultimate aim. In other 
words, beside economic purposes, cooperatives also pursue social goals; therefore, 
the role of relational goods – often able to counterbalance free riding and promote 
economic performance – should not be neglected (Zamagni 2005). However, how 
to account for them when assessing potential loans remains an issue. 
The difficulties that cooperators might face in obtaining and providing financial 
capital have been used as an argument against the viability of these firms (Blair et 
al, 2000). However, research on cooperatives suggests that their success depends to 
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a large extent on the type of financial and cultural climate that prevails in the 
economy (Milenkovitch, 1971; Horvat, 1975; Thomas and Logan, 1982; Thomas 
and Defourny, 1990). There is, in fact, substantial evidence showing that limited 
access to finance and/or inappropriate financing mechanisms imply that 
cooperatives have less impact than they could have (Thomas and Defourny, 1990). 
In Chapter Five it has been remarked that Jefferis and Mason (1990) point out that 
one reason for the decline of the British cooperative sector is the restrictiveness of 
the financial environment on coops’ ability to raise finance (on this point see also 
Oakeshott, 1978; Logan and Gregory, 1981). Still in Chapter Five we have been 
informed that an exception to this general attitude on the part of financial 
institutions occurred in the decade from 1976 to 1986, when there was a 
substantially increased availability of finance from public sources. This contributed 
to the massive expansion of the British cooperative sector between 1980 and 1986 
(Estrin and Pérotin, 1987; Jefferis and Mason, 1990).5 
Several studies have shown that finance does not represent a particular problem 
for cooperatives when institutional conditions are such that banks develop 
experience in lending to the cooperative sector, as this tends to favour the 
acquisition of information on cooperatives’ credit riskiness (Bonin et al, 1993; 
Smith, 2001). Analysing the historical concentration of cooperative and capitalist 
firms, Avner Ben-Ner (1988b) concludes that cooperatives’ diffusion (in labour and 
skill intensive industries) has been positively impacted by mainly two factors that 
reduced their formation costs: easier credit availability on more competitive and 
less discriminatory capital markets, and access to capital through specialised banks 
supported by the State or cooperatives’ organisations. In the Basque region of 
Spain, for instance, where Mondragón cooperatives are based, the availability of a 
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specialised source of finance, through the interventionist role of the Caja Laboral 
Popular bank, has been a major factor accounting for the success of these Spanish 
coops (Fairclough, 1987). Indeed, at an early stage in their history, the Caja bank 
was set up with the explicit purpose of providing external funds to cooperative 
firms (Thomas and Logan, 1982). 
 
3 EMPIRICAL QUESTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This work empirically assesses the relationship between bank market power and the 
creation and activity of Italian firms, with a special focus on cooperatives. The 
central hypothesis of the research is that, ceteris paribus, local differences in the 
structure of the banking market influence differently the financing of cooperatives, 
as compared to other forms of business organisations (namely, partnerships and 
corporations – henceforth, non-cooperative firms), in relation to both firm creation 
and entrepreneurial activity. 
The reasoning set out in the previous section provides the justification for 
carrying out the analysis by distinguishing between cooperative and non-
cooperative firms. On one hand, it is reasonable to argue that, other things held 
equal, at an informative level cooperatives represent the least transparent (or more 
opaque) category of firms. Hence (potentially) the riskiest business type for 
financial intermediaries. On the other hand, the studies belonging to the 
information-based-approach show that, in general terms, the implications of bank 
market structure can be different from those predicted by the traditional structure-
conduct-performance scheme, with the effects on firms’ financing, hence on 
entrepreneurship, being also related to the possibility of setting in and maintaining 
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lending relationships. In light of these considerations, focusing on possible 
differences among business structures assumes relevance since cooperative firms’ 
institutional characteristics may impact negatively on the establishment and/or 
maintenance of lending relationships. The empirical strategy employed to carry out 
the analysis is presented in the following sub-sections. 
 
3.1 Measuring firm birth and activity 
 
Firms’ annual birth rate in industry i, province p and year t is measured as the flow 
of newly registered firms in year t on the stock of firms registered at the end of year 
t-1: 
 
1−
=
ipt
ipt
ipt reg
newreg
birth , where i=1,…,27; p=1,…,103; t=1998,…,2003.          (1) 
 
As far as firms’ activity rate is concerned, this is given, for each province p and 
sector i, by the flow of active firms in year t divided by the stock of firms registered 
at the end of the same year: 
 
ipt
ipt
ipt reg
active
activity = , where i=1,…,27; p=1,…,103; t=1998,…,2003.         (2) 
 
The activity rate is here interpreted as a rough measure of firms’ ‘good health’, 
since – as indicated by InfoCamere (2006)6 – the stock of firms registered at the end 
of each year includes, beside the active ones, also those inactive, suspended, in 
liquidation and bankrupted. Thus, the activity rate gives the proportion of firms 
which at least are not in a declared state of difficulty. 
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3.2 Measuring bank market power 
 
Bank market power is measured at provincial level by using the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) on deposits.7 Data at local banking office level are not 
publicly available in Italy (this is the case also in most other European countries). 
To deal with this issue, each variable x needed in the computation of the HHI 
indicator is drawn as8: 
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛∗=
it
ipt
itipt BR
BR
Dd ,                                                      (3) 
 
where i=1,..., N; p=1,..., 103; t=1998,…, 2003; iptd  indicates deposits for each 
branch office of bank i in province p in year t; itD  is the balance sheet value of 
deposits for bank i in year t; iptBR  is the number of branch offices of bank i in 
province p in year t; finally, itBR  is the total number of branch offices of bank i in 
year t. Then, for each year considered in the analysis, the indicator of local banking 
concentration is computed as: 
 ( )2∑= ipp msHHI ,                                   (4) 
 
where ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
p
ip
ip D
d
ms  is the market share on deposits for each branch office of bank i 
in province p, and ∑= i ipp dD .  
Employing the above methodology to compute HHI permits the average value of 
deposits per branch office to vary across banks and over time. This removes two 
limiting assumptions that characterise most past studies, namely that the average 
value of deposits per branch office of a bank is the same for all branches at all banks 
and is the same over time (Carbò Valverde et al, 2003). Data availability precludes 
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instead the possibility to deal with another assumption that is implicit in the 
calculation of HHI. This is that the average value of deposits per branch office of a 
bank is the same for all branch offices of the same bank.   
In the structure-conduct-performance paradigm, the HHI index is viewed as an 
inverse measure of bank competition: higher values of HHI are associated with a 
higher concentration of the credit market, hence with lower competition. 
Conversely, lower values of HHI indicate a less concentrated banking industry, and 
thus more competition.9 
 
3.3 Estimation methods 
 
Firms’ birth and activity rates are computed on the separate samples of cooperative 
and non-cooperative firms. The distribution of these variables is such that firms’ 
birth rate takes on the value of zero for a considerable range of observations in both 
samples (i.e. cooperative and non-cooperative firms). Instead, firms’ activity rate 
assumes zero values for a non-trivial proportion of data only in the case of 
cooperatives. 
Given the features of the dependent variables, the empirical analysis is 
implemented by applying the Tobit technique to estimate the models for the 
creation and activity of cooperatives, and also for the creation of non-cooperative 
firms. Linear regressions are, instead, carried out when the average activity rate is 
the dependent variable in the equation estimated for the sample of non-cooperative 
firms. The next sub-section offers a brief description of the Tobit model, while 
leaving aside the discussion on the traditional regression model. 
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3.3.1 The Tobit model 
 
The censored Tobit model is usually used when dealing with a continuous variable 
having positive probability mass point at zero. It has been first applied by James 
Tobin (1956) and, following Takeshi Amemiya’s (1985) taxonomy, is also known 
as type I Tobit model. The general formulation of the Tobit model, estimated by 
maximum likelihood, is given in terms of the following index function: 
 
ititity ε+= βx*     i=1,…,N; t=1,…,T                                       (5) 
 
0=ity         if   0* ≤ity        
*
itit yy =       if   0* >ity , 
 
where itε ~ ( )2,0 σN . This is a standard regression model, where observations are 
censored at zero from below. In (5), when the model for firm birth is estimated, ity  
is first the average birth rate of cooperatives and then the average birth rate of non-
cooperative firms. yit is also the average activity rate of cooperative firms when 
considering the model for firm activity. itx  is a ( )k×1  vector of explanatory 
variables and includes an intercept. Finally, β  is a ( )1×k  vector of unknown 
parameters. The parameters in β  have a double interpretation: one as the impact of 
a change in itx  on the probability of observing a non-zero rate of birth (in the first 
model) and of activity (in the second one); the other interpretation as the impact of a 
change in itx  on the level of these rates. The interest is in computing: 
( ) ( )( )⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡+=> σφ
σϕ
/
/0,|
xβ
xβxβititit yxyE              (6) 
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and 
 
( )
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+=∂
∂
σ
ββφ i
i
itit x
x
xyE '|               (7) 
 
where ϕ  is the probability density function and φ  is the cumulative probability 
density function. 
As argued by Jeffrey Wooldridge (2002), applying a Tobit model to a panel data 
structure entails some problems. First, one of the main assumptions underlying the 
unobserved effects (both random and fixed) Tobit model is the strict exogeneity of 
regressors. However, as it will be argued in Section 5, there is reason to suspect that 
the indicator of bank market power may be endogenous. Secondly, a fixed effects 
Tobit model would bring about, as the main doctrine argues, a further shortcoming. 
“Estimating limited dependent variable models with fixed effects entails an 
incidental parameters problem, which leads to inconsistent estimation of β  with T  
fixed and ∞→N ” (Wooldridge 2002, p. 484). 
To avoid the abovementioned drawbacks, estimations are carried out on firms’ 
average birth and activity rates. These are computed – for each province – at 
industry level on the years 1999-2003, since some of the variables controlling for 
market specific effects are computed at the beginning of the period under analysis 
(see sub-section 3.3.2).10 Employing average values brings about two further 
advantages: it allows smoothing the effect of possible temporary shocks, and leaves 
the opportunity to include in the analysis both industry-specific effects and the 
heterogeneity across markets. 
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3.3.2 The econometric specifications 
 
The econometric specification of the model concerning firm birth (BIRTH)11 
includes the following explanatory variables: the 1999-2003 firms’ average 
cancellation rate (DEATH),12 which should be positively correlated to firm birth 
since, due to firms’ turnover, relatively more firms should be created where a larger 
proportion of existing firms go out of business13; the initial industry share in each 
province (INDUSHARE), accounting for the fact that new firms are less likely to be 
formed in more densely populated markets14; the indicator of local banking 
concentration (HHI), described in sub-section 3.2; the (log of) average provincial 
population (POP), as a measure of local market size; the share of workforce holding 
high school diploma or higher degree in 1997 (EDUC), proxying for human capital 
endowment; a proxy for the strength of community ties (STIES) – or, as some 
authors claim, a proxy for civicness, hence for social capital15 – obtained by 
averaging data on electoral participation,16 so as to account for the possible impact 
of differences in social structure on firm birth; a proxy for adherence to corporate 
law, given by the crimes committed against the economy normalised by population 
and averaged over the years 1999-2003 (CRIMEECO)17; a location dummy 
variable (CEN-NORTH), taking on the value of 1 for Centre Northern provinces 
and 0 otherwise; the share of municipalities having less than 30,000 residents in 
1996 (SMALLTOWN), accounting for the presence of external and agglomeration 
economies which should lead firm creation to be higher in urban areas (Vernon, 
1960); a proxy for local infrastructures endowment (ROADS), measured as 
kilometres of non-urban roads at the end of 1996 normalised by province area, and 
expected to have a positive effect on economic activity, hence on entrepreneurship; 
the provincial real per capita income in 1998 (RPI) as a proxy for local wealth 
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controlling for the fact that, if convergence effects are at work, economies with low 
initial incomes should grow faster (Barro, 1991; Mankiw et al, 1992), hence should 
display higher rates of firm creation; finally, to account for sectoral specific effects, 
industry dummies are included (INDUSTRY). 
Turning to the specification for the regressions on firms’ activity rate (ACTV),18 
beside the variables so far described, it accounts also for firms’ average birth rates. 
Moreover, in the equation estimated for cooperatives, the average activity rate of 
other firms (ACTV_OF) is also employed.19 
For a more detailed description of the variables included in the empirical models, 
their main summary statistics and the correlation matrix see Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable
BIRTH_OF Average birth rate of partnerships and corporations for the years 1999-2003
BIRTH_COOP Average birth rate of cooperative firms for the years 1999-2003
ACTV_OF Average activity rate of partnerships and corporations for the years 1999-2003
ACTV_COOP Average activity rate of cooperative firms for the years 1999-2003 
DEATH_OF Average death rate of partnerships and corporations for the years 1999-2003 
DEATH_COOP Average death rate of cooperative firms for the years 1999-2003 
INDUSHARE Registered firms in industry i and province p on total registered firms in the province in 199
HHI Average Herfindahl-Hirschman Index on deposits at provincial level for the period 1999-2003 (*100
HHI2 Squared of the averageHerfindahl-Hirschman Index on deposits  
POP Average provincial population for the period 1999-2003
EDUC Share of workforce with a high school diploma or higher degree in 1997
STIES 
CRIMEECO N° of crimes committed against the economy normalised by population (average 1999-2003) *1000  
CEN-NORTH Dummy = 1 if firm is located in the Centre Northern area and zero otherwise
SOUTH Dummy = 1 if firm is located in the South and zero otherwise
SMALLTOWN Share of municipalities with less than 30,000 residents in 1996
ROADS Kilometers of non-urban roads at the end of 1996 normalised by province area (K2) 
RPI Real per capita income in 1998
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
BIRTH_OF * 2220 2.1657 2.2184 0 25.0
BIRTH_COOP * 2220 2.0617 4.7024 0 50.0
ACTV_OF * 2220 78.165 12.106 0 100
ACTV_COOP * 2220 66.021 25.991 0 100
DEATH_OF * 2220 2.7468 1.4213 0 15.0
DEATH_COOP * 2220 3.1506 5.3288 0 50.0
INDUSHARE * 2220 4.4060 7.8410 0.0020 48.8177
HHI 2220 13.177 5.525 5.15 42.45
POP + 2220 591,913 645,737 90,065 3,721,603
EDUC * 2220 37.207 4.099 22.406 49.460
STIES * 2220 54.045 8.090 36.767 68.906
CRIMEECO 2220 3.5993 1.3861 1.1218 11.7971
CEN-NORTH 2220 0.6329 0.4821 0 1
SOUTH 2220 0.3671 0.4821 0 1
SMALLTOWN * 2220 48.519 25.650 0 93.330
ROADS * 2220 17.986 3.545 7.800 26.300
RPI # 2220 16.684 4.279 8.965 27.728
For the description of the variables see Table 6.1. * In percentage terms; # in thousand of
Euro; + in units. All the other variables are dummies, with the exception of HHI and
CRIMEECO (see Table 6.1).
TABLE 6.1 - Description of Variables
Description
Average electoral participation to the 1995 and 2001 referenda, and to the 1999
European elections
All variables are drawn from InfoCamere except for: i) HHI and HHI2, obtained by calculations on data BILBANK (ABI) and Bank of
Italy; ii) RPI, POP, STIES and CRIMEECO, drawn from ISTAT; iii) EDUC, SMALLTOWN and ROADS, drawn from Bonaccorsi di Patti
and Dell'Ariccia (2004).  
TABLE 6.2 - Summary Statistics
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4 DATA 
 
The data used in this study come from several sources. Information on firms has 
been obtained from Movimprese, a database compiled by InfoCamere containing 
data on firms’ demographics collected from local firm registries. Gross flows of 
newly created, active and cancelled firms are present in this dataset, as well as end 
of year stocks of registered firms. This piece of information is available for 103 
provinces, 28 industrial sectors and firm legal structure (i.e. sole traders, 
partnerships, corporations, cooperatives, and other legal forms).20 The dataset for 
the period 1998-2003 is initially made up of 17,304 observations. From it, are 
dropped observations on firms operating in the financial sector, since the great part 
of financial firms are banks. This leads to 16,686 observations. Then, since the 
intention is to focus on enterprises, sole traders are excluded. The category labelled 
‘other firms’ is also deleted because it groups a heterogeneous class, comprising a 
great number of typologies, in many cases representative of only a small number of 
firms. Finally, after taking the average values for the period 1999-2003, and 
checking for the presence of outliers, the sample employed in the estimations is 
made up of 2,220 observations.21 
A second dataset employed is BILBANK, edited by the Italian Banking 
Association (ABI) and containing balance sheet data on nearly all Italian banks for 
each year in the period 1998-2003. A third piece of information comes from the 
Bank of Italy and regards the provincial distribution of branches for each Italian 
bank over the period 1998-2003. This is used to disaggregate banking balance sheet 
data at provincial level, as illustrated in sub-section 3.2. A fourth data source is the 
Italian National Statistical Institute (ISTAT): figures on provincial income, 
population, voters’ turnout and crimes against the economy are drawn from here. 
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Finally, data on human capital, municipal distribution of population and 
infrastructural endowment are drawn from the Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia 
(2004) database. 
Table 6.2 reports the main summary statistics for the sample employed in the 
estimations. As shown there, non-cooperative firms’ average birth rate is 2.17%. 
This rate is highest (25%) in fishery, and in the leather tanning and finishing 
industry, while its lowest (positive) value is in (other) public, social and personal 
services (0.09%). Passing to cooperatives, Table 6.2 reports that their average birth 
rate is 2.06%. This is maximum (50%) in transports, storage and communications, 
and in the manufacture of mechanical machinery and equipment. Yet, fewest coops 
are formed in agriculture, hunting and forestry (0.06%). 
As far as firms’ average activity rate is concerned, this is 78.17% for non-
cooperative firms (see Table 6.2), and it is maximum (100%) in the sectors of: 
fishery; mineral extraction; chemical production; manufacture of transport means; 
electricity, water and gas production and distribution, and education. In all the just 
mentioned sectors but fishery, also cooperative firms have the highest activity rate 
(100%) – on average equal to 66.02% (see Table 6.2) – as well as in the remaining 
manufacturing industries, the hospitality and restoration sector, the transports, 
storage and communications industry, and the health and social services sector. On 
the other hand, firms’ lowest (positive) activity rates are in chemicals production for 
non-cooperative firms (22.56%) and in constructions for cooperatives (7.54%). 
It is worth noting that the average cancellation rate is maximum in the fishery 
sector for non-cooperative firms (15%), and for cooperatives in the non-energy 
minerals extractive industry, in some manufacturing sectors, and in electricity, 
water and gas production and distribution (50%). Moreover, the minimum 
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(positive) rate of cancellation is in the transports, storage and communication 
industry for non-cooperative firms (0.26%), and in the construction industry for 
cooperatives (0.63%). 
Regarding territorial differences in entrepreneurship, in the sample, the average 
birth rate of non-cooperative firms is 2.44% in the Centre-Northern area and 1.69% 
in the Southern one. For cooperatives, instead, these figures are 2.45% and 1.40%, 
respectively. Also firms’ activity rate is higher in the Centre-North than in the South 
(79.89% versus 75.19% for non-cooperatives, and 67.63% versus 63.24% for 
cooperatives). Finally, with respect to firms’ cancellation, this is higher in the 
Centre-North than in the South, for both non-cooperative (2.98% versus 2.34%) and 
cooperative firms (3.61% versus 2.37%). 
 
5 RESULTS 
 
Estimation results are reported in Tables 6.4-6.7. All estimations have been carried 
out using robust standard errors22 (i.e. adjusted standard errors that are valid in the 
presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form).23 After having run all 
regressions, the average value of the square of HHI (HHI2) has been included in the 
econometric specifications, in order to test for non-monotonic effects of local banking 
concentration on firm creation and activity. Results obtained from these latter 
estimations reveal statistically significant non-linear effects of bank market power for 
both samples. This suggests that the specifications with non-linearity are the relevant 
ones. Yet, a major criticism that could be advanced to the analysis is that the indicator 
of local banking concentration may be endogenous, if banks tend to enter local 
markets where the rates of firm creation and activity are higher for exogenous 
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reasons. To deal with this potential objection all regressions are re-estimated by 
testing for endogeneity. To do so, the Wald test is carried out for the Tobit regressions 
and the Hausman test is run for the OLS regressions.24 Regarding the instruments 
employed, these are the HHI indicator and DENSITY (provincial population over 
province area), both taken at their 1995 values, and MUN (number of provincial 
municipalities in logarithmic terms). 25  
The estimations carried out on the sample of cooperative firms do not reveal 
presence of endogeneity of HHI and HHI2 for both BIRTH_COOP and 
ACTV_COOP (see Table 6.4). Therefore, the results previously obtained, and 
reported in Table 6.4, are the relevant ones for these models. Focusing on the variable 
of interest, that is the measure of bank market power, column BIRTH_COOP in 
Table 6.4 shows that HHI follows a bell-shaped pattern. This suggests that a relatively 
concentrated local credit market benefits the creation of cooperative firms, while it 
has a detrimental impact after it reaches a threshold. Looking at the results on the 
quadratic functional form of HHI in the estimations for the model on firm’s activity 
(column ACTV_COOP in Table 6.4), the evidence shows a U-shaped relationship 
between bank market power and cooperatives’ activity rate. This indicates that active 
cooperatives benefit from more intense banking competition, even though this latter 
has negative effects when too exasperated. 
Turning to the results obtained for the sample of non-cooperative firms, presented 
in Table 6.5, the Wald test reported in column BIRTH_OF fails to reject the null 
hypothesis of exogeneity of the concentration indicator in the model for birth. Figures 
in the same table show that, as for BIRTH_COOP, also in the case of BIRTH_OF the 
relationship between non-cooperative firms’ creation and bank market power presents 
a bell-shaped pattern. As regards the model for firm activity, the Hausman test reveals 
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evidence of endogeneity of HHI and HHI2 (Table 6.5, column ACTV_OF). As 
opposed to the evidence obtained for the sample of cooperatives, the non-linear 
pattern followed by these variables is once again bell-shaped, showing that for the 
activity of non-cooperative firms some market power in the local credit market is 
beneficial, while it has negative effects after it goes beyond a threshold. 
To recapitulate the empirical evidence obtained, the results for the model of firm 
creation show a bell-shaped relationship between bank market power and firm birth, 
for both cooperative and non-cooperative firms. This finding can be interpreted 
arguing that, at the time of their establishment, it is likely that firms are considered to 
be equally risky by banking institutions, independently of their legal structure.26 In 
other words, this seems to suggest that, when firms start-up, cooperatives’ 
institutional characteristics would not represent for banks an element for 
discriminating between these firms and other business structures. 
Passing to firms’ activity rate, the results show that a relatively higher concentration 
of the credit market tends to favour non-cooperative firms, while this would be 
detrimental for cooperatives – which seem to benefit from a more intense banking 
competition.27 This conclusion appears to be coherent with the hypothesis put forward 
in this chapter, according to which the effects produced by the structure of the credit 
market can differ between coops and non-coops, due to the fact that cooperatives’ 
institutional specificities can jeopardise the maintenance of lending relationships; so 
that, where the credit market is more concentrated, these firms would be disadvantaged. 
On the other hand, the evidence according to which a greater banking competition 
would be beneficial for cooperatives could be explained by resorting to at least two 
arguments. First, a higher number of banks operating in the market could lead (the 
most) opaque firms to fractionalise their debt among several intermediaries, so as to 
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maximise the amount of credit they obtain. On their part, relying on the monitoring 
activity of the other intermediaries involved, banks are more prone to lend to opaque 
firms. This interpretation could be in line with the multiple banking relationship 
phenomenon (known as multiaffidamento) characterising the Italian business practice 
(e.g. Pagano et al, 1998; Ongena and Smith, 2000). Another possible interpretation 
could be that increased competitive pressures encourage more efficient bank 
screening procedures, so that banks are inclined to lend to (more) opaque firms based 
on their expected performance rather than past records. As claimed by Benfratello et 
al. (2008), higher competition may induce banks to “introduce better and more 
advanced practices in the screening, selection, evaluation and monitoring of projects 
and entrepreneurs. […] These practices could include looking more carefully and 
with better tools at borrowers’ future prospects, as opposed to relying purely on 
firms’ marketable assets as collateral, which characterizes standard operating 
behavior in many cases” (ibid: 9-10). 
The findings can be interpreted by means of the institutional complementarity 
approach: the relationships between firms and banking institutions can be considered 
complementary in the sense that the presence of firms (i.e. their birth rate) and their 
effectiveness (evaluated in terms of their activity rate) are reinforced by the 
institutionalised presence of specific arrangements characterising the governance 
mechanisms operating in the financial domain. More precisely, a relatively more 
concentrated banking system seems to be complementary to both the creation and 
activity of non-cooperative firms. On the other hand, while banks enjoying some 
market power appear to favour also the creation of cooperatives, it is a relatively more 
competitive banking system the institutional counterpart that strengthens cooperatives 
in their activity.  
BIRTH_OF 1.0973 0.0000
DEATH_OF 0.1659 0.3690
BIRTH_COOP 0.1205 0.3480
DEATH_COOP -0.0752 0.1490 -0.6513 0.0000
ACTV_OF 0.6633 0.0000
INDUSHARE 0.0669 0.0210 -0.1504 0.0680
HHI 0.2732 0.0550 -0.7503 0.0300
HHI2 -0.9006 0.0100 2.1432 0.0060
POP 1.3266 0.0000 -1.0433 0.2600
EDUC 0.0847 0.1500 -0.0835 0.6230
STIES 0.0254 0.6090 -0.4088 0.0060
CRIMEECO -0.1322 0.3920 -0.1131 0.8160
CEN-NORTH 0.5630 0.5870 2.9590 0.3130
ROADS 0.0971 0.2660 -0.0807 0.6710
SMALLTOWN -0.0028 0.7600 0.0028 0.9130
RPI 0.0156 0.8720 0.5715 0.0420
Wald test 531.56 0.0000 862.56 0.0000
Wald test of exogeneity 2.64 0.2676 3.61 0.1647
N.OBS 2,220 2,220
left-censored 1,204 110
uncensored 1,016 2,110
BIRTH_OF -1.1410 0.0270
DEATH_OF 0.1609 0.0030 -1.2872 0.1430
INDUSHARE 0.0176 0.3180 0.0343 0.9080
HHI 0.9416 0.0630 24.907 0.0040
HHI2 -2.3917 0.0800 -66.551 0.0040
POP 0.0010 0.9950 2.9724 0.2660
EDUC -0.0873 0.0180 -2.5048 0.0000
STIES -0.0230 0.1550 -0.1436 0.5970
CRIMEECO 0.0198 0.7940 2.6991 0.0330
CEN-NORTH -0.6031 0.3860 -26.406 0.0240
ROADS -0.0867 0.2400 -3.3365 0.0080
SMALLTOWN -0.0070 0.1030 0.1429 0.0420
RPI 0.1866 0.0030 2.5733 0.0180
Wald test 831.58 0.0000
Wald test of exogeneity 11.81 0.0027
F-test 1.81 0.0017
Uncentered R-Squared 0.703
Sargan Statistic 0.019 0.8903
Wu-Hausman test 86.09 0.0000
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 162.64 0.0000
N.OBS 2,220 2,220
left-censored 222
uncensored 1,998
Interval regression Interval regression
TABLE 6.4 - Cooperative firms' birth and activity rates results
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
BIRTH_COOP ACTV_COOP
For the description of the variables see Table 6.1. The regressions are estimated employing market-
industry observations. In italics are reported the p-values of the tests. The z and t statistics (not
reported) are based on robust standard errors. In both tables, industry dummies and constant
included but not reported. Interval regression is a Tobit estimation with robust SE. The instrumental
variables used in the regressions testing for endogeneity are: the 1995 value of HHI; DENSITY
(provincial population over province area), and MUN (number of municipalities present in a province
in logarithm terms).   
TABLE 6.5 - Non-Cooperative firms' birth and activity rates results
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
BIRTH_OF ACTV_OF
Two-step Tobit 2SLS
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5.1 Robustness 
 
To test the robustness of the results, several sensitivity checks are performed. First, 
to account for market specific effects, the models are re-estimated by including 
market dummy variables. This specification is robust to the existence of market 
specific omitted variables; moreover, it reduces the concern for the endogeneity of 
the bank market power index. Results obtained from these estimations, presented in 
Table 6.6, fully confirm the conclusions previously drawn. 
The empirical models are then augmented with an interaction term between HHI 
and the geographical dummy CEN-NORTH (HHINTE) with the view to control for 
possible regional heterogeneity between the centre-north and south macro areas. 
These estimations validate the findings obtained even though the interaction term 
HHINTE is not statistically significant. Results from this robustness proof are not 
reported but are available from the author upon request.  
As a further check, an alternative indicator of banking market structure is 
employed (∆HHI). This is given by the absolute value of the change of HHI 
between the beginning and end of the period examined (Bonaccorsi di Patti and 
Dell’Ariccia, 2004). This is an inverse measure of bank market power, under the 
assumption that significant changes in industry structure affect banks’ expectations 
of extracting future rents from borrowers. To make ∆HHI positively correlated with 
market power, its linear transformation is taken (1-∆HHI). Then, all regressions are 
re-run by including 1-∆HHI and its squared (1-∆HHI2). The results (not reported, 
but available from the author upon request) are basically unchanged. 
Conclusions continue to hold also when sole traders are included in the sample 
of non-cooperative firms. Table 6.7 reports the marginal effects and threshold 
values of HHI for the estimates in Tables 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6. 
BIRTH_OF 0.2496 0.0410 -0.1964 0.2780
DEATH_OF -0.0299 0.8690 0.0722 0.2850 0.3167 0.3180
BIRTH_COOP -0.0067 0.9600
DEATH_COOP -0.0769 0.1550 -0.6888 0.0000
ACTV_OF 0.1976 0.0640
INDUSHARE 0.0668 0.0390 0.0116 0.3240 -0.1377 0.0620 -0.0138 0.7010
HHI 0.6712 0.0360 0.1222 0.0300 -2.2365 0.0020 1.1159 0.0000
HHI2 -1.4592 0.0370 -0.2320 0.0570 4.8961 0.0010 -2.0514 0.0000
POP 1.5763 0.0310 -0.0840 0.4860 -6.8612 0.0020 -2.5538 0.0000
EDUC 0.1352 0.4430 -0.0776 0.0170 0.4408 0.2580 -0.8592 0.0000
STIES 0.0033 0.9710 0.0471 0.0140 -0.6469 0.0480 -0.2816 0.0010
CRIMEECO -0.2230 0.5330 -0.1187 0.1310 -2.8514 0.0010 -1.1950 0.0000
ROADS -0.0048 0.9840 0.0492 0.3930 0.0902 0.8520 0.4496 0.0210
SMALLTOWN 0.0221 0.2670 -0.0010 0.7790 0.0546 0.4010 -0.0083 0.7030
RPI 0.4928 0.0160 0.0115 0.7790 2.0229 0.0000 0.4987 0.0030
F-test 51.37 0.0000
R-Squared 0.6774
Wald test 716.91 0.0000 3117.37 0.0000 1914.68 0.0000
N.OBS 2,220 2,220 2,220 2,220
left-censored 1,204 222 110
uncensored 1,016 1,998 2,110
For the description of the variables see Table 6.1. The regressions are estimated employingmarket-
industry observations. In italics are reported the p-values of the tests. The z and t statistics (not
reported) are based on robust standard errors. Industry dummies, market dummies and constant
included but not reported. 
Interval regression Interval regression Linear regressionInterval regression
TABLE 6.6 - Robustness: including market fixed effects
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
BIRTH_COOP BIRTH_OF ACTV_COOP ACTV_OF
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BIRTH_COOP BIRTH_OF ACTV_COOP ACTV_OF
A - Industry fixed effects
BIRTH_OF 0.3195 -1.1410
DEATH_OF 0.0483 0.1290 -1.2872
BIRTH_COOP 0.0871
DEATH_COOP -0.0219 -0.4707
ACTV_OF 0.4795
INDUSHARE 0.0195 0.0094 -0.1087 0.0343
HHI 0.0796 0.0386 -0.5424 24.907
HHI2 -0.2623 -0.0830 1.5491 -66.551
POP 0.3863 -0.1882 -0.7541 2.9724
EDUC 0.0247 -0.0158 -0.0604 -2.5048
STIES 0.0074 -0.0072 -0.2955 -0.1436
CRIMEECO -0.0385 -0.0370 -0.0818 2.6991
CEN-NORTH 0.1629 0.1760 2.1483 -26.406
ROADS 0.0283 0.0024 -0.0584 -3.3365
SMALLTOWN -0.0008 -0.0067 0.0020 0.1429
RPI 0.0045 0.0556 0.4131 2.5733
Threshold value of HHI 0.1517 0.2327 0.1750 0.1871
BIRTH_OF 0.0720 -0.1964
DEATH_OF 0.0504 -0.0086 0.3167
BIRTH_COOP -0.0051
DEATH_COOP -0.0222 -0.5202
ACTV_OF 0.1493
INDUSHARE 0.0081 0.0193 -0.0138 -0.1040
HHI 0.0854 0.1937 1.1159 -1.6892
HHI2 -0.1620 -0.4210 -2.0514 3.6979
POP -0.0587 0.4548 -2.5538 -5.1821
EDUC -0.0542 0.0390 -0.8592 0.3329
STIES 0.0329 0.0009 -0.2816 -0.4886
CRIMEECO -0.0829 -0.0643 -1.1950 -2.1536
ROADS 0.0343 -0.0014 0.4496 0.0682
SMALLTOWN -0.0007 0.0064 -0.0083 0.0413
RPI 0.0080 0.1422 0.4987 1.5278
Threshold value of HHI 0.2635 0.2300 0.2720 0.2284
For the description of the variablessee Table 6.1. In the models for BIRTH_OF, BIRTH_COOP and
ACTV_COOP the interpretationof the marginal effects is in terms of the impact of a change in the
independentvariableson the expectedvalueof BIRTH and ACTV, conditionalon being uncensored.
The standard interpretationapplies to the model for ACTV_OF. In all models dy/dx is for discrete
change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
TABLE 6.7 - Marginal effects and threshold values for firms' birth and activity rate
B - Industry and market fixed effects
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
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6 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter investigated the relationship between banking market structure and the 
creation and activity of firms. In order to test for differences among business 
structures, the empirical analysis confronted cooperative and non-cooperative firms. 
The econometric investigation, carried out on a sample of Italian firms operating in 
27 industries during the period 1998-2003, leads to some major conclusions. 
The first one is that the impact of bank market power on the creation of 
cooperatives does not seem to be different from that exerted on non-cooperative 
firms operating in the same local market. For all business types, the empirical 
analysis finds a bell-shaped relationship between bank market power and firms’ 
birth rate, suggesting that firm creation is favoured by a moderate bank market 
power, which is instead detrimental after it reaches a threshold. This finding – in 
line with the conclusions reached, for instance, by Petersen and Rajan (1995) and 
Zarutskie (2006) – can be interpreted arguing that, at the time of their establishment, 
firms tend to be considered equally risky by banking institutions. In other words, 
when firms start-up, cooperative firms’ institutional characteristics would not 
represent for banks an element for discriminating between these firms and other 
business types. 
A less homogeneous pattern, and this is a second main conclusion, is found with 
respect to firms’ activity rate. The empirical evidence still finds a bell-shaped 
parabola for non-cooperative firms. By contrast, a U-shaped relationship emerges 
for cooperatives: this seems to indicate that active cooperatives in the market 
benefit from more intense banking competition, even though it produces negative 
effects when too exasperated. This result lends support to the hypothesis put 
forward in this chapter, according to which the effects produced by the structure of 
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the banking market can differ between coops and non-coops, since cooperatives’ 
institutional specificities can jeopardise the possibility of maintaining lending 
relationships; so that, where the credit market is more concentrated, these firms 
would be disadvantaged. On the other hand, the evidence showing that a greater 
banking competition would be beneficial for established cooperatives can be 
explained by resorting to at least two arguments. First, a higher number of banks 
operating in the market could lead (the most) opaque firms to fractionalise their 
debt among several intermediaries, so as to maximise the amount of credit obtained. 
On their part, in such a situation, banks are more inclined to lend to opaque firms 
counting on the monitoring activity of the other intermediaries involved (Pagano et 
al, 1998; Ongena and Smith, 2000). An alternative interpretation could be that 
increased competitive pressures encourage more efficient bank screening 
procedures, so that banks are inclined to lend to (more) opaque firms on the basis of 
expected performance rather than past records and firms’ marketable assets as 
collateral (Benfratello et al, 2008). 
In terms of the institutional complementarity approach, the findings suggest that, 
for the Italian case, a relatively more concentrated banking system is 
complementary to both the birth and activity of non-cooperative firms. Moreover, 
while banks enjoying some market power tend to favour also the creation of 
cooperatives, it is a relatively more competitive banking system the institutional 
counterpart that strengthens their activity. Overall considered, the results for 
cooperatives are in line with the studies showing that the performance of these firms 
strongly depends on the institutional context in which they are embedded (e.g. 
Horvat, 1975; Thomas and Logan, 1982). 
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In terms of the economic literature discussed in Chapter 4, the present research 
work shows that cooperatives’ property rights structure does not necessarily result 
in higher costs of capital and/or credit rationing – as argued instead by studies as 
Drèze (1993), Putterman (1993) and Dow (2003). In support to those writers who 
instead point out the need for financial institutions to develop experience in lending 
to the cooperative sector (Horvat, 1982b; Ireland and Law, 1982; Bowles and 
Gintis, 1986; Ben-Ner, 1988a,b; Gintis, 1989, 1990), the results obtained in this 
Chapter inform that in relatively more competitive credit markets banking 
institutions may be better able to adopt screening and monitoring technologies that 
enable developing such experience.  
A major implication of the evidence obtained is that, with regard to the creation 
phase of their life-cycle, cooperatives are not different from other firms – at least for 
how they tend to be perceived by banking institutions and respond to bank market 
power. It is, however, during their activity that cooperatives appear to manifest a 
behaviour different from other enterprises and, in this respect, further research is 
called for to inquire into the sources and consequences of this diversity. 
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NOTES 
 
1 The Second European Banking Directive was introduced in 1989 and implemented in 1993 
(Chen, 2007). 
 
2 The horizon problem concerns the impossibility for partners to recoup the self-financed capital 
invested in the firm when their expected tenure in the firm is shorter than the time it takes for the 
stream of discounted net returns from the project to equal the initial cost of the investment. For a 
detailed discussion on the theme of internal financing in cooperative firms the reader is referred to 
Chapter Four. 
 
3 Cooperative members cannot diversify the risk to their employment, human capital and financial 
capital which are bundled in the same coop (Ben-Ner, 1988b). 
 
4 On the issue of cooperatives’ credit riskiness, Jefferis and Mason (1990) argue that it is important 
to distinguish between actual and perceived risk. Unfamiliarity with coops on the part of banks 
causes an information deficiency, which results in a higher level of risk being perceived by the 
lender, hence in either a higher interest rate on loans or a restriction on funds. However, this does 
not necessarily mean that the actual risk is greater. The crucial factor is the risk perceived on the 
basis of the available information. 
 
5 Podivinsky and Stewart (2007) report that cooperative firms’ registrations increased by more 
than 13% over the 10-year period 1976-1985. Moreover, looking at the general pattern of entry in 
the U.K. a comparison of the first half of the period (1976-1980) with the second one (1981-1985) 
reveals a growth rate of more than 300% in VAT registrations for cooperatives and of 11% for 
other firms. 
 
6 InfoCamere is the source from which data on firms’ demographics have been obtained. This 
organization coordinates, at national level, the network of provincial Chambers of Commerce. 
 
7 The HHI is computed on deposits (and not on loans) since depositors typically have less market 
power than borrowers. Moreover, “the HHI for deposits represents a good proxy for competition in 
loan markets if the empirical investigation involves firms that largely borrow from local markets, that 
is if credit markets are local for the firms under consideration” (Petersen and Rajan, 1995, p. 418). 
This is the case for the sample units of the present work. In fact, as Francesco Cesarini (2003) 
highlights, once internal funds are depleted, the banking channel is often the only way for Italian firms 
- usually facing high costs in employing arm's length finance - to gain access to external funds. 
 
8 In disaggregating national data on deposits at provincial level, we follow Santiago Carbò 
Valverde et al. (2003), and Mariarosaria Agostino and Francesco Trivieri (2008). 
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9 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is the measure used in most studies on bank market power, 
though it has been criticised by several authors (for a critical review see Guzman, 2000). 
Alternative indicators suggested by the literature are the Lerner Index and the non-structural H 
statistic of John Panzar and James Rosse (1987). Data availability has precluded the use of such 
indicators in the empirical analysis of this work. 
 
10 Using variables defined in a period preceding the one considered in the empirical investigation 
underlies the assumption that some provincial characteristics take time to display their impact on firm 
creation and activity. 
 
11 This variable is labelled BIRTH_OF for non-cooperative firms and BIRTH_COOP when referred 
to cooperatives. 
 
12 DEATH is obtained by averaging over the years 1999-2003 the annual cancellation rates, 
computed for sector i and province p as the ratio of firms cancelled in year t over the stock of firms 
registered at the end of year t-1. This variable is labelled similarly to BIRTH, depending on which 
group of firms it refers to. 
 
13 The regressions having BIRTH_COOP as dependent variable include also the birth and death 
rates of other firms (BIRTH_OF and DEATH_OF). 
 
14 INDUSHARE is calculated as the ratio of firms registered in industry i and province p in 1998 
over the total number of firms registered in province p in the same year. 
 
15 Starting from Robert Putnam’s (1993) study, various indexes proxying for social capital have 
been used in the literature. It is, however, still debated which is the most appropriate indicator. The 
electoral participation to referenda and elections has been used by studies as John Helliwell and 
Robert Putnam (1995), Mario Forni and Sergio Paba (2000), Luigi Guiso et al. (2004a, b) and 
Benfratello et al. (2008). 
 
16 The rounds of voting included in STIES are: the 1995 referenda, the 1999 European elections and 
the 2001 referenda. The choice of these rounds has been driven by data availability. Indeed, 
information on participation to the general elections is not available at provincial level, but only 
for constituencies. Moreover, regional elections do not always take place for all regions in the 
same year, so that data on voters’ turnout are not evenly available. 
 
17 The crimes this variable includes are: falsity in acts and persons; counterfeit, alteration or use of 
trademarks; other crimes against the safety, the economy and the public trust. Since information on 
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this variable was accessible only for the years 2000-2003, the 2000 figures have been imputed to 
the year 1999, so as to compute the mean value over the period 1999-2003. 
 
18 Also this variable is labelled differently depending on the group of firms that is taken into 
account. It is identified as ACTV_COOP in the estimations for cooperatives and as ACTV_OF in 
those carried out on non-cooperative firms. 
 
19 Data availability precluded the possibility to explicitly account for other non-financial variables 
that may impact on firms’ activity. Nonetheless, both industry and market specific effects can be 
included in the empirical models to mitigate the concern for omitted variables (see sub-section 5.1). 
Yet, the intention for future research is to dispose of a more varied and richer dataset. 
 
20 The Italian corporate law disciplines firms’ legal structures according to the principle of juristic 
personality. A first typology of firms is that of sole trader, a business entity having no separate 
existence from its owner. Basically, under this legal structure a person does business in his own 
name and under unlimited liability. Secondly, have partnerships, unincorporated businesses 
without juristic personality since their legal personality is not separated from that of their 
members. These enterprises normally operate under the unlimited liability of partners, although 
other forms (i.e. societa’ in accomandita semplice) have evolved in which only certain members 
have unlimited liability, while the others have limited liability. A third legal form is that of 
corporations, incorporated businesses which are legal entities recognised as a (fictious) person by 
law. These enterprises are, in other words, juristic persons and operate under limited liability. 
Fourthly, have cooperative firms, hinging on the principle of mutual aid, which have legal 
personality and can operate under both limited and unlimited liability. Finally, among the 
typologies established lately from the classical forms so far presented are the s.r.l. unipersonale 
(an incorporated company having a single owner), societa’ di professionisti (professionals’ 
company) and societa’ Europea (European company). 
 
21 Following Luis Servèn (2003), the criterion used to operate the outliers’ correction is to 
consider as outliers the observations for which any of the variables lie beyond 10 standard 
deviation away from the mean. 
 
22 A way to compute robust standard errors for the Tobit model is to resort to interval regression. 
To do so, it is first necessary to reconfigure the data by assigning two values of the response 
variable to each observation. When the response variable is left-censored, as in the case under 
exam, the first value is set to missing and the other to zero. Of course, the point estimates obtained 
with the interval regression are exactly the same as those of the Tobit regression. Therefore, to 
avoid cluttering, only the interval regression estimates are reported. 
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23 One of the core assumptions of the regression model is that the variance of the error term, 
conditional on the explanatory variables, is constant (i.e. homoskedasticity assumption). If the 
variance of the error term, given the explanatory variables, is not constant then we are in the 
presence of heteroskedasticity. In such case the estimators of the variances are biased. Since 
standard errors are based directly on those variances, they are no longer valid for constructing 
confidence intervals and test statistics. To correct heteroskedasticity it is necessary to adjust the 
standard errors so that they are valid in the presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form. 
 
24 The Wald test of exogeneity is a test of joint correlation between the error terms in the 
structural equation and those in the reduced-form equations for the endogenous variables. In the 
two-step estimator, the residuals from the first stage are included as regressors in the second stage. 
The Wald statistics is a test of significance of those residuals. 
 
25 Results for the Hansen-Sargan test are reported only for the OLS regressions. This is because 
econometric software do not allow to carry out such a test for the Tobit model. However, in order to 
have at least a feeling about the validity of the instruments used, the Tobit specifications have been 
estimated by OLS, so as to obtain the Hansen-Sargan statistic. The outcomes of the Hansen-Sargan 
test never rejected the null that the instruments were valid. 
 
26 It is worth noting that in the sample of non-cooperative firms more than 90% observations lie 
below the threshold value of HHI, while this figure is nearly 80% for cooperatives. 
 
27 For both cooperative and non-cooperative firms, almost 90% observations fall before the 
parabolas minimum and maximum points, respectively. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE GROWTH 
OF COOPERATIVE FIRMS 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter continues the empirical investigation of institutional complementarities 
by looking at the relationship between financial development and firm performance. 
This is an issue of interest in the analysis of the determinants of cooperative firms’ 
growth, as it interrelates with the far more reaching research topic of the financing 
of cooperatives, which we have extensively discussed in past chapters. 
Banking development represents an important factor influencing firms’ resources 
acquisition, hence their economic performance. It has been argued that a more 
developed banking sector is more effective in screening and monitoring investors, 
thus increasing the efficiency of resource allocation (see Goldsmith, 1969; 
Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990, among others). This greater ability to collect and 
process information might result in lower costs of bank financing (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1998) and greater availability of funds (Bencivenga and Smith, 1991; 
Levine, 1992). Furthermore, these positive effects may be particularly beneficial for 
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firms that are more dependent on financial intermediaries for their external 
financing (Benfratello et al, 2008). 
The arguments just discussed make it of great interest to investigate whether the 
growth of cooperative firms is influenced by local banking development. The 
analysis is once again comparative, therefore beside cooperatives, partnerships and 
corporations are also taken into account. This allows to assess whether local 
banking development impacts differently on the growth of diverse enterprises, 
hence permitting to evaluate for which business type, if any, it exerts a stronger 
influence. The working hypothesis is that financial development could be especially 
beneficial for those firms, such as cooperatives, that are particularly dependent on 
banks for their external financing. To address the research question, the analysis 
developed in this chapter tests empirically this hypothesis by applying the 
institutional complementarity approach. The interest is in assessing whether specific 
features of banking institutions (i.e. their degree of development) and of firms (i.e. 
the legal form they assume) are complementary in the sense that the effectiveness of 
firms (evaluated in terms of their growth rate) is reinforced by the presence of a 
particular order characterising the financial domain (i.e. the degree of 
development of banking institutions). 
In the previous chapter institutional complementarities have been investigated 
indirectly by using the sample split method and looking at differences between 
samples. In this chapter we take the analysis a step further and implement a direct 
test of the institutional complementarity hypothesis. To do so, a multiplicative 
interaction model is estimated on a sample of firms operating in the Italian 
provinces during the period 1995-2003. Implementing the analysis at the province 
level, which is the relevant local market in the Italian case, is important because 
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there is significant evidence that credit markets are sub-national – particularly for 
small firms (Kwast et al, 1997; Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi, 2001a), so that 
distance matters in the provision of funds (Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Bofondi and 
Gobbi, 2003). Moreover, as already mentioned in Chapter Six, in Italy the structure 
of the banking industry differs substantially across local markets and this provides 
sufficient cross-sectional variability within a single institutional framework 
(Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia, 2004). 
Several features distinguish this work from the extant literature. For the first 
time, the institutional complementarity approach is adopted to analyse the 
relationship between local financial development and firm growth. Furthermore, 
even though previous research has investigated the impact of financial development 
on firm growth, this work enriches the existing literature by exploring the 
possibility that this effect may vary among different business types. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the main literature 
proposed on the issue of financial development, with a special focus on the reasons 
that make it relevant for cooperative firms. Section 3 specifies the measures of firm 
growth and banking development used, as well as the econometric specification. 
Section 4 describes the data employed to implement the empirical analysis. Section 
5 presents and discusses the results obtained and the sensitivity checks performed. 
Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
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2 THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT: A REVIEW OF THE 
LITERATURE 
 
The relationship between financial development and economic performance has been 
analysed by a substantial body of literature. In this line of study several contributions 
investigated the economic effects of more developed banking institutions, since bank 
debt represents for many firms, especially small and medium sized ones, the dominant 
source of external financing (on this point see, for instance, Cesarini, 2003; Onida, 
2004). A common conclusion reached by these studies is that financial development 
impacts on firms’ ability to grow, hence on countries’ growth prospects (see, among 
others, King and Levine, 1993; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Bekaert et al, 2005).1 
The debate on the channels through which financial institutions affect the real 
economy centres on the relative importance of different, but interrelated, effects. The 
first one is that better financial intermediation improves the efficiency of investments, 
even when it does not increase their level. In other words, financial development 
facilitates better screening and monitoring of investors by banks and this raises the 
marginal productivity of capital (Goldsmith, 1969; Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; 
Fernandez and Galetovic, 1994). Evidence favouring this view is offered, among 
others, by Jose De Gregorio and Pablo Guidotti (1995), and Jith Jayaratne and Philip 
Strahan (1996). The latter authors analyse the economic impact of the American 
intrastate branch banking reform. This amendment affected banking in 35 States by 
relaxing restrictions on intrastate branching since the early 1970s. The reform allowed 
bank holding companies to consolidate bank subsidiaries into branches and to ease de 
novo branching State-wide. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) find evidence that the real 
per capita growth rate increased significantly following intrastate branch reform. 
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They also find that bank lending quality is the main channel through which this 
financial sector reform influenced economic growth. 
Related to the just discussed channel, financial development can improve economic 
performance at both firm and industry level by reducing the cost of raising funds from 
sources external to the firm, relative to the cost of internally generated cash flows 
(Rajan and Zingales, 1998). In broad terms, external funds are thought to be costlier 
because outsiders have less control over borrower’s actions (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) or because they know less about what the borrower will do with the funds 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Myers and Majluf, 1984). Under such circumstances 
financial development – in the form of better accounting and disclosure rules, and better 
corporate governance through institutions – reduces the wedge between the cost of 
internal and external funds and enhances growth, especially for firms that are mostly 
reliant on external financing (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Benfratello et al, 2008). 
Strictly related to the above mechanism is the role that financial development 
plays in regard to credit availability, thus in fostering investment levels. According to 
several studies, pioneered by works as Ronald McKinnon (1973) and Edward Shaw 
(1973), a more developed financial sector is better able to mobilise a larger amount of 
savings and translate them into investments. In other words, financial institutions 
insure individuals and firms against the risks associated with their liquidity needs, 
hence allowing them to invest in productive assets and technologies (Bencivenga and 
Smith, 1991; Levine, 1992; Saint-Paul, 1992, only to quote a few). 
Among the empirical analyses carried out on these issues, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Vojislav Maksimovic (1998) provide a micro-level test of the hypothesis 
advanced by Robert King and Ross Levine (1993), and Ross Levine and Sara Zervos 
(1998) that the extent to which financial markets and intermediaries are developed is 
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a determinant of growth. More precisely, in order to investigate how differences in 
financial systems affect firms’ use of external financing to finance growth, the authors 
estimate a financial planning model. This enables them to obtain the maximum 
growth rate that each firm in their thirty-country sample could attain without 
accessing long-term financing. Then, these predicted growth rates are compared to 
those realised by firms in countries with differing degree of development in their legal 
and financial systems. The main finding of this work is that firms in countries having 
active and more developed financial markets are better able to obtain external finance 
and grow faster. 
Rajeev Dehejia and Adriana Lleras-Muney (2003) use data on U.S. State bank 
branching and deposit insurance regulation, which they consider to be an exogenous 
source of variation in financial development. The authors show that changes in State 
banking regulations have a significant impact on financial development, as proxied 
by the level and growth of bank loans. They also find evidence that banking 
development impacts on components of growth: it facilitates the shift from the 
agricultural to the manufacturing sector, has a positive effect on human capital 
accumulation and also on wealth acquisition. 
Using a firm-level survey database covering 44 countries, Thorsten Beck et al. 
(2003) analyse the relationship between firm size and the development of banking 
institutions and legal protection of investors. With regard to the former aspect, which 
is more prominent for the issues under discussion, the authors find that there exists a 
positive relationship between the level of development of a country’s banking system 
and firm size. Furthermore, this impact is stronger for firms that depend more heavily 
on external finance. Continuing to employ a firm-level survey database, this time 
covering 54 countries, Beck et al. (2005) find that financial and institutional 
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development weakens the constraining effects of financial, legal and corruption 
obstacles to firm growth. They also find that small firms, which are more constrained 
by corruption, benefit the most from financial development. 
Working on Italian data, Guiso et al. (2004a) investigate the effect of financial 
development within regions. To measure financial development, these authors build a 
local indicator of how much more likely an individual is to obtain credit in a region, 
rather than in another one. Therefore, this index is a measure of how easy it is for an 
individual to borrow at the local level. It is based on the notion that developed 
financial markets grant individuals and firms easier access to external funds. The 
empirical analysis finds strong effects of local financial development: in more 
financially developed regions individuals are more likely to become entrepreneurs at 
a younger age; more firms are created and firms grow more; finally, per capita 
income is higher. 
Benfratello et al. (2008) have analysed the impact of local banking development 
on the innovative activity of Italian firms during the period 1992-2000. They find that 
local banking development, as measured by branch density, has a positive effect on 
the probability that a firm introduces a process or product innovation. In particular, 
for process innovation the effect is larger for small firms operating in more high-tech 
sectors and in sectors characterised by a greater need of external finance. 
To recapitulate, the literature surveyed in this section, summarised in schematic 
form in Table 7.1, strongly supports – both at the micro and macro levels – the 
existence of a close link between financial development and economic performance. 
This provides scope to inquire into the effects of local financial development for the 
growth of different typologies of enterprises. 
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2.1 The external financing of Italian cooperative firms 
 
In Chapter Five some issues related to the financing needs of Italian cooperatives 
have been touched upon. We now elaborate on that discourse in light of its 
relevance for the themes investigated in the present chapter. 
We have already introduced that to stimulate the capitalisation of Italian 
cooperative firms through the conferment of funds by third parties, the 59/1992 
Law introduced the figure of financial backer member (i.e. socio sovventore), a 
category of partners having the role of financiers, but not engaging in the 
mutualistic exchange. By attributing to these external members up to one third of 
votes in the company meetings, this reform, and more generally those introduced 
in the last two decades in most European countries, altered the traditional 
cooperative principle ‘one head, one vote’, hence – at least potentially – the 
governance of these firms.2 Clear-cut answers as to the actual impact of the 
legislative changes introduced in the 1990s are still absent. However, this is 
beyond the immediate point. What is important to remark here is that the very 
reason motivating the reform was the need to attract the resources, scarce for 
cooperatives, required to foster growth. Bearing this in mind, the figure of 
financial backer member, along with the participatory rights it assigns, can be 
regarded functional to fulfil the instrumental role of capital in cooperative firms. 
The 59/1992 Law established that financial backer members, beside the vote 
right previously mentioned, could also receive a remuneration higher than the one 
assigned to cooperator members, even though this extra-dividend could not be 
greater than 2%. This measure aimed to reconcile the non-profit nature of 
cooperatives with the profitability strategy of these financiers, so as to increase 
the amount of financial resources that could have been attracted. Whether or not 
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this reconcilement of interests has been achieved is still debated among observers, 
who also question the effectiveness of the reform itself. In this regard, it has been 
argued that the 1992 Law did not respond adequately to the needs that motivated 
it, since the amount of financial resources it has been able to mobilise did not 
match cooperatives’ requirements. A possible explanation for this is that the new 
financial instruments have never been sold in official financial markets (La 
Loggia Albanese, 2003; Salani, 2005; Zevi, 2005). 
A further relevant issue characterising the Italian case is that until 2003, 
although most of the corporate law regulating corporations applied also to 
cooperatives, an important element of differentiation in the discipline of these two 
business types was relative to the financial instruments they could access. In fact, 
an institutional constraint bounded the sources of external financing available to 
cooperatives. Afterwards, with the 2003 corporate law reform, the lawmaker 
acknowledged to cooperatives the possibility of using a wider range of financial 
instruments. However, given the relatively short time that has elapsed since then, 
it seems reasonable to expect that the effects of this reform (both in terms of 
financing and corporate governance), will be displayed only after a longer time 
will have passed. For the above reason, bank credit can still be regarded the main 
source of external financing for cooperatives.  
Considering the arguments so far discussed it can be concluded that – although 
banks represent the primary source of external financing also for partnerships, and 
a nonetheless important channel of resources acquisition for corporations – 
financial development can be particularly relevant in the case of cooperatives, as it 
might mitigate some of the previously discussed difficulties experienced by these 
firms, hence contributing to cater their financing requirement. 
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3 EMPIRICAL QUESTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This work intends to empirically assess the relationship existing between local 
banking development and the growth of Italian firms, with a special focus on 
cooperatives. More precisely, the interest is in investigating whether local banking 
development impacts differently on the growth of cooperative firms, as compared to 
partnerships and corporations (henceforth, non-cooperative firms).3 The reasoning 
set out in sub-section 2.1 should have clarified that the cooperative legal form has 
still strong implications in terms of financial structure of these firms, structure 
characterised – more than for any other typology – by the relevance of bank 
financing. Although it is not disputed that, in general, the benefits of a more 
developed banking sector are contingent upon firm financial structure, the working 
hypothesis is that these benefits could be especially marked for cooperatives, given 
their institutional structure.4 
The empirical analysis tests the research question by applying the institutional 
complementarity approach à la Aoki (2001): the interest is in assessing whether 
specific features of banking institutions (i.e. their degree of development) and of 
firms (i.e. the legal form they assume) are complementary in the sense that the 
effectiveness of cooperatives (evaluated in terms of their growth rate) is reinforced 
by the presence of more developed local financial intermediaries. 
To carry out a direct test of the institutional complementarity hypothesis, a 
multiplicative interaction model is specified. This enables testing conditional 
hypotheses, that is hypotheses in which a relationship between two or more 
variables depends on the value of one or more other conditioning variables 
(Brambol et al, 2006). Using a multiplicative interaction model in the present 
research work allows the impact of local banking development on firm growth to 
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differ between cooperatives, on one side, and non-cooperative firms, on the other 
side.5 In other words, in this model the partial effect of local banking development 
(BRANCH) on firm growth (GROWTH) is made conditional on firm’s legal 
structure (COOP). More precisely, the marginal effect of BRANCH is given by 
 
COOP
BRANCH
GROWTH
INTEBRANCH ∗+=∂
∂ ββ ˆˆ ,                                                                        (1) 
 
where BRANCHβˆ  is the marginal effect of local banking development on the growth 
of non-cooperative firms, while COOPINTE ∗βˆ is the estimated coefficient on the 
interaction term multiplied by the conditioning dichotomous variable COOP, which 
is equal to 1 when the condition “firm is a cooperative” is met and 0 otherwise. 
From equation (2) it follows that the marginal effect of local banking development 
on the growth of cooperative firms is INTEBRANCH ββ ˆˆ + . If complementarities are at 
work, INTEβˆ  must display a positive sign. In order to test the significance of (2), it is 
necessary to compute the standard error of this quantity, which is given by: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 212 ˆˆcov2ˆvarˆvarˆ INTEBRANCHINTEBRANCH COOPCOOP ββββσ ++= .                              (2) 
 
The following sub-sections present the measures of firm growth and local 
banking development, and discuss the other variables included in the empirical 
specification, as well as the econometric strategy adopted. 
 
3.1 Measuring firm growth 
 
To test the previously discussed research question, it is first necessary to define the 
measure of firm growth employed in the empirical analysis. Real sales are the 
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chosen indicator of growth; therefore, the dependent variable is the annual growth 
rate of firm’s real sales. 
Although several other measures have been used in the literature on firm growth, 
focusing on sales appears to be appropriate for a series of reasons. First, beside 
employment, this is the most widely used indicator in empirical growth research 
(Delmar, 1997) and there seems to be an emerging consensus that if only one 
indicator is to be chosen as a measure of firm growth, this should be sales (Hoy et 
al, 1992; Sutton, 1997; Ardishvili et al, 1998; Delmar et al, 2003). Secondly, data 
on sales are relatively easily accessible and are insensitive to capital intensity and 
degree of integration (Delmar et al, 2003). Thirdly, sales are a suitable indicator 
across different conceptualisations of the firm (Davidsson and Wiklund, 2000). 
Finally, demand and, therefore, sales are a precursor of growth in other indicators 
(Flamholtz, 1986; Delmar, 1997). 
Beside the above advantages, drawbacks of sales as a growth indicator are that 
this measure is sensitive to fluctuations in currency exchange rates and inflation. 
The latter is not an issue for concern in this work, since firms’ growth rates are 
computed on real sales.6  
 
3.2 Measuring local banking development 
 
Local banking development is measured for province p and year t as number of 
bank branches normalised by population: 
 
pt
pt
pt population
esbankbranch
BRANCH = , where p=1,…,103;  t=1995,…,2003.                           (3) 
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This variable has been widely used in studies on local banking development (e.g. 
Degryse and Ongena, 2005). It describes the structure of the banking system in the 
provinces and, in particular, captures the dimension of banking development within the 
market (Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi, 2001b) mostly affected by the deregulation 
process that has greatly contributed to transform the physiognomy of the Italian 
banking system in the last two decades (Benfratello et al, 2008).7 A further advantage 
of using BRANCH to measure local financial development is that this variable is 
available on a homogeneous basis for long periods of time (Benfratello et al, 2008). 
 
3.3 The econometric specification 
 
As already mentioned, in the empirical model the dependent variable is the annual 
growth rate of firm’s real sales (GROWTH), while BRANCH is the main 
explanatory variable. The vector of other regressors includes the following variables 
accounting for firm specific, local market and sectoral characteristics. Firm size 
(EMPLOY) is measured as number of employees and, according to the relevant 
literature in the field, this variable could exert either a relevant or insignificant 
impact on firm growth.8 Firm age (AGE) is expected to be negatively related to 
GROWTH.9 Firm cash flow (CASHFLOW) is measured as the sum of declared 
income, depreciation and quiescence fund scaled by total assets, and is a proxy for 
internally generated finance (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002), hence for firm liquidity 
constraints (Fagiolo and Luzzi, 2006).10 The ratio of bank loans (i.e. short and long-
term bank debts) on firm’s total assets (BANKDEBT) indicates the proportion of 
bank debt a firm employs to finance its assets. The dummy variable COOP 
distinguishes between different firms’ legal structures, by taking on the value of 1 
for cooperatives and 0 for non-cooperative firms. The interaction term (INTE) 
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between BRANCH and COOP accounts for the possibility that the impact of local 
banking development on firm growth varies with firm legal structure. The 
dichotomous variable GRU takes on the value of 1 if the firm belongs to a group 
and 0 otherwise. The (log of) provincial population (POP) is a measure for province 
size. The provincial real per capita income (RPI) proxies for local wealth. The 
dichotomous variable CEN-NORTH captures geographical differences in firm 
growth between Centre Northern provinces and Southern ones. Three dummy 
variables distinguishing between firms operating in the supplier dominated, scale 
intensive, or specialised suppliers sectors (PAV) control for sectoral heterogeneity 
within the manufacturing industry (the control group is the science based sector).11 
Finally, time dummies are included to control for year fixed effects. In order to 
mitigate any potential simultaneity bias all variables have been lagged one year.12 
The econometric specification is estimated by applying the technique of panel 
data. Rather than estimating separate equations for cooperative and non-cooperative 
firms (as it has been done in Chapter Six), the empirical analysis is implemented on 
the whole sample. Then, by introducing the dummy variable COOP and the 
interaction term INTE, it is possible to distinguish between firms’ legal structures 
and analyse if local banking development impacts differently on the growth of 
diverse typologies of firms. Such an empirical strategy presents two distinctive 
advantages: first, using the multiplicative interaction term INTE allows to test 
directly for the presence of complementary relationships between specific features 
of the banking system and of business types; secondly, the number of cooperatives 
present in the original dataset is rather limited.13 
Tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 provide a more detailed description of the variables 
presented in this section, their main summary statistics and the correlation matrix. 
Variable
GROWTH Firm's annual growth rate of real sales
EMPLOY Firm's number of employees
SIZE Firm's total assets
AGE Firm age measured as current year minus year of establishment
CASHFLOW Firm’s declared income plus depreciation and quiescence fund scaled by total assets
BANKDEBT Short and long-term bank loans on firm's total assets
INV Investments in installation, machinery, and equipment on total assets
BRANCH Number of bank branches operating in a province normalised by population, scaled by 10,000
COOP Dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 if firm is a cooperative and 0 otherwise
GRU Dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 if firm belongs to a group and 0 otherwise
POP Provincial population
RPI Provincial real per capita income
CEN-NORTH Dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 if firm operates in a Centre Northern province and 0 otherwise
SOUTH Dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 if firm operates in a Southern province and 0 otherwise
PAV1 Dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 if firm operates in the supplier dominated sector and 0 otherwise
PAV2 Dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 if firm operates in the scale intensive sector and 0 otherwise
PAV3 Dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 if firm operates in the specialised suppliers sector and 0 otherwise
PAV4 Dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 if firm operates in the science based sector and 0 otherwise
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GROWTH * 17479 3.35 17.21 -44.99 105.33
EMPLOY+ 17477 79 158 11 2,200
SIZE # 15570 8,194 20,941 12 376,483
AGE ++ 17479 24 17 0 191
CASHFLOW * 15570 12.99 8.27 -62.14 69.98
BANKDEBT * 15570 16.51 17.90 0.00 89.78
INV * 12893 9.712 11.433 0 77.09
BRANCH 17479 5.8423 1.4650 1.5531 10.2865
COOP 17479 0.0326 0.1775 0 1
GRU 17479 0.2279 0.4195 0 1
POP + 17479 1,050,100 1,068,675 89,775 3,775,765
RPI # 17479 21.4862 4.7012 9.3096 31.9725
CEN-NORTH 17479 0.8595 0.3475 0 1
SOUTH 17479 0.1405 0.3475 0 1
PAV1 17479 0.5147 0.4998 0 1
PAV2 17479 0.1767 0.3814 0 1
PAV3 17479 0.2577 0.4374 0 1
PAV4 17479 0.0509 0.2197 0 1
For the description of the variables see Table 7.2. *In percentage terms; # In thousands
of Euro; + In units; ++ Years. All the other variables are dummies, with the exception of
BRANCH (see Table 7.2).
TABLE 7.2 - Description of Variables
Description
All variables are drawn from Capitalia except for: i) BRANCH, obtained by calculations on data ISTAT and Bank of Italy, ii) RPI
and POP which are drawn from ISTAT.  
TABLE 7.3 - Summary statistics
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4 DATA 
 
The dataset used to implement the econometric analysis covers the nine-year period 
1995-2003 and has been derived combining information obtained from three main 
sources. Data on firms come from the last three waves of the survey Indagine sulle 
imprese manifatturiere conducted with triennial cadence by Capitalia’s observatory 
on small and medium sized enterprises. The sample of Italian manufacturing firms 
used in the surveys is stratified and randomly selected for firms with 11 to 500 
employees, while it is by census for firms with more than 500 employees. Data 
collected through the surveys are both qualitative and quantitative. Qualitative 
information is obtained by dispensing a questionnaire to sample firms and is 
referred to the end of the three-year period of each survey wave. Quantitative data 
are obtained from examining firms’ yearly balance sheets. 
Information collected through the questionnaire, which is made up of six 
sections, covers a number of aspects. The first section gathers information on 
establishment year, legal form, prevailing sector of activity, ownership and control, 
and participation in consortia activities. The second section collects data on 
employment, while the third one examines investment and R&D activities, and their 
financing. The fourth section is concerned with the internationalisation process, and 
covers aspects such as the export activity, its geographical distribution, foreign 
direct investments, etc. The fifth part of the questionnaire analyses firm’s market 
and gives information on distributive channels and characteristics of main 
competitors. Finally, the sixth section deals with the issue of firm financing, and 
contains questions regarding banking relationships, the access to the latest financial 
instruments, the use of financial incentives and several other pieces of information. 
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The dataset for the period 1995-2003 is made up of 6,452 firms. Since not all 
firms are present in each survey wave, the panel is unbalanced and made up of 
28,185 observations. A careful examination of the original dataset showed that in 
some cases the year of firm establishment was taking on two clashing values. To 
correct these inconsistencies, and homogenise the sample, the mean value of the 
two clashing years has been imputed when the time span was less than a decade, 
while excluding from the sample observations for which the time span elapsing 
between the two clashing years was longer than ten years. After operating these 
adjustments, the sample consists of 25,491 observations. 
The sub-sample of cooperatives includes 190 firms, for a total of 831 
observations.14 Of these, 26.3% (amounting to 219 observations) operate in 
Southern regions, while 73.7% (i.e. 612 observations) are run in Centre Northern 
ones. Regarding the Pavitt sectoral distribution of sampled cooperatives, 160 
firms (for a total of 696 observations) belong to the supplier dominated sector, 21 
cooperatives (96 observations) operate in the scale intensive sector, 9 firms 
(amounting to 39 observations) are in the specialised suppliers sector, while none 
of the cooperatives included in the sample belongs to the science based sector. As 
far as the number of employees is concerned, 26.3% cooperatives (216 
observations) employ between 11 and 20 workers, 44.2% (for a total of 405 
observations) have between 21 and 50 employees, 22.1% firms (equal to 153 
observations) employ between 51 and 100 workers, 3.2% (amounting to 27 
observations) have between 101 and 250 employees, finally, 4.2% cooperatives 
(amounting to 30 observations) employ between 251 and 500 workers.15 
A second source of data comes from the Bank of Italy and regards the provincial 
distribution of branches for each Italian bank over the period considered in the 
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analysis. Finally, figures on provincial population and real value added are drawn 
from the Italian National Statistical Institute (ISTAT). 
After correcting for the presence of outliers, and excluding sole traders and firms 
classified in the category “other legal structures”, the number of observations for 
each variable employed in the empirical investigation is reported in Table 7.3.16 
 
5 RESULTS 
 
Estimation results are presented in Tables 7.5-7.9. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange 
Multiplier test always favours the linear regression model against the random 
effects one. Therefore, the figures reported in the tables are obtained from running 
pooled regressions. All estimations have been carried out by using robust standard 
errors. The Wooldridge test for serial correlation in panels reveals no 
autocorrelation in the residuals. Looking at Table 7.5, MOD1 reports the results for 
the general model of firm growth. Since some of the control variables turn out to be 
not statistically significant, the general-to-simple procedure of reiterated elimination 
is applied to the specification of MOD1 and several nested models are estimated. 
First, being CEN-NORTH the less statistically significant variable, this is excluded 
from the model and estimations are re-run on MOD2. Then, since results obtained 
for MOD2 reveal that POP is not statistically significant, this is not included in 
MOD3, which is the final model.17 Estimation results for MOD3 are reported in 
Table 7.5. 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: GROWTH
MOD 1 MOD 2 MOD 3
EMPLOY -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0019
0.0500 0.0490 0.0490
AGE -0.0334 -0.0335 -0.0332
0.0010 0.0010 0.0010
CASHFLOW -0.1094 -0.1094 -0.1095
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
BANKDEBT 0.0204 0.0204 0.0203
0.0510 0.0520 0.0520
BRANCH 0.4393 0.4282 0.3417
0.0270 0.0250 0.0220
COOP -5.1204 -5.0433 -5.1618
0.0840 0.0860 0.0780
INTE 1.0160 1.0053 1.0238
0.0380 0.0390 0.0360
GRU 1.4625 1.4692 1.4710
0.0010 0.0010 0.0010
POP 0.1886 0.2079
0.5460 0.4850
RPI -0.1611 -0.1709 -0.1393
0.0360 0.0080 0.0030
CEN-NORTH -0.1862
0.8270
PAV1 -2.6168 -2.6157 -2.6452
0.0040 0.0040 0.0030
PAV2 -0.6900 -0.6925 -0.6917
0.4590 0.4580 0.4580
PAV3 -1.6715 -1.6715 -1.6780
0.0690 0.0690 0.0680
LM Test 0.03 0.02 0.03
0.8731 0.8752 0.8710
AR(1) test 0.4250 0.3840 0.3790
0.5148 0.5358 0.5381
Model Test 25.32 26.62 28.05
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R-squared 0.0452 0.0452 0.0452
F Test (BRANCH INTE) 5.430 5.730 5.960
0.0044 0.0033 0.0026
N. OBS 10,202 10,202 10,203
TABLE 7.5 - Estimation results
For the description of the variables see Table 7.2. In italics are reported the p-values
of the tests. The t statistics (not reported) are based on robust standard errors. INTE
is the interaction term between BRANCH and COOP. With exception of this latter,
and of territorial and industrial dummies, all the explanatory variables have been
lagged once, to avoid simultaneity. The variable POP is taken in logarithm terms.
Time dummies and constant included but not reported. LM test is the Breusch and
Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test for random effects. AR(1) test is the Wooldridge test
for serial correlation in panels; it is a F-test under the null of no first order
autocorrelation. F test is a test of joint significance of the variables indicated in round
brackets. From MOD 1 to MOD 3 the general-to-simple procedure has been applied.
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To begin with the comment on the significant control variables, figures for 
MOD3 in Table 7.5 suggest an inverse relationship between firm size and firm 
growth; this result, in line with most studies (such as Mata, 1994; Weiss, 1998; 
Audretsch et al, 1999; Becchetti and Trovato, 2002), rejects Gibrat’s law of 
proportionate effects, according to which firm growth should be independent of 
size.18 A negative impact on GROWTH is also found for AGE and this suggests – 
in line with the a priori expectations and the findings of studies as Keith Glancey 
(1998) and Per Davidsson et al. (2002) – that younger firms grow faster.19 
Moreover, the results show that CASHFLOW is inversely related with firm 
growth,20 and that firms employing a larger amount of bank debt (BANKDEBT) and 
those belonging to a group (GRU) have higher growth rates. It is then found that 
firms located in less wealthy provinces grow more (RPI). Finally, firms operating in 
supplier dominated (PAV1), scale intensive (PAV2) and specialised suppliers 
(PAV3) sectors grow less than those working in the science based sector (PAV4). 
Passing to the main variables of the investigation, the results suggest that, other 
things being equal, cooperatives tend to grow less than non-cooperative firms 
(COOP). This result would seem to support those studies claiming that the 
institutional characteristics of cooperative firms pose constraints to their 
performance (see, for instance, Williamson, 1975, 1980, 1985; Vitaliano, 1983; 
Putterman, 1993). Moreover, the empirical evidence shows that local banking 
development is an important determinant of firm growth: the sign on BRANCH 
suggests that local banking development has a positive impact on the growth of 
non-cooperative firms. The beneficial effect of BRANCH on GROWTH is even 
stronger for cooperative firms, since the positive sign on the interaction term INTE 
indicates that as local banking markets become more developed, cooperatives tend 
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to grow at a rate higher than non-cooperative firms. This result seems to provide 
evidence in favour of the existence of a relationship of institutional 
complementarity: the effectiveness of cooperative firms, measured in terms of their 
growth rate, is reinforced by the presence of more developed local banking 
institutions. 
The empirical evidence obtained could be interpreted as suggesting that banking 
development allows financial intermediaries to better collect and process the 
information embedded in the local market, therefore reducing the scope for moral 
hazard and adverse selection (Goldsmith, 1969; Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990). 
This can encourage risk-taking on the part of cooperatives. It can also favour the 
reproduction of some cooperatives’ firm-specific resources, such as social 
relations and social values, which are embedded in the local community and are 
important for the economic governance of these firms (Dixit, 2007). It could be 
through these channels that banking development particularly enhances the 
growth of cooperatives.21 This seems to be evidence in favour of Raghuram Rajan 
and Luigi Zingales (1998) and Benfratello et al. (2008), who show that financial 
development especially benefits firms that are mostly dependent on banks for 
their external financing. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the variables BRANCH and INTE are statistically 
significant when considered individually and also when tested jointly. 
 
5.1 Sensitivity analysis 
 
A potential issue in the analysis presented is that BRANCH may be endogenous, if 
local banking markets tend to be more developed where firms’ growth rates are 
higher for exogenous reasons. A similar reasoning could apply also to BANKDEBT 
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and CASHFLOW. Therefore, to address this potential problem MOD3 is re-
estimated by testing for endogeneity. The instruments used to implement this check 
are: the provincial area in square kilometres (AREA); the number of municipalities 
present in the province (MUNI); the geographical dummy CEN-NORTH; one lag 
of BANKDEBT and CASHFLOW, also this lagged once. Results from this 
estimation are reported in Table 7.6.  
Figures for MOD3 in Table 7.6 show that the Wu-Hausman and Durbin-Wu-
Hausman tests find no evidence of endogeneity; moreover, the Hansen-Sargan test 
reveals that the instruments employed are valid. Therefore, the results previously 
discussed for MOD3 are fully confirmed. 
To check the robustness of the empirical specification, some new variables are 
then introduced. In order to account for the impact of investments on firm growth, 
the model is estimated by including the variable INV, measured as investments in 
installation, machinery and equipment on total assets.22 Results from this check are 
presented in column MOD4 of Table 7.6. Figures obtained for INV show that, as 
expected, firms investing more have a higher growth rate. Moreover, the previous 
findings continue to be valid, as no change is registered neither for the core 
variables of this study (BRANCH, COOP, INTE), nor for the control ones. 
The next step of the robustness analysis is to include INV among the endogenous 
regressors in the specification testing for endogeneity, since also INV may be 
endogenous, at least potentially. To carry out the two stage least squares regression, 
beside the instruments previously used, INV lagged once is included as well. 
Results obtained from this check on MOD4 do not show evidence of endogeneity 
(see Table 7.6), thus confirming the conclusions discussed in the previous section. 
 
Dependent variable: GROWTH
MOD 3 MOD 4 MOD 4
(Endogeneity check) (Endogeneity check)
EMPLOY -0.0030 -0.0022 -0.0025
0.0330 0.0280 0.0850
AGE -0.0312 -0.0307 -0.0265
0.0470 0.0040 0.1130
CASHFLOW -0.0502 -0.1628 -0.1057
0.2570 0.0000 0.0780
INV 0.0868 0.0470
0.0000 0.4250
BANKDEBT 0.0306 0.0282 0.0280
0.0920 0.0170 0.1780
BRANCH 0.5197 0.3354 0.7099
0.1840 0.0400 0.1150
COOP -0.1849 -6.2213 -1.9194
0.9710 0.0750 0.7620
INTE 0.3242 1.0661 0.4618
0.6940 0.0600 0.6510
GRU 1.3665 1.1718 1.0709
0.0360 0.0120 0.1210
RPI -0.1939 -0.1664 -0.2869
0.0220 0.0010 0.0020
PAV1 -2.1004 -2.5744 -1.2849
0.0920 0.0040 0.3070
PAV2 -0.2441 -0.5146 0.5879
0.8510 0.5850 0.6540
PAV3 -1.3185 -1.2229 -0.4833
0.3010 0.1870 0.7080
LM Test 0.31
0.5762
AR(1) test 1.9600
0.1619
Model Test 13.74 25.93 10.97
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R-squared 0.0594
UN R-squared 0.0505 0.0646
F Test (BRANCH INTE) 4.81
0.0081
Tests of endogeneity:
Wu-Hausman F test: 0.5904 0.6565
0.6213 0.6223
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 1.7777 2.6400
0.6198 0.6198
Hansen-Sargan statistic 
(overidentification test of all 
instruments)
1.765  
0.4138 4.375  0.1122
N. OBS 5,205 7,988 3,858
TABLE 7.6 - Robustness: checking for endogeneity and including new regressors 
For the description of the variables see Table 7.2. In italics are reported the p-values of the tests. The t
statistics (not reported) are based on robust standard errors. INTE is the interaction term between BRANCH
and COOP. With exception of this latter, and of territorial and industrial dummies, all the explanatory variables
have been lagged once, to avoid simultaneity. Time dummies and constant included but not reported. LM test
is the Breusch and Pagan Lagrange multiplier test for random effects. AR(1) test is the Wooldridge test for
serial correlation in panels; it is a F-test under the null of no first order autocorrelation. F test is a test of joint
significance of the variables indicated in round brackets. The tests of endogeneity for the estimations on MOD
3 regard the variables BRANCH, BANKDEBT, CASHFLOW, while those for the estimations on MOD 4 are for
the variables BRANCH, BANKDEBT, CASHFLOW and INV. In the first case the instruments used are: the
provincial area in square kilometres (AREA), the number of municipalities (MUNI), the dummy CEN-NORTH,
one lag of BANKDEBT and one lag of CASHFLOW. In the second case the instruments include also one lag of
the variable INV.
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Taking the robustness analysis a step further, the original specification (MOD1) 
is estimated by changing the dependent variable: firm growth is now measured as 
the annual growth rate of employees (GROWTH2).23 Furthermore, EMPLOY is 
replaced with SIZE1 (measured as the log of real sales lagged once) and INV is 
included as well. Results from this sensitivity check are reported in column MOD5 
of Table 7.7. The figures in this table show that, although some control variables are 
no longer significant, the main conclusions of this study are confirmed: local banking 
development is beneficial for the growth of non-cooperative firms (BRANCH); this 
positive impact is even more marked for cooperatives (INTE), suggesting that 
financial development contributes to mitigate some of the initial disadvantages that 
coops, compared to other enterprises, experience (COOP). These same conclusions 
are reached also when firm size is first measured by (the log of) total assets lagged 
once - SIZE2 - (MOD6 in Table 7.7) and then by EMPLOY (MOD7 in Table 7.7). 
As a further check, since firm growth in one period is likely to be affected by 
unobserved area specific factors, which may be at work also in other periods, the 
robustness analysis clusters observations at the province level. Clustering makes 
allowance of within zone correlation of the error terms over time, so that it is 
necessary to correct standard errors and tests statistics for within cluster correlation. 
The regressions re-run by clustering on provinces are relative to MOD3 (Table 7.5), 
MOD4 (Table 7.6), and the models having GROWTH2 as dependent variable 
(Table 7.7). Figures from these estimations are presented in Table 7.8. 
Table 7.9 reports figures on the significance of the quantity of interest (the 
impact of BRANCH on GROWTH when COOP=1), computed by applying 
expression (3), and on the relevant marginal effects.24 
 
Dependent variable: GROWTH2
MOD 5 MOD 6 MOD 7
EMPLOY -0.0024
0.0100
SIZE1 0.2754
0.0880
SIZE2 0.2618
0.0890
AGE -0.0568 -0.0576 -0.0483
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
CASHFLOW -0.0391 -0.0370 -0.0395
0.0580 0.0740 0.0540
INV 0.0471 0.0474 0.0464
0.0020 0.0020 0.0020
BANKDEBT 0.0076 0.0074 0.0127
0.4480 0.4630 0.1930
BRANCH 0.3941 0.3945 0.3621
0.0270 0.0270 0.0420
COOP -10.211 -10.359 -10.768
0.0030 0.0030 0.0020
INTE 1.8152 1.8356 1.9229
0.0010 0.0010 0.0010
GRU 0.1533 0.1482 0.8764
0.7080 0.7190 0.0260
POP 0.4989 0.4921 0.4920
0.0850 0.0890 0.0900
RPI -0.1903 -0.1898 -0.1915
0.0080 0.0080 0.0070
CEN-NORTH 0.0482 0.1044 0.2240
0.9520 0.8960 0.7800
PAV1 -0.4492 -0.4243 -0.5055
0.4760 0.5010 0.4220
PAV2 0.2694 0.2894 0.2082
0.6960 0.6750 0.7620
PAV3 -0.0417 -0.0260 -0.0442
0.9480 0.9670 0.9450
LM Test 0.550 0.540 0.590
0.4577 0.4605 0.4442
AR(1) test 1.6390 1.5140 1.5730
0.3967 0.4261 0.4759
Model Test 7.03 6.99 6.97
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R-squared 0.0294 0.0293 0.030
F Test (BRANCH INTE) 8.96 9.08 9.22
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
N. OBS 4,065 4,065 4,065
TABLE 7.7 - Robustness: changing the dependent variable 
For the description of the variables see Table 7.2. In italics are reported the p-values of the tests. The
t statistics (not reported) are based on robust standard errors. GROWTH2 is the annual growth rate
of employees. SIZE1 is the log of real sales, while SIZE2 is the log of total assets. INTE is the
interaction term between BRANCH and COOP. With exception of this latter, and of territorial and
industrial dummies, all the explanatory variables have been lagged once, to avoid simultaneity. Time
dummies and constant included but not reported. LM test is the Breusch and Pagan Lagrange
multiplier test for random effects. AR(1) test is the Wooldridge test for serial correlation in panels; it is
a F-test under the null of no first order autocorrelation. F test is a test of joint significance of the
variables indicated in round brackets. 
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(on) 
MOD 3
(on) 
MOD 4
(on) 
MOD 5
(on) 
MOD 6
(on) 
MOD 7
EMPLOY -0.0019 -0.0022 -0.0024
0.0480 0.0350 0.0180
SIZE1 0.2754
0.1480
SIZE2 0.2618
0.1380
AGE -0.0332 -0.0307 -0.0568 -0.0576 -0.0483
0.0010 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
CASHFLOW -0.1095 -0.1628 -0.0391 -0.0370 -0.0395
0.0000 0.0000 0.0630 0.0780 0.0530
INV 0.0868 0.0471 0.0474 0.0464
0.0000 0.0060 0.0060 0.0070
BANKDEBT 0.0203 0.0282 0.0076 0.0074 0.0127
0.0500 0.0100 0.3710 0.3870 0.1340
BRANCH 0.3417 0.3354 0.3941 0.3945 0.3621
0.0140 0.0200 0.0670 0.0670 0.0960
COOP -5.1618 -6.2213 -10.211 -10.359 -10.768
0.0870 0.0890 0.0070 0.0060 0.0040
INTE 1.0238 1.0661 1.8152 1.8356 1.923
0.0330 0.0710 0.0040 0.0030 0.0020
GRU 1.4710 1.1718 0.1533 0.1482 0.8764
0.0000 0.0110 0.7090 0.7280 0.0200
POP 0.4989 0.4921 0.4920
0.1130 0.1190 0.1250
RPI -0.1393 -0.1664 -0.1903 -0.1898 -0.1915
0.0000 0.0000 0.0090 0.0090 0.0090
CEN-NORTH 0.0482 0.1044 0.2240
0.9490 0.8890 0.7700
PAV1 -2.6452 -2.5744 -0.4492 -0.4243 -0.5055
0.0000 0.0000 0.4370 0.4600 0.3870
PAV2 -0.6917 -0.5146 0.2694 0.2894 0.2082
0.3530 0.4950 0.6480 0.6250 0.7300
PAV3 -1.6780 -1.2229 -0.0417 -0.0260 -0.0442
0.0240 0.0720 0.9450 0.9660 0.9420
Model Test 32.39 24.96 9.48 9.00 8.11
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R-squared 0.0452 0.0594 0.0294 0.0293 0.03
F Test (BRANCH INTE) 7.78 5.01 7.96 8.09 8.45
0.0007 0.0085 0.0006 0.0006 0.0004
N. OBS 10,203 7,988 4,065 4,065 4,065
For the description of the variables see Table 7.2. In italics are reported the p-values of the
tests. The t statistics (not reported) are based on robust standard errors adjusted for
clustering on provinces. GROWTH is the annual growth rate of real sales, and GROWTH2
is the annual growth rate of employees. SIZE1 is the log of real sales, while SIZE2 is the
log of total assets. INTE is the interaction term between BRANCH and COOP. With
exception of this latter, and of territorial and industrial dummies, all the explanatory
variables have been lagged once, to avoid simultaneity. The variable POP is taken in
logarithm terms. Time dummies and constant included but not reported. F test is a test of
joint significance of the variables indicated in round brackets. 
TABLE 7.8 - Robustness: clustering on provinces 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
GROWTH GROWTH 2
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MOD 3 MOD 4 MOD 5
Est. coeff. of  BRANCH (1) 0.4393 0.3354 0.3941
Est. coeff. of INTE (2) 1.0160 1.0661 1.8152
Var of (1) 2.22E-02 2.66E-02 3.18E-02
Var of (2) 2.37E-01 3.21E-01 3.17E-01
COV. (1) (2) -1.37E-02 -1.79E-02 -1.55E-02
t-ratio 2.8362 2.5112 3.9200
MOD 6 MOD 7
Est. coeff. of  BRANCH (1) 0.3945 0.3621
Est. coeff. of INTE (2) 1.8356 1.9229
Var of (1) 3.18E-02 3.18E-02
Var of (2) 3.18E-01 3.15E-01
COV. (1) (2) -1.56E-02 -1.54E-02
t-ratio 3.9511 4.0661
MOD 3
(clustered)
MOD 4
(clustered)
MOD 5
(clustered)
Est. coeff. of  BRANCH (1) 0.3417 0.3354 0.3941
Est. coeff. of INTE (2) 1.0238 1.0661 1.8152
Var of (1) 1.85E-02 2.01E-02 4.54E-02
Var of (2) 2.24E-01 3.41E-01 3.68E-01
COV. (1) (2) -1.90E-02 -9.27E-03 -3.08E-02
t-ratio 3.0202 2.3942 3.7247
MOD 6
(clustered)
MOD 7
(clustered)
Est. coeff. of  BRANCH (1) 0.3945 0.3621
Est. coeff. of INTE (2) 1.8356 1.9229
Var of (1) 4.54E-02 4.63E-02
Var of (2) 3.67E-01 3.59E-01
COV. (1) (2) -3.05E-02 -3.22E-02
t-ratio 3.7636 3.9159
TABLE 7.9 - The impact of BRANCH on GROWTH when COOP=1
For the description of the variables see Table 7.2. For the computation of the tests
statistics see expression (2) in the main body of the chapter.
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6 CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this chapter has been to empirically investigate whether local financial 
development influences the growth of Italian firms. To assess if the degree of 
development of local credit markets impacts differently on the growth of diverse 
business types, the empirical analysis allowed the effect of local banking 
development on firm growth to differ between cooperative and non-cooperative 
firms. 
The econometric investigation, implemented on a sample of Italian firms for the 
period 1995-2003, leads to two main conclusions. The first one is that, compared to 
non-cooperative firms, cooperatives tend to grow less. In fact, the empirical 
evidence seems to suggest that, even after controlling for firm specific and local 
market characteristics, cooperatives exhibit a lower growth rate. Thus, this result 
would seem to support those studies claiming that the institutional characteristics of 
cooperative firms pose constraints to their performance (see, for instance, 
Williamson, 1975, 1980, 1985; Vitaliano, 1983; Putterman, 1993). 
A second result is that local banking development is a determinant of firm 
growth, since firms operating in more developed credit markets are found to have 
higher growth rates. Therefore, this seems to indicate that the characteristics of the 
institutional context in which firms operate influence their performance. 
Furthermore, and this is the main finding of this work, the results suggest that the 
beneficial effect of local financial development is stronger for cooperative firms: as 
local banking markets become more developed, cooperatives tend to grow at a rate 
higher than non-cooperative firms. This seems to be empirical evidence in favour of 
the existence of a relationship of institutional complementarity between local 
banking institutions and cooperative firms, as the effectiveness of cooperatives, 
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evaluated in terms of their growth rate, appears to be reinforced by the presence of 
more developed local financial intermediaries.  
This conclusion is in line with studies claiming the importance of supportive 
financial institutions for cooperatives’ flourishing and success (Estrin and Jones, 
1988; Bonin et al, 1993; Smith, 2001; Mathews, 2002; Stiglitz, 2004, among 
others). It could be interpreted as suggesting that banking development allows 
financial intermediaries to better collect and process the information embedded in 
the local market, therefore reducing the scope for moral hazard and adverse 
selection (Goldsmith, 1969; Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990). In turn, this can 
encourage risk-taking on the part of cooperatives and favour the reproduction of 
firm-specific resources, as social relations and social values, which are embedded 
in the local community and are important for the economic governance of 
cooperatives. The evidence supports also Rajan and Zingales (1998) and 
Benfratello et al. (2008), who show that financial development especially benefits 
firms that are mostly reliant on banks for their external financing. 
The findings obtained in this Chapter further corroborate the main conclusions 
stemming from the analysis carried out in Chapter 6. Robust empirical evidence 
shows that cooperatives’ performance is strongly context dependent. There are 
important institutional complementarities between the behaviour of local banking 
institutions and cooperative firms’ performance. This requires re-thinking the 
economic theory of the cooperative firm to incorporate institutional contexts. 
Chapter 4 has pointed out the inconsistencies between mainstream and 
institutionalist accounts (e.g. Ward, 1958; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1979; Williamson 1975, 1980, 1985 versus Horvat, 1982a; Bowles and 
Gintis, 1994a; Hodgson, 1999). The anecdotal evidence reconstructed in Chapter 
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5 has illustrated that historically the cross-country relative performance of the 
cooperative sector has been affected by country-specific legal, financial, political 
and cultural contexts. This Chapter, along with Chapter 6, demonstrates how 
framing the analysis of the cooperative firm within the institutional 
complementarity approach (discussed in Chapter 3) enables overcoming the above 
impasse. 
Regarding the policy interpretation of the results obtained in the present Chapter, 
it could be argued that initiatives aiming to promote a relatively more deregulated 
banking system would represent an important step toward the creation of an 
institutional context that strengthens firms, especially cooperatives, hence 
promoting economic activity. 
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NOTES 
 
1 It is worth mentioning that in this literature a large number of contributions have focused on cross-
country analysis (see Levine, 1997 for a survey of the main studies), while fewer works have 
investigated within-country differences. 
 
2 For a discussion of the European reforms introduced in the 1990s – as the 1991 Belgian Law, the 
1992 Italian and French Laws, the 1992 Catalonian Law, and the 1993 Basques Law – see the 
volume edited by Jose Monzon Campos et al. (1996). 
 
3 For a brief discussion on the legal structures disciplined by the Italian corporate law see Chapter 
Six, endnote 20. 
 
4 In this analytical framework, what matters are cooperative firms as a whole, that is as an 
organisational form having traits that, on one hand, still render it mostly dependent upon banking 
institutions and, on the other hand, make the bank-firm link complex. Thus, given the purpose of 
the empirical investigation, possible differentiations in the financial structure of these firms are left 
aside. Yet, this latter aspect deserves further in depth inquiry, on both theoretical and empirical 
grounds, in future research. 
 
5 See Thomas Brambol et al. (2006) for an excellent analysis of multiplicative interaction models 
and their applications.  
 
6 It is worth noting that it has been preferred to control for the sensitivity of sales to inflation, even 
though in Italy inflation rates are rather contained. 
 
7 Up to the early 1990s, the main features of the Italian banking industry were the result of the 
regulation introduced in 1936 in order to avoid banking instability. Many restrictions were laid 
down on banks’ activity - among which the total control upon entry and exit in the industry, as 
well as on branching decisions. A radical regulatory reform, introduced at the beginning of the 
1990s, has modified this scenario (see Costi 2007, for an extensive discussion on this normative). 
Primed by the new legislative framework, the selling-off of state-held banking shares, large 
consolidation waves and a rapid growth of branch numbers have transformed the physiognomy of 
the Italian banking sector. From 1990 to 2006, 444 mergers and 205 acquisitions among Italian 
credit institutions (excluding operations that involved the same bank more than once) were 
completed. In the same period, the number of banks operating in the country dropped from 1,064 
to 793, whereas bank branches increased from 17,721 to 32,337 (Bank of Italy Annual Reports 
1991-2007). Focusing on the geographical expansion of banks following the deregulation process, 
Benfratello et al. (2008) show that branch density at provincial level: i) has increased largely, on 
average; ii) has been characterised by a large interprovincial dispersion, and this latter has been 
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increasing over time; iii) displays much more variation between provinces than over time. 
Moreover, bank geographical expansion and consolidation activities have led to a significant 
disparity of banking concentration across the Italian provinces; this phenomenon characterises 
almost all regions, as well as all the macro-areas of the country (see also FinMonitor, 2006). 
 
8 Although Robert Gibrat’s law of proportionate effects (1931) states that firm growth is 
independent of size, empirical research has not reached unequivocal conclusions. Indeed, while 
most studies rejected the model (Tschoegl, 1983; Evans, 1987; Dunne et al, 1989; Dunne et al, 
1994; Mata, 1994; Weiss, 1998; Audretsch et al, 1999; Becchetti and Trovato, 2002), others found 
evidence in favour of Gibrat’s law (Chen et al, 1985; Kumar, 1985; Acs and Audretsch, 1990; 
Wagner, 1992; Diaz-Hermelo and Vassolo, 2004). In between these conclusions, Francesca Lotti 
et al. (2003) found that in some Italian manufacturing industries the behaviour of Gibrat’s law 
depends on the life cycle of the firm. In particular, the law does not hold in the first year following 
start-up, when smaller entrants grow faster in order to achieve a size that enhances their survival 
likelihood. Thereafter, the law is not rejected, as smaller and larger entrants are not found to follow 
different growth patterns. 
 
9 Regarding the relationship between firm age and growth, the general pattern suggested by 
previous research is that young firms are more likely to grow faster (see, for instance, Glancey, 
1998; Almus and Nerlinger, 1999; Wijewardena and Tibbits, 1999; Becchetti and Trovato, 2002; 
Davidsson et al, 2002; Niskanen and Niskanen, 2005). 
 
10 The impact of cash flow on firm growth varies with the availability of external sources of 
financing, as the latter relax the link between growth and internal finance (Carpenter and Petersen, 
2002). 
 
11 This classification of the industrial sectors has been proposed by Keith Pavitt (1984). 
 
12 An exception to this is represented by the variable COOP and by territorial and sectoral 
dummies. 
 
13 Yet, the intention for future research is to dispose of a much greater amount of observations on 
cooperatives.  
 
14 The analysis carried out in the present work refers to manufacturing firms. However, cooperatives 
operate in a number of different sectors, from food industry to a broad range of services, as well as 
social activities. Future research is, therefore, called to fill this gap. 
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15 Regarding the composition of the sub-sample of cooperatives across the surveys considered in 
the analysis – spanning the triennia 1995-1997, 1998-2000 and 2001-2003 – 61% firms are present 
in one wave, 31.6% are included for six years, hence in two surveys, and 7.4% firms appear in all 
three waves. As explained by Attilio Pasetto – in charge for Capitalia’s Indagine sulle imprese 
manifatturiere – in order to keep in each wave a significant quota of sample units belonging to the 
preceding surveys, and also to supplement the sample with new units, Capitalia uses the criterion 
of partial re-sampling of firms (rotation panel design). So that, differences in the firms taking part 
in the surveys are mainly due to the sampling method adopted. Moreover, as far as non-responding 
units are concerned, these include firms that did not adhere to initiatives subsequent to the first 
one, those that run out of business, those whose number of employees fell below 11, and those not 
belonging to the manufacturing industry anymore.  
 
16 Following Servèn (2003), the criterion used to operate the outliers correction is to consider as 
outliers all observations for which any of the variables lies beyond 10 standard deviation away 
from the mean. It is worth pointing out that sole traders have been excluded from the sample as the 
intention is to focus on enterprises. As regards the category “other legal structures”, this has not 
been considered since it includes very heterogeneous business types. 
 
17 The variable PAV2 is not excluded from MOD3, even if not statistically significant since, as an 
anonymous referee pointed out, PAV1, PAV2, and PAV3 are to be intended as an integrated set of 
variables. 
 
18 As Petrunia (2007) points out, rejection of Gibrat’s law occurs in previous studies because of 
one of three reasons. The first is that smaller firms are found to grow more than larger ones (e.g. 
Kumar, 1985; Evans, 1987; Hall, 1987; Dunne and Hughes, 1994). A second reason for rejection 
is that growth seems to favour larger firms (e.g. Hart and Prais, 1956; Singh and Whittington, 
1975). The final reason for rejecting Gibrat’s Law is that the assumption of no persistence in firm 
growth over time fails to hold (e.g. Chesher, 1979; Kumar, 1985). 
 
19 A possible intuition explaining the estimated inverse relationship between firm age and growth 
has been provided by Glancey (1998). He argues that “older firms may have developed routines 
which are out of touch with changes in market conditions, in which case an inverse relationship 
between age and growth could be observed” (ibid: p. 21). On the other hand, Thomas Cooley and 
Vincenzo Quadrini (2001) show that in the presence of financial frictions firms are not able to 
raise all the funds required to make the marginal product of capital equal its opportunity cost. This 
implies that as capital increases over time, its marginal product declines, and so does firm growth. 
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20 Also Giorgio Fagiolo and Alessandra Luzzi (2006) found that liquidity constrained firms are 
those that grow persistently more. The authors show that small and quite dynamic firms are capable 
of performing well, despite being cash-constrained. 
 
21 It is important to clarify that it would be erroneous to argue that the more banks are developed, 
the more firms tend to structure themselves as cooperatives, since this would imply to regard the 
degree of development of financial intermediaries as driving individuals’ organisational choice. 
The institutional complementarity approach does not conflict with this, since one of its major 
implications is that the presence of institutional complementarities does not necessarily leas to the 
selection of the Pareto improving institutional arrangement. As discussed in Chapter Three, being 
a dynamic approach admitting multiple equilibria, institutional complementarity does not rule out 
that the prevailing institutional arrangements may be Pareto sub-optimal, as well as non 
comparable in a Paretian sense. This is so because, due to their bounded rationality in perception and 
choice, agents cannot strategically coordinate their choices across domains, even if they participate in 
them simultaneously (Aoki, 2001). 
 
22 The outliers correction for INV has been operated after having estimated the models 1-3. Results 
are unchanged when these models have been re-estimated after this correction. 
 
23 It has been argued that employment is a more informative indicator of organisational 
complexity than sales, and may be preferable if the focus is on the managerial implications of 
growth (Greiner, 1972; Churchill and Lewis, 1983). Moreover, some scholars claimed that for 
resource- and knowledge-based views of the firm, which consider firms as bundle of resources, 
growth analysis should focus on the accumulation of resources, such as employees (Penrose, 1959; 
Kogut and Zander, 1992). 
 
24 These figures regard the models from 3 to 7. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The overall argument of this study is that the dynamics governing the evolution of 
socio-economic systems are much more complex than conventional accounts 
suggest, and that the theoretical claims of a universalistic history in which all 
production systems must follow the same line of development must be abandoned. 
Utopian claims suggesting that history follows a unilinear path have underestimated 
the multiplicity of forms that productive organisations may assume. Favoured 
instead is the analysis of specific social, political, cultural and economic conditions 
that prevail in different institutional settings, and of the interdependencies arising 
among these context-specific factors. It is precisely because of the 
interdependencies, the institutional complementarities that become established in 
different settings that a multiplicity of historical paths of development exists, and 
that diversity both among and within socio-economic systems is a persistent 
phenomenon.  
Further, the empirical study on the impact of context-specific institutional factors 
on firm performance showed no justification for the view that strict efficiency and 
competitive considerations determine which type of firm is likely to become 
233 
established, and eventually prevail over others, in a capitalist environment. 
Conventional accounts have assumed that such a firm would be the capitalist, 
hierarchical structure. However, the research findings of the present study do not 
support the pessimistic prediction that more participatory, non-hierarchical firms 
would be unequivocally unviable. Instead, the performance of the democratic firm 
is largely dependent on the institutional conditions prevailing in the environment in 
which firms operate. There are relations of context dependence, of institutional 
complementarities that determine the relative performance of different firm types. 
Hence, the features of the institutional context characterising different spheres of a 
socio-economic system must be taken as the reference point around which the 
analysis of the relative performance of different forms of productive organisation 
has to be centred. 
The aim of this chapter is to reflect on the main themes of the institutionalist 
analysis on diversity in forms of economic organisations in light of the research 
findings presented in the previous chapters. The second part of the chapter reflects 
on the implications for policy making and the final part of the chapter discusses 
future research avenues that emanate from this study. 
 
2 BANKS’ BEHAVIOUR, INCENTIVES AND THE PERFORMANCE OF 
THE DEMOCRATIC FIRM 
 
In the context of the Italian institutional setting, the relative performance of 
different ownership structures appears to be heavily conditioned by the structure 
and behaviour of banking institutions. The performance of cooperative firms seems 
to be linked to the degree of development and competition characterising the local 
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credit market in a sense of institutional complementarity: Italian cooperatives 
exhibit higher activity and growth rates in relatively less concentrated and more 
developed banking markets. In such markets firms operating in the cooperative 
sector can outperform capitalist firms. The empirical analysis conducted in Chapter 
7 has in fact found that although, other things being equal, cooperatives tend to 
grow less than capitalist firms (in other words, the intercept of the regression line is 
lower for coops), when local financial development is taken into account, this has a 
higher positive impact on cooperative firms’ growth than on capitalist structures 
(i.e. the slope of the regression line is steeper for coops). Hence the potential for 
cooperatives to outperform capitalist firms. In regard to the dynamics underlying 
the above relationship of institutional complementarity, various interrelated effects 
could be at work. We do not propose that the following are the precise issues that 
explain the empirical evidence obtained. Nor we aim to engage in a purely 
speculative discussion. We mainly try to reflect on the findings of this research 
work and suggest some possible interpretations. 
Firstly, financial intermediaries enjoying a relatively low market power, or in 
other words operating in relatively more competitive local markets, can adopt 
screening and monitoring technologies that rely more on soft information, such as 
evaluating borrowers’ future prospects, rather than imposing pure collateral 
requirements. Such practices can have positive effects on the bank financing of 
cooperative firms since they could contribute to lower the perceived riskiness of 
these borrowers, and also in the light of the typically limited financial resources that 
the members of a cooperative firm can mobilise to guarantee loans applications. In 
other words, the constraint imposed on cooperatives by a restricted availability of 
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finance would be less binding. Hence the improvement in their economic 
performance.   
Secondly, more developed local financial intermediaries can be better able to 
collect and process information and this can have positive effects in terms of 
reducing problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. In other words, if lenders 
can perform effective screening and monitoring of investors, borrowers’ behaviour 
tends to become more inclined towards risk sharing, hence more prone towards 
taking responsibility for the risk associated to their actions and to investment 
projects. This could be particularly important for cooperative firms, whose 
members’ attitude towards risk is normally aversion, and contribute to boost their 
performance.  
Thirdly, when firms borrow from banks located in the same area in which they 
operate, personal and social relations can play a role in regard to the outcome and 
terms of the loan application process. That is to say, if firm members and bank 
managers work and live in the same local community, and maybe know each other 
or have reliable information about the other from other community members, then 
this can add value to the lending relationship, and contribute to make it less formal 
and more horizontal. This would be particularly important for cooperative firms, as 
their typical strong local nature places particular emphasis on the value of social 
interactions for their economic governance. Arguably, these informal institutions of 
governance are less likely to be reproduced in markets where banks have substantial 
market power. In that case the bank-firm relationship would be more vertical, with 
less flexible terms, and banks’ behaviour would be more oriented towards long-
term rent extraction. 
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The implications of the empirical findings of this study for the economic theory 
of the democratic firm and, more in general, for economic analysis are outlined in 
the next section.   
 
3 RETHINKING THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF THE DEMOCRATIC 
FIRM AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC ANALYSIS  
 
This study provides robust evidence suggesting that there are context dependency 
effects that influence the performance profile of the democratic firm. In other 
words, firm-level institutional complementarities are an important determinant of 
the overall performance of the Italian cooperative sector. The findings contribute to 
enrich that line of economic analysis contending that the traditional theory of the 
cooperative firm is essentially flawed. The research provides further empirical 
support to those studies that have shown that the performance of cooperative firms 
is largely dependent on the general institutional and cultural climate prevailing in 
the context in which they operate. The weight of testimony in favour of the above 
argument requires rethinking the economic theory of the democratic firm. This 
brings about major implications for the general theory of the firm, and also for 
economics. This is a challenge that cannot be ignored. In our view, the notion of 
institutional complementarity and its implications should inform economic analysis. 
In regard to the theory of cooperatives, introducing institutional complementarity 
would contribute to remedy to the otherwise mysterious clash between the 
conventional accounts postulating the inefficiency and unviability of the 
cooperative organisational form, and the substantial evidence that shows, in various 
forms, the significance of this firm type in several countries.  
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Related to the above, this research work has also broader implications that go 
beyond the economic theory of the democratic firm and contribute to enrich the 
debate on diversity in forms of capitalism and, more specifically, on variety in 
forms of economic organisations. The study explains that positive feedback 
processes mean that the relative performance of the units populating a socio-
economic system is the result of the interrelations that become established among 
them at various levels of the system. These system specific complementarity effects 
enable explanation of the persistent diversity that is observed both among and 
within socio-economic systems. They also imply that views proclaiming the 
superiority, and feasibility, of a single and ubiquitous type of economic 
arrangement are insensitive to the social and historical dimensions that characterise 
economic life. Economic analysis must instead be attentive to those dimensions. 
 
4 POLICY CONCLUSIONS 
 
Providing a formula for policy making to improve the performance of cooperative 
firms, valid for any single country or group of countries, is not the intention here. 
The entire discourse of this study has been to proclaim the relativity of any general 
formula and emphasise the need to contextualise the analysis of socio-economic 
phenomena. Furthermore, it would be easy but disingenuous to add to the extensive 
list of unsuccessful institutional fixes that have been posited by consultants, 
governments and academics over the years. This is not to dismiss, however, the role 
of human agency in changing economic and political trajectories, and it does not 
mean that important things cannot be said. 
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In very general terms, the challenge is to provide institutional support that 
encourages and promotes economic democracy. Of course the large-scale 
realisation of economic democracy would represent a breakthrough in human 
history; however it would require radical changes occurring in all the spheres 
composing of a society. Nevertheless, the pursuit of economic democracy through 
policy design would also be clashing with the arguably stronger current tendencies 
that spur the formation of concentrated centres of economic power. Hence if we 
were to propose the above we would just be formulating another utopia. So what 
margin of manoeuvre is left for the original idea of promoting economic 
democracy? A system that can foster the formation, at different levels of the 
economy, of umbrella organisations supporting in various ways the formation and 
development of more open and participatory forms of economic organisations 
would be an appreciable step forward towards the diffusion of a culture open to the 
introduction of more democratic practices in the workplace. 
In regard to the Italian context, and with specific reference to the institutions 
operating in the financial domain, this study has shown that policies oriented to the 
promotion of relatively more competitive and developed credit markets would offer 
incentives that would contribute to the development of democratic economic forms. 
 
5 FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDAS 
 
In terms of research there are four possible future research agendas that emerge 
from this study. The first research area would be further tracking of the relationship 
between firm performance and institutional context by investigating institutional 
complementarity effects in domains other than the financial one. The purpose of the 
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study would be to look once again at possible differences between democratic and 
capitalist firms in regard to the impact of context specific characteristics on their 
relative performance. 
The second way in which this study could be built upon would be to deepen the 
analysis and open up the ‘black box’ of a number of firms, to examine the 
relationship between the specific features of their socio-economic environment and 
their impacts on qualitative and quantitative aspects of employment within the firm.   
The third possible area of investigation would be to study performance 
differentials among firm types across different institutional contexts by carrying out 
a comparative cross-country analysis. The particular focus would be to identify 
institutional dimensions along which countries could be compared quantitatively, 
and use the results of these comparisons to construct a typological map. 
The final area of research is perhaps the most important, for the contribution it 
would make to improved economic analysis, and certainly the most challenging and 
emanates from the implications of this study earlier discussed. The challenge would 
be to identify some building blocks for a theory of the firm that incorporates the 
wider institutional context in the analysis of firm behaviour and performance. 
240 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Acs, Z. & Audretsch, D. B. (1990) Small firms and entrepreneurship: A 
comparison between West and East countries, Discussion Paper: MIT Press. 
 
Aglietta, M. (1987) A Theory of Capitalist Regulation. The US Experience. 
Translated from the first edition of 1976 by David Fernbach, London and New 
York: Verso. 
 
Agostino, M. & Trivieri, F. (2008) ‘Banking competition and SMEs bank financing. 
Evidence from the Italian provinces’, Journal of Industry, Competition and 
Trade, 8 (1), pp. 33-53. 
 
Albert, M. (1993) Capitalism vs. Capitalism, New York: Four Walls Eight Windows. 
 
Alchian, A. A. & Demsetz, H. (1972) ‘Production, information costs and economic 
organization’, American Economic Review, 62, pp. 777-795. 
 
Almus, M. & Nerlinger, E. A. (1999) ‘Growth of new technology-based firms: 
which factors matter?’, Small Business Economics: An Entrepreneurship 
Journal, 13(2), pp. 141-154. 
 
Amable, B. (2000) ‘Institutional complementarity and diversity of social systems of 
innovation and production’, Review of International Political Economy, 7, pp. 
645-687. 
 
Amable, B., Barré, R. & Boyer, R. (1997) Les Systèmes d’Innovation à l’Ère de La 
Globalisation, Paris: OST/Economica. 
 
Amable, B., Ernst E. & Palombarini, S. (2005) ‘How do financial markets affect 
industrial relations: an institutional complementarity approach’, Socio-Economic 
Review, 3(2), pp. 311-330. 
241 
Amable, B. & Gatti, D. (2006) ‘Labor and product market reforms: Questioning 
policy complementarity’, Industrial and Corporate Change, 15 (1), pp. 101-122. 
 
Amemiya, T. (1985) Advanced Econometrics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
 
Ansoff, H. I. (1965) Corporate Strategy. An Analytical Approach to Business Policy 
for Growth and Competition, New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Aoki, M. (1994) ‘The contingent governance of teams: Analysis of institutional 
complementarity’, International Economic Review, 35(3), pp. 657-676. 
 
Aoki, M. (2000) Information, Corporate Governance, and Institutional Diversity. 
Competitiveness in Japan, the USA, and the Transitional Economies, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Aoki, M. (2001) Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
 
Aoki, M. (2007) ‘Endogeneizing institutions and institutional changes’, Journal of 
Institutional Economics, 3(1), pp. 1-31. 
 
Ardishvili, A., Cardozo, S., Harmon, S. & Vadakath, S. (1998) ‘Towards a theory 
of new venture growth’, Paper presented at the 1998 Babson Entrepreneurship 
Research Conference, Ghent, Belgium. 
 
Arthur, W. B. (1983) Competing technologies and lock in by historical events, 
Paper WP-83-90, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 
Laxwnburg, Austria. 
 
Arthur, W. B. (1988) ‘Self-reinforcing mechanisms in economics’, in Anderson, 
P.W., Arrow, K.J. & Pines, D. (eds.) The Economy as an Evolving Complex 
System, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
 
242 
Arthur, W. B. (1989) ‘Competing technologies, increasing returns, and lock-in by 
historical events’, Economic Journal, 99, pp. 116-131. 
 
Arthur, W. B. (1990) ‘Positive feedbacks in the economy’, Scientific American, 
262, pp. 92-99.  
 
Audretsch, D. B., Santarelli, E. & Vivarelli, M. (1999) ‘Start-up size and industrial 
dynamics: some evidence from Italian manufacturing’, International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, 17, pp. 965-983. 
 
Bank of Italy (various years) ‘Annual report’, available at: http://www.bancadita-
lia.it/pubblicazioni/relann [Accessed: 6 August 2008]. 
 
Barro, R. (1991) ‘Economic growth in a cross section of countries’, The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 106, pp. 407-444. 
 
Bartlett, W., Cable, G., Estrin, S., Jones, D. C. & Smith, S. C. (1992) ‘Labour-
managed cooperatives and private firms in North Central Italy: an empirical 
comparison’, Industrial and Labour Relations Review, 46(1), pp. 103-118. 
 
Basili, M., Duranti, C. & Franzini, M. (2004) ‘Network, trust and institutional 
complementarities’, Rivista di Politica Economica, 1(2), pp. 159-179. 
 
Baslé, M. (2002) ‘Acknowledged and unacknowledged institutionalist antecedents 
of régulation theory’, in Boyer, R. & Saillard, Y. (eds.) Régulation Theory. The 
State of the Art, London and New York: Routledge.  
 
Batstone, E. (1982) ‘Country studies: France’, in Stephen, F. H. (ed.) The 
Performance of Labor-Managed Firms, London: Macmillan.  
 
Bayo-Moriones, J. A., Galilea-Salvatierra, P. J. & Merino-Dìaz de Cerio, J. (2002) 
‘Participation, cooperatives and performance: An analysis of Spanish manufacturing 
243 
firms’, in Kato, T. & Pliskin, J. (eds.), Advances in the Economic Analysis of 
Participatory and Labor-Managed Firms, vol. 7, The Netherlands: Elsevier.  
 
Becchetti, L. & Trovato, G. (2002) ‘The determinants of growth for small and 
medium sized firms. The role of the availability of external finance’, Small 
Business Economics: An Entrepreneurship Journal, 19(4), pp. 291-306. 
 
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A. & Maksimovic, V. (2003) Financial and legal 
institutions and firm size, Working Paper n. 2997, World Bank Policy Research. 
 
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A. & Maksimovic, V. (2005) ‘Financial and legal 
constraint to growth. Does size matter?’, Journal of Finance, 1(2), pp. 137-177. 
 
Beinhocker, E. D. (2006) The Origin of Wealth: Evolution, Complexity, and the 
Radical Remaking of Economics, Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business 
School Press. 
 
Bekaert, G., Harvey, C. H. & Lundblad, C. (2005) ‘Does financial liberalization 
spur growth?’, Journal of Financial Economics, 77, pp. 3-55. 
 
Benassy, J. P., Boyer, R. & Gelpi R. M. (1979) ‘Régulation des économies 
capitalistes et inflation’ Revue Économique, 30 (3), pp. 397-441.  
 
Bencivenga, V. & Smith, B. (1991) ‘Financial intermediation and endogenous 
growth’ Review of Economic Studies, 58(2), pp. 195-209. 
 
Benfratello, L., Schiantarelli, F. & Sembenelli, A. (2008) ‘Banks and innovation: 
Microeconometric evidence on Italian firms’ Journal of Financial Economics, 
90, pp. 197-217. 
 
Benko, G. & Lipietz, A. (1998) ‘From the regulation of space to the space of 
regulation’, Geo Journal, 44(4), pp. 275-281. 
 
244 
Ben-Ner, A. (1988a) ‘The life cycle of worker-owned firms in market economies: A 
theoretical analysis’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 10, pp. 
287-313. 
 
Ben-Ner, A., (1988b) ‘Comparative empirical observations on worker-owned and 
capitalist firms’, International Journal of Industrial Organisation, 6, pp. 7-31. 
 
Ben-Ner, A., Han, T. S. & Jones, D. C. (1994) ‘The productivity effects of 
employee participation in control and in economic returns’, in Pagano, U. & 
Rowthorn, R. (eds.) Democracy and Efficiency in the Economic Enterprise, 
London: Routledge. 
 
Berman, K. V. (1982) ‘The United States of America: a cooperative model for 
worker management’, in Stephen, F. H. (ed.) The Performance of Labour-
Managed Firms, London: Macmillan. 
 
Berman, K. V. & Berman, M. D. (1978) ‘The long-run analysis of the labour-
managed firm: comment’, American Economic Review, 68(4), pp. 701-705. 
 
Berman, K. V. & Berman, M. D. (1989) ‘An empirical test of the theory of the 
labour-managed firm’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 13(2), pp. 281-300. 
 
Berman, M. D. (1977) ‘Short-run efficiency in the labour-managed firm’, Journal 
of Comparative Economics, 1(3), pp. 304-314. 
 
Bertrand, M., Schoar, A. & Thesmar, D. (2007) ‘Banking deregulation and industry 
structure: evidence from the French Banking reforms of 1985’, The Journal of 
Finance, 62(2), pp. 597-628. 
 
Best, M. (1990) The New Competition: Institutions of Industrial Restructuring, 
Oxford: Polity Press.  
 
Bettio, F. & Plantenga, J. (2004) ‘Comparing Care Regimes in Europe’, Feminist 
Economics, 10(1), pp. 85-113. 
245 
Bianco, I. (1975) Il Movimento Cooperativo Italiano, Storia e Ruolo nell’Economia 
Nazionale, Milano: Baldini e Castoldi. 
 
Black, S. E. & Strahan P. E. (2002) ‘Entrepreneurship and bank credit availability’, 
The Journal of Finance, 6, pp. 2807-2833. 
 
Blair, M., Kruse, D. L. & Blasi, J. R. (2000) ‘Employee ownership: an unstable 
form or a stabilizing force?’, in Blair, M. & Hockan, T. (eds.) The New 
Relationship: Human Capital in the American Corporation, Washington D.C: 
Brookings Institution Press. 
 
Blanchflower, D. & Oswald, A. (1990) ‘What makes an entrepreneur?’, Journal of 
Labor Economics, 16, pp. 26-60. 
 
Bofondi, M. & Gobbi, G. (2003) Bad loans and entry in local credit markets, Banca 
d’Italia, Tema di discussione n. 509. 
 
Bonaccorsi di Patti, E. & Dell’Ariccia, G. (2004) ‘Bank competition and firm 
creation’ Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 36(2), pp. 225-252. 
 
Bonaccorsi di Patti, E. & Gobbi, G. (2001a) ‘The changing structure of local credit 
markets: are small businesses special?’ Journal of Banking and Finance, 25, pp. 
2209-2237. 
 
Bonaccorsi di Patti, E. & Gobbi, G. (2001b) The effects of bank consolidation and 
market entry on small business lending, Banca d’Italia, Tema di discussione n. 404. 
 
Bonin, J., Jones, D. C. & Putterman, L. (1993) ‘Theoretical and empirical studies of 
producer cooperatives: will ever the twain meet?’, Journal of Economic 
Literature, 31, pp. 1290-1320. 
 
Boot, A. W. A. & Thakor, A. V. (2000) ‘Can relationship banking survive 
competition?’, The Journal of Finance, 55, 2, pp. 679-713. 
 
246 
Bowles, S. & Gintis, H. (1976) Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational 
Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life, New York: Basic Books. 
 
Bowles, S. & Gintis, H. (1993) ‘The democratic firms: an agency-theoretic 
evaluation’, in Bowles, S., Gintis, H. & Gustafsson, B. (eds.) Markets and 
Democracy: Participation, Accountability and Efficiency, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Bowles, S. & Gintis, H. (1994a) ‘Is the demand for workplace democracy 
redundant in a liberal economy?’, in Pagano, U. & Rowthorn, R. (eds.) 
Democracy and Efficiency in the Economic Enterprise, London: Routledge. 
 
Bowles, S. & Gintis, H. (1994b) ‘Credit market imperfections and the incidence of 
worker-owned firms’, Metroeconomica, 45(3), pp. 209-223. 
 
Bowles, S. & Gintis, H. (1994c) ‘The distribution of wealth and the viability of the 
democratic firm’, in Pagano, U. & Rowthorn, R. (eds.) Democracy and 
Efficiency in the Economic Enterprise, London: Routledge. 
 
Boyer, R. (ed). (1988) The Search for Labour Market Flexibility, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
 
Boyer, R. (1990) The capital labour relations in OECD countries, Working Paper 
CEPREMAP n. 9020. 
 
Boyer, R. (1996) ‘The convergence hypothesis revisited: Globalization but still the 
century of nations?’, in Berger, S. & Dore, R. (eds) National Diversity and 
Global Capitalism, Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press. 
 
Boyer, R. (1999) ‘The variety and dynamics of capitalism’, in Groenewegen, J. & 
Vromen, J. (eds) Institutions and the Evolution of Capitalism: Implications of 
Evolutionary Economics, Northampton: Edward Elgar. 
 
247 
Boyer, R. (2001) ‘The diversity and future of capitalisms: a regulationnist analysis’ 
in Hodgson, G. M., Itoh, M. & Yokokawa, N. (eds) Capitalism in Evolution: 
Global Contentions – East and West. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
Boyer, R. (2002) ‘The origins of régulation theory’, in Boyer, R. & Saillard, Y. (eds) 
Régulation Theory. The State of the Art, London and New York: Routledge.  
 
Boyer, R. (2005a) ‘Coherence, diversity, and the evolution of capitalisms. The 
institutional complementarity hypothesis’, Evolutionary and Institutional 
Economics Review, 2(1), pp. 43-80. 
 
Boyer, R. (2005b) ‘How and why capitalisms differ’, Economy and Society, 34(4), 
pp, 509-557.  
 
Boyer, R. & Durand, J.P. (1997) After Fordism, London: Macmillan.  
 
Boyer, R. & Hollingsworth, J.R. (1997) ‘From national embeddedness to spatial 
and institutional nestedness’, in Hollingsworth, J.R. & Boyer, R. (eds) 
Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness of Institutions, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
Boyer, R. & Saillard, Y. (2002) ‘A summary of régulation theory’, in Boyer, R. & 
Saillard, Y. (eds) Régulation Theory. The State of the Art, London and New 
York: Routledge.  
 
Boyer, R. & Yamada, T. (eds). (2000) The Crisis of Japanese Capitalism, London: 
Routledge. 
 
Bradley, K. (1984) ‘Review of The Performance of Labour-Managed Firms’ by 
Stephen, F. H., The Economic Journal, 94(375), pp. 681-683. 
 
Bradley, K. & Gelb. A. H. (1983) Cooperation at Work: The Mondragón 
Experience, London: Heinemann. 
 
248 
Brambol, T., Clark, W. R. & Golder, M. (2006) ‘Understanding interaction models: 
improving empirical analysis’, Political Analysis, 14, pp. 63-82. 
 
Brewer, A. A. & Browning, M. J. (1982) ‘On the employment decision of a labour-
managed firm’, Economica, 49, pp. 141-146. 
 
Canosa, F. (1978) Bianca, Rossa e Verde. La Cooperazione in Italia, Bologna: 
Cappelli.  
 
Cao M. & Shi S. (2001) ‘Screening, bidding, and the loan market tightness’, 
European Finance Review, 5, pp. 21-61. 
 
Carbo’ Valverde, S., Humphrey, D. B. & Rodriguez, F. R., (2003) ‘Deregulation, 
bank competition and regional growth’, Regional Studies, 37(3), pp. 227-237. 
 
Carpenter, R. E. & Petersen, C. (2002) ‘The growth of small firms constrained by 
internal finance’, The review of Economics and Statistics, 84(2), pp. 298-309. 
 
Carson, R. L. (1973) Comparative Economic Systems, New York: Macmillan. 
 
Carson, R. L. (1977) ‘A theory of cooperatives’, Canadian Journal of Economics, 
10(4), pp. 565-589. 
 
Casper, S., Whitley, R. (2004) ‘Managing competences in entrepreneurial  
technology firms: A comparative institutional analysis of Germany, Sweden, and 
the UK’, Research Policy, 33(1), pp. 89-106. 
 
Castles, F., Curtin, J. & Vowles, J. (2006) ‘Public policy in Australia and New 
Zeeland: The new global context’, American Journal of Political Science, 41(2), 
pp. 131-143. 
 
Cepremap-Cordes (1977) Approches de l’inflation: l’exemple français. Authors: 
Benassy, J., Boyer, R., Gelpi, R. M., Lipietz, A., Mistral, J., Munoz, J. & 
Ominami, C., Rapport de la convention de recherché 22/176, Paris: CEPREMAP.  
249 
Cepremap-Cordes (1978) Approches de l’inflation: l’exemple français. Recherches 
Economiques et Sociales, n. 12, Paris : La Documentation Française. 
 
Cesarini, F. (2003) ‘Il rapporto banca-impresa’, Paper presented at the workshop 
‘Impresa, risparmio e intermediazione finanziaria: aspetti economici e profili 
giuridici’, Trieste). 
 
Cetorelli, N. (1997) The role of credit market competition on lending strategies and 
on capital accumulation, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Working Paper n. 
14. 
 
Cetorelli, N. (2001) ‘Competition among banks: good or bad?’, Economic 
Perspectives, 2, pp. 38-48. 
 
Cetorelli, N. (2003) ‘Life-cycle dynamics in industrial sectors: the role of banking 
market structure’, The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 85(4), pp. 135-
148. 
 
Cetorelli, N. (2004) ‘Real effects of bank competition’, Journal of Money, Credit 
and Banking, 36(3), pp. 543-558. 
 
Cetorelli, N. & Peretto, P. (2000) Oligopoly banking and capital accumulation, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Working Paper n. 12. 
 
Cetorelli, N. & Strahan, P. E. (2006) ‘Finance as a barrier to entry: bank 
competition and industry structure in local U.S. markets’, The Journal of 
Finance, 61(1), pp. 437-461. 
 
Chandler, A. D. (1977) The Visible Hand, Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Chandler, A. D. (1990) Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
 
250 
Chavance, B., Magnin, E., Motamed-Nejad, R. & Sapir, J. (1999) Capitalisme et 
Socialisme en Perspective. Evolution et Transformations de Systèmes 
Èconomiques, Paris : La Découverte.  
 
Chell, E., Haworth, J. & Brearley, S. (1991) The Entrepreneurial Personality, 
London: Routledge. 
 
Chen, K., Babb, E. M. & Schrader, L. F. (1985) ‘Growth of large cooperative and 
proprietary firms in the US food sector’, Agribusiness, 1, pp. 201-210. 
 
Chen, X., (2005) ‘Financial liberalization, competition, and bank loan quality’, 
Journal of Economic Integration, 20, pp. 109-122. 
 
Chen, X., (2007) ‘Banking deregulation and credit risk. Evidence from the UE’, 
Journal of Financial Stability, 2, pp. 356-390.  
 
Chesher, A., (1979) ‘Testing the law of proportionate effect’, Journal of Industrial 
Economics, 27(4), pp. 403-411. 
 
Choi, B., Poon, S. K, Davis, J. D. (2008) ‘Effects of knowledge management strategy 
on organizational performance: A complementarity theory-based approach’, 
Omega. The International Journal of Management Science, 36, pp. 235-251. 
 
Churchill, C. & Lewis, V. L. (1983) ‘The five stages of small business growth’, 
Harvard Business Review, 61(3), pp. 30-50. 
 
Cook, M. L. (1995) ‘The future of U.S. agricultural cooperatives: a neo-institutional 
approach’, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 77, pp. 1153-1159. 
 
Cooley, T. F. & Quadrini, V. (2001) ‘Financial markets and firm dynamics’, 
American Economic Review, 91, pp. 1286-1310. 
 
251 
Coriat, B. & Saboia, J. (1987) Régime d’accumulation and rapport salarial au 
Brésil (des années 1950 aux années 1980): Un processus de fordisation forceée 
and contrariée, Cahiers du GERTTD n. 8701, Paris. 
 
Costi, R. (2007) L’ordinamento bancario, Bologna: Il Mulino. 
 
Craig, B. & Pencavel, J. (1992) ‘The behaviour of worker cooperatives: the 
Plywood companies of the Pacific Northwest’, American Economic Review, 82 
(5), pp. 1083-1105. 
 
Crouch, C. (2005a) ‘Complementarity and fit in the study of capitalisms’, in 
Morgan, G., Whitley, R. & Moen, E. (eds) Changing Capitalisms? 
Internationalization, Institutional Change, and Systems of Economic 
Organization, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Crouch, C. (2005b) Capitalist Diversity and Change: Recombinant Governance 
and Institutional Entrepreneurs, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
David, P. (1985) ‘Clio and the Economics of QWERTY’, The American Economic 
Review, 75, pp. 332-337. 
 
David, P. (2007) ‘Path dependence, its critics and the quest for historical 
economics’’, in Hodgson, G. M. (ed) The Evolution of Economic Institutions. A 
Critical Reader, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.  
 
Davidsson, P., Kirchhoff, B., Hatemi, J.A. & Gustavsson, H. (2002) ‘Empirical 
analysis of business growth factors using Swedish data’, Journal of Small 
Business Management, 40(4), pp. 332-349. 
 
Davidsson, P. & Wiklund, J. (2000) ‘Conceptual and empirical challenges in the 
study of firm growth’, in Sexton, D., Landstrom, H. (eds) The Blackwell 
Handbook of Entrepreneurship, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 
 
De Bary, A. (1879) Die Erscheinung der Symbiose, Strasbourg: Karl J. Trubner. 
252 
De Gregorio, J. & Guidotti, P. (1995) ‘Financial development and economic 
growth’, World Development, 23, pp. 433-448. 
 
Deeg, R. (2007) ‘Complementarity and institutional change in capitalist systems, 
Journal of European Public Policy, 14(4), pp. 611-630. 
 
Deeg, R. & Jackson, G. (2007) ‘Towards a more dynamic theory of capitalist 
variety. Socio-Economic Review, 5(1), pp. 149-179. 
 
Defourny, J. (1990) ‘Financial equilibrium and risk aversion in French workers’ 
cooperatives’, Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Special Issue, 61 
(2-3), pp. 331-351. 
 
Defourny, J. (1992) ‘Comparative measures of technical efficiency for 500 French 
workers’ cooperatives’, in Jones, D. C. and Svejnar, J. (eds) Advances in the 
Economic Analysis of Participatory and Labor-Managed Firms, vol. 4, 
Greenwich: JAI Press. 
 
Defourny, J., Estrin, S. & Jones, D. C. (1985) ‘The effects of worker participation 
on enterprise performance’, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 
32(2), pp. 197-217. 
 
Degryse, H. & Ongena, S. (2005) ‘Distance, lending relationships and competition’, 
Journal of Finance, 60(1), pp. 231-266. 
 
Dehejia, R. & Lleras-Muney, A. (2003) Why does financial development matter? 
The United States from 1900 to 1940, NBER Working Paper n. 955. 
 
Delmar, F. (1997) ‘Measuring growth: methodological considerations and empirical 
results’, in Donckels, R., Miettinen, A. (eds) Entrepreneurship and SME 
Research: On its Way to the Next Millennium, Aldershot: Ashgate. 
 
Delmar, F., Daviddson, P. & Gartner, W.B. (2003) ‘Arriving at the high-growth 
firms’ Journal of Business Venturing, 18, pp. 189-216. 
253 
Delorme, R (ed.). (1996) A l’Est, du Nouveau. Changement institutionnel et 
transformations économiques, Paris: L’Harmattan. 
 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A. & Maksimovic, V. (1998) ‘Law, finance, and firm growth’ The 
Journal of Finance, 53(6), pp. 2107-2137. 
 
Demsetz, H. (1988) ‘The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm’, in 
Demsetz, H. (ed) Ownership, Control and the Firm: The Organisation of 
Economic Activity, vol. 1, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
 
Dìaz-Hermelo, F. & Vassolo, R. (2004) The determinants of firm’s growth: An 
empirical examination, Working Paper, Universidad Austral. 
 
Dixit, A. K. (2007) ‘Economic governance’, in Durlauf, S., Blume, L. E. (eds) The 
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Domar, E. D. (1966) ‘The soviet collective farm as a producer cooperative’, 
American Economic Review, 56(4), pp. 734-757. 
 
Doucouliagos, C. (1990) ‘Why capitalist firms outnumber labour-managed firms’, 
Review of Radical Political Economies, 22(4), pp. 44-67. 
 
Dow, G. (1993) ‘Democracy versus appropriability: Can labour-managed firms 
flourish in a capitalist world?’, in Bowles, S., Gintis, H. & Gustafsson, B. (eds) 
Markets and Democracy: Participation, Accountability and Efficiency, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Dow, G. (2003) Governing the Firm, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Drèze, J. (1993) ‘Self-management and economic theory: efficiency, funding, and 
employment', in Bardhan, P. & Roemer, J. (eds) Market Socialism: The Current 
Debate, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
254 
Dunne, P. & Hughes, A. (1994) ‘Age, size, growth and survival: UK companies in 
the 1980s’, Journal of Industrial Economics, 42(2), pp. 115-140.  
 
Dunne, T., Roberts, M. J. & Samuelson, L. (1989) ‘The growth and failure of US 
manufacturing plants’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104(4), pp. 671-698. 
 
Easterly, W. (2001) The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures and 
Misadventures in the Tropics, Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
 
Elster, J. & Moene, K. O. (1989) Alternatives to Capitalism, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Enberg, L. (1993) ‘Financing employee-managed firms: Some problems of a wider 
extension’, Economic and Industrial Democracy, 14, pp. 277-300.  
 
Ernst, C. E. (2003) ‘Financial systems, industrial relations, and industry 
specialization. An econometric analysis on institutional complementarities’. 
Paper presented at the OeNB Workshop ‘The transformation of the European 
financial system. Where do we go? Where should we go?. 
 
Estrin, S. (1985) ‘The role of producer cooperatives in employment creation’, 
Economic Analysis and Workers’ Management, 19, pp. 345-384. 
 
Estrin, S. (1991a) ‘Some reflections on self-management, social choice and reform 
in Eastern Europe’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 15(2), pp. 349-361. 
 
Estrin, S. (1991b) ‘The case of self-managing market socialism’ The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 5(4), pp. 187-194. 
 
Estrin, S. & Jones, D. C. (1988) ‘The determinants of investments in employee 
owned firms: Evidence from France’, Economic Analysis, 1(1), pp.17-28. 
 
Estrin, S. & Perotin V. (1987) ‘Producer cooperatives: the British experience’, 
International Review of Applied Economics, 1(2), pp. 152-175.  
255 
Eurostat (2001) A Pilot Study on Co-operatives, Mutuals, Associations and 
Foundations. Luxembourg: Eurostat. 
 
Evans, D. S. (1987) ‘Tests of alternative theories of firm growth’, Journal of Political 
Economy, 95(4), pp. 657-674. 
 
Evans, D. S. & Jovanovic, B. (1989) ‘An estimated model of entrepreneurial choice 
under liquidity constraints’, Journal of Political Economy, 97(4), pp. 808-827. 
 
Fabbri, F. (ed). (1979) Il Movimento Cooperativo nella Storia D’Italia (1854-1975), 
Milano: Feltrinelli. 
 
Fagiolo, G. & Luzzi, A. (2006) ‘Do liquidity constraints matter in explaining firm 
size and growth? Some evidence from the Italian manufacturing industry’, 
Industrial and Corporate Change, 15(1), pp. 1-39. 
 
Fairclough, M. (1987) Mondragon in Context, Research Report n. 1, Department of 
Sociology, University of Bristol. 
 
Fallenbuchl, Z. M. (1978) ‘Commentary’, in Balawyder, A. (ed) Cooperative 
Movements in Eastern Europe. Montclair, New Jersey: Allanheld, Osmun & Co. 
Publishers. 
 
Fernandez, D. & Galetovic, A. (1994) Schumpeter might be right – but why? 
Explaining the relation between finance, development and growth, Working 
Paper, School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University. 
 
Fici, A. (ed). (2004) La Partecipazione Finanziaria dei Lavoratori nelle Societa’ 
Cooperative Italiane, Roma: Franco Angeli. 
 
FinMonitor (2006) Rapporto semestrale su fusioni e aggregazioni tra gli 
intermediari finanziari in Europa, Bergamo: University of Bergamo. 
 
256 
Fitzroy, F. R. & Kraft, K. (1986) ‘Profitability and profit sharing’, Journal of 
Industrial Economics, 35(2), pp. 113-130. 
 
Fitzroy, F. R. & Kraft K. (1987) ‘Cooperation, productivity and profit sharing’, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102(1), pp. 23-35. 
 
Flamholtz, E. G. (1986) Managing the Transition from an Entrepreneurship to a 
Professionally Managed Firm, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
 
Fleurbaey, M. (1993) ‘Economic democracy and equality: a proposal’, in Bardhan, 
P. and Roemer, J. E. (eds) Market Socialism: The Current Debate, New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Fornasari, M. & Zamagni, V. (1997) Il Movimento Cooperativo nella Storia 
D’Italia. Un Profilo Storico-Economico (1854-1920), Firenze: Vallecchi. 
 
Forni, M. & Paba, S. (2000) ‘The source of local growth: evidence from Italy’, 
Giornale degli economisti e annali di economia, 59, pp. 1-49. 
 
Fotopoulos, G. & Spence, E. N. (1999) ‘Spatial variation in new manufacturing 
plant openings: some empirical evidence from Greece’, Regional Studies, 33, pp. 
219-229. 
 
Fukuyama, F. (1989) ‘The End of History?’, The National Interest, 16, pp. 3-18. 
 
Fukuyama, F. (1992) The End of History and the Last Man, New York: Free Press.  
 
Furubotn, E. G. (1974) ‘Bank credit and the labor-managed firm: the Yugoslav 
case’, Canadian-American Slavic Studies, 8(1), pp. 89-106. 
 
Furubotn, E. G. & Pejovich, S. (1970a) ‘Tax policy and investment decisions of the 
Yugoslav firm’, National Tax Journal, 23(3), pp. 335-48. 
 
257 
Furubotn, E. G. & Pejovich, S. (1970b) ‘Property rights and the behavior of the firm 
in a socialist state: the example of Yugoslavia’, Zeitschrift für 
Nationalökonomie, 30(5), pp. 431-454. 
 
Furubotn, E. G. & Pejovich, S. (1972) ‘Property rights and economic theory: A 
survey of recent literature’, Journal of Economic Literature, 10(4), pp. 1137-1162. 
 
Furubotn, E.G. & Pejovich, S. (1973) ‘Property rights, economic decentralization 
and the evolution of the Yugoslav firm 1965-72’, Journal of Law and 
Economics, 16(2), pp. 275-302. 
 
Gagliardi, F. (2008) ‘Institutions and economic change: A critical survey of the new 
institutional approaches and empirical evidence’, The Journal of Socio-
Economics, 37(1), pp. 416-443.  
 
Gajda, J. (1978) ‘Workers’ cooperatives in the Polish industry – Their role and 
development, in Balawyder, A. (ed) Cooperative Movements in Eastern Europe, 
Montclair, New Jersey: Allanheld, Osmun & Co. Publishers. 
 
Gardner, H. S. (1998) Comparative Economic Systems, Second edition, Orlando: 
The Dryden Press. 
 
Garofoli, G. (1994) ‘New firm formation and regional development: the Italian 
case’, Regional Studies, 28(4), pp. 381-393. 
 
Gatti, D. (2000) ‘Competence, knowledge, and the labour market. The role of 
complementarities’, unpublished manuscript. 
 
George, D. A. R. (1982) ‘Workers’ cooperatives in Denmark’, Managerial and 
Decision Economics, 3(4), pp. 205-212. 
 
Georgellis, Y., Sessions, J. G., Tsitsianis, N. (2005) ‘Self-employment longitudinal 
dynamics: A Review of the literature’, Economic Issues, 10(2), pp. 51-84. 
 
258 
Geron, J. L. (1990) ‘Le financement des cooperatives de travailleurs en Belgique, 
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Special Issue, 61(2-3), pp. 245-265. 
 
Gibrat, R. (1931) Les Inegalites Economiques, Paris: Librairie Du Recueil Sirey. 
 
Gintis, H. (1989) ‘Financial markets and the political structure of the enterprise’, 
Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, 11, pp. 311-322. 
 
Glancey, K. (1998) ‘Determinants of growth and profitability in small 
entrepreneurial firms’, International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behaviour and 
Research, 1(4), pp. 18-27. 
 
Goethe, J. W. (1982) Theory of Colours. Translated from the first edition of 1810 
by Charles Lock Eastlake. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press. 
 
Goldsmith, R. (1969) Financial Structure and Development. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
 
Greenwood, J. & Jovanovic, B. (1990) ‘Financial development, growth, and the 
distribution of income’, Journal of Political Economy, 98, pp. 1076-1107. 
 
Greiner, L. E. (1972) ‘Evolutions and revolutions as organizations grow’, Harvard 
Business Review, 50(4), pp. 37-46. 
 
Grossman, S. J. & Hart, O. D. (1986) ‘The costs and benefits of ownership: A 
theory of vertical and lateral integration’, Journal of Political Economy 94(4), 
pp. 691-719. 
 
Gui, B. (1993) ‘La teoria economica delle cooperative di produzione: un commento 
a Jossa’, Rivista della cooperazione, 17, pp. 35-44. 
 
Gui, B. (1994) ‘Is there a chance for the worker-managed form of organisation?’, in 
Pagano, U. & Rowthorn, R. (eds) Democracy and Efficiency in the Economic 
Enterprise, London: Routledge. 
259 
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P. & Zingales, L. (2004a) ‘Does local financial development 
matter?’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(3), pp. 929-969. 
 
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P. & Zingales, L. (2004b) ‘The role of social capital in 
financial development’, The American Economic Review, 94, 3, pp. 526-556. 
 
Gunn, C. E. (1984) Workers' Self-Management in the United States, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press.  
 
Guzman, M. (2000) ‘Bank structure, capital accumulation and growth: a simple 
macroeconomic model’, Economic Theory, 16, pp. 421-455. 
 
Hackethal, A. & Schmidt, R. H. (2000) ‘Finanzsystem und komplementaritat’, 
Kredit und Kapital, 15, pp. 53-102. 
 
Hall, A. & Franzese, R. J. (1998) ‘Mixed signals: Central bank independence, 
coordinated wage bargaining, and European monetary union’, International 
Organization, 52 (3), pp. 505-535. 
 
Hall, B. H. (1987) ‘The relationship between firm size and firm growth in the US 
manufacturing sector’, Journal of Industrial Economics, 35(4), pp. 583–606. 
 
Hall, P. A. & Gingerich, D. W. (2004) Varieties of capitalism and institutional 
complementarities in the macroeconomy. An empirical analysis, Discussion 
Paper n. 04/5, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies. 
 
Hall, P. A. & Soskice, D. (2001) ‘An introduction to varieties of capitalism’, in 
Hall, P.A. & Soskice, D. (eds) Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional 
Foundations of Comparative Advantage, New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hancé, B., Rhodes, M. & Thatcher, M. (2007) Beyond Varieties of Capitalism: 
Conflict, Contradictions, and Complementarities in the European Economy, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
260 
Hansmann, H. (1988) ‘Ownership of the firm’, Journal of Law, Economic, and 
Organization, 4(2), pp. 267-304.  
 
Hart, O. D. (1995) Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
 
Hart, O. & Moore, J. (1990) ‘Property rights and the nature of the firm’, Journal of 
Political Economy 98(6), pp. 1119-1158. 
 
Hart, P. E. & Prais, S. J. (1956) ‘The analysis of business concentration: A 
statistical approach’, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 119, pp. 150–190. 
 
Hartz, L. (1955) The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American 
Political Thought since the Revolution, New York: Harcourt, in Hodgson, G. M. 
(1993) Economics and Evolution. Bringing Life Back into Economics, 
Cambridge: Polity Press.  
 
Hayek, F. A. (1982) Law, Legislation and Liberty, 3-volume combined edn, 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.   
 
Hazen, P. (2003) ‘Testimony at hearing to examine new generation cooperatives 
and strategies to maximize farm and ranch income’, Committee on Agriculture, 
U.S. House of Representatives, October. 
 
Helliwell, J. F. & Putnam, R. (1995) ‘Economic growth and social capital in Italy’, 
Eastern Economic Journal, 21, pp. 295-307. 
 
Herrigel, G. (1996) Industrial Constructions: The Sources of German Industrial 
Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Hirschman, A. (1982) ‘Rival interpretations of market society: Civilizing, 
destructive or feeble?’, Journal of Economic Literature, 20(4), pp. 1463-1484, in 
Hodgson, G. M. (1993) Economics and Evolution. Bringing Life Back into 
Economics, Cambridge: Polity Press.  
261 
Hobbs, P. & Jefferis, K. (1990) ‘So how many co-operatives are there? A critical 
note on co-operative statistics’, in Jenkins, G. & Poole, M. (eds) New Forms of 
Ownership in Management and Employment, London: Routledge.  
 
Hodgson, G. M. (1993) Economics and Evolution. Bringing Life Back into 
Economics, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Hodgson, G. M. (1994) ‘Organisational form and economic evolution. A critique of 
the Williamson hypothesis’, in Pagano, U. & Rowthorn, R. (eds) Democracy and 
Efficiency in the Economic Enterprise, London: Routledge. 
 
Hodgson, G. M. (1996) ‘Varieties of capitalism and varieties of economic thought’, 
Review of International Political Economy, 3(3), pp. 380-433. 
 
Hodgson, G. M. (1999) Economics and Utopia: Why The Learning Economy is not 
The Ending of History, London: Routledge. 
 
Hodgson, G. M. (2004) The Evolution of Institutional Economics, London: 
Routledge.  
 
Hodgson, G. M. (2006) ‘What are institutions?’, Journal of Economic Issues, 40(1), 
pp. 1-25. 
 
Holmstrom, B. (1982) ‘Moral hazard in teams’, Bell Journal of Economics, 13, pp. 
324-340. 
 
Hölzl, W. (2006) ‘Convergence of financial systems: towards an evolutionary 
perspective’, Journal of Institutional Economics 2(1), pp. 67-90. 
 
Höpner, M. (2005a) ‘What connects industrial relations and corporate governance? 
Explaining institutional complementarity’, Socio-Economic Review, 3, pp. 331-358. 
 
262 
Höpner, M. (2005b) ‘Epilogue to ‘explaining institutional complementarity’. What 
have we learnt? Complementarity, coherence and institutional change’, Socio-
Economic Review, 3, pp. 383-387. 
 
Horvat, B. (1975) ‘An institutional model of a self-managed socialist economy’, in 
Horvat, B., Markovic, M. & Supek, R. (eds) Self-Governing Socialism, White 
Plains, New York: International Arts and Science Press. 
 
Horvat, B. (1982a) The Political Economy of Socialism: A Marxist View, New 
York: M.E. Sharpe.  
 
Horvat, B. (1982b) ‘Labour-managed firms and social transformation’, in Stephen, 
F. H. (ed) The Performance of Labour-Managed Firms, London: Macmillan 
 
Hoy, F., McDougall, P. P. & Dsouza, D. E. (1992) ‘Strategies and environments of 
high growth firms’, in Sexton, D. L. & Kasarda, J. D. (eds) The State of the Art 
of Entrepreneurship, Boston: PWS-Kent Publishing. 
 
InfoCamere (2006) ‘Glossario di alcuni termini usati nella pubblicazione’, available 
at: http://www.infocamere.it/doc/glossario.pdf [Accessed: 30 August 2006].  
 
Japanese Joint Committee on Cooperatives (1992) ‘History of the co-op movement 
in Japan’, Review of International Co-operation, 85, pp. 7-17. 
 
Jarsulic, M. (1980) ‘Worker-management and the choice of technique’, Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 4, pp. 259-263 
 
Jayaratne, J. & Strahan, P. E. (1996) ‘The finance-growth nexus: evidence from 
bank branch deregulation’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111, pp. 639-670. 
 
Jefferis, K. & Mason, N. (1990) ‘The financing of worker co-operatives in the UK. 
Evidence and implications’, Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 
Special Issue, 61(2-3), pp.213-244. 
 
263 
Jensen, M. C. & Meckling, W. H. (1976) ‘Theory of the firm: managerial 
behaviour, agency costs and capital structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, 
3(4), pp. 305-360. 
 
Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. (1979) ‘Rights and production functions: An 
application to labour-managed firms and codetermination’, Journal of Business, 
52(4), pp. 469-506. 
 
Jenson, J. (1990) ‘Representations in crisis: The roots of Canada’s permeable 
Fordism’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, 24(2), pp. 653-683. 
 
Jessop, B. (1997) ‘Survey article: The regulation approach’, The Journal of 
Political Philosophy, 5 (3), pp. 287-326. 
 
Jones, D. C. (1982). ‘British producer cooperatives, 1948-1968: productivity and 
organisational structure’, in Jones, D. C. and Svejnar, J. (eds) Participatory and 
Self-Managed Firms: Evaluating Economic Performance, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Lexington Press. 
 
Jones, D. C. (1985) ‘The economic performance of producer co-operatives within 
command economies: evidence for the case of Poland’, Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, 9, pp. 111-126. 
 
Jones, D. C. & Backus, D. K. (1977) ‘British producer cooperatives in the footwear 
industry: An empirical test of the theory of financing’, Economic Journal, 87, 
pp. 488-510. 
 
Jones, D. C. & Pliskin, J. (1989) ‘British evidence on the employment effects of 
profit sharing’, Industrial Relations, 28(2), pp. 276-298. 
 
Jones, D. C. & Svejnar, J. (1985) ‘Participation, profit-sharing, worker ownership and 
efficiency in Italian producer cooperatives’, Economica, 55(208), pp. 449-465. 
 
264 
Jossa, B. (2005) ‘Marx, Marxism and the cooperative movement’, Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 29(1), pp. 3-18. 
 
Jossa, B. & Cuomo, G. (1997) The economic theory of socialism and the labour-
managed firm. Market, socialism and labour management, Cheltenham-
Brookfield: Edward Elgar. 
 
Kaldor, N. (1967) Strategic Factors in Economic Development, Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press. 
 
Kaldor, N. (1972) ‘The irrelevance of equilibrium economics’, Economic Journal, 
82(4), pp. 1237-1255. 
 
Kaldor, N. (1978) Further Essays on Economic Theory, vol. 5 of Collected 
Economic Essays, London: Duckworth.  
 
Kaldor, N. (1985) Economics Without Equilibrium, Cardiff: University College 
Cardiff Press. 
 
Kalmi, P. (2007) ‘The disappearance of cooperatives from economic textbooks’, 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 31, pp. 625-647. 
 
Kapp, K. W. (1976) ‘The nature and significance of institutional economics’, 
Kyklos, 29, pp. 209-232. 
 
Kauffman, S. A. (1993) The Origins of Order. Self-Organization and Selection in 
Evolution, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Kauffman, S. A., Lobo, J. & Macready, W. G. (2000) ‘Optimal search on a 
technology landscape’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 43, pp. 
141-166. 
 
265 
Keeble, D. & Walker, S. (1994) ‘New firms, small firms and dead firms: spatial 
patterns and determinants in the United Kingdom’, Regional Studies, 28, pp. 
411-427. 
 
Kenkel, P. (2005). ‘Evolving needs of cooperatives and producer-owned 
businesses’, Invited Paper for the Farm Credit System Publication Serving the 
Changing Financial Needs of American Farmers and Ranchers, 2005-2016: A 
Project of Farm Credit Horizons.  
 
Kennett, D. (2001) A New View of Comparative Economic Systems, Orlando: 
Harcourt College Publishers. 
 
King, R. & Levine, R. (1993) ‘Finance and growth: Schumpeter might be right’, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, pp. 717-738. 
 
Klinedinst, M. & Sato, H. (1994) ‘The Japanese cooperative sector’, Journal of 
Economic Issues, 28(2), pp. 509-518. 
 
Kogut, B. & Zander, U. (1992) ‘Knowledge of the firm, combinative capabilities, 
and the replication of technology’, Organization Science, 3(3), pp. 383-397. 
 
Kumar, M. S. (1985) ‘Growth, acquisition activity and firm size: evidence from the 
United Kingdom’, Journal of Industrial Economics, 33(3), pp. 327-338. 
 
Kwast, M., Starr-McCluer, M. & Wolken, J. (1997) ‘Market definition and the 
analysis of antitrust in banking’, The Antitrust Bulletin, 42, pp. 973-995. 
 
La Loggia Albanese, E. (2003) ‘Titoli di partecipazione nelle societa’ cooperative’, 
Rivista di diritto dell’economia, dei trasporti e dell’ambiente, 1, pp. 111-123.  
 
Lachmann, L. M. 1970 The Legacy of Max Weber, London: Heinemann. 
 
Langlois, R. N. (1988) ‘Economic change and the boundaries of the firm’, Journal 
of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 144(4), pp. 635-657. 
266 
Law, P. J. (1977) ‘The Illyrian firm and Fellner’s union-management model’, 
Journal of Economic Studies, 4(1), pp. 29-37. 
 
Lazonick, W. (1991) Business Organization and the Myth of the Market Economy, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Lee, B. (1988) Productivity and Employee Ownership: The Case of Sweden, PhD 
Thesis, Uppsala University. 
 
Lee, S. Y., Florida, R. & Acs, Z. J. (2004) ‘Creativity and entrepreneurship: a 
regional analysis of new firm formation’, Regional studies, 38(8), pp. 879-891. 
 
Levin, H. M. (1984) ‘Employment and productivity of producer cooperatives’, in 
Jackall, R. & Levin, H. M. (eds) Worker Cooperatives in America, Berkley: 
University of California Press. 
 
Levine, R. (1992) Financial structure and economic development, Working Paper 
n. 849, The World Bank. 
 
Levine, R. (1997) ‘Financial development and economic growth: views and 
agenda’, Journal of Economic Literature, 35, pp. 688-726. 
 
Levine, R. & Zervos, S. (1998) ‘Stock markets, banks, and economic growth’, 
American Economic Review, 88, pp. 537-558. 
 
Levinthal, D. (1997) ‘Adaptation on rugged landscapes’, Management Science 43, 
pp. 934-950. 
 
Logan C. & Gregory, D. (1981) Co-operatives and Job Creation in Wales, Cardiff: 
Wales T.U.C. 
 
Lotti, F., Santarelli, E. & Vivarelli, M. (2003) ‘Does Gibrat’s law hold among 
young, small firms?’, Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 13, pp. 213-235. 
 
267 
Lowitzsch, J. & Woodward, R. (2006) Extended country report. Financial 
participation of employees in Poland, Inter-University Centre Split/Berlin, 
Institute for Eastern European Studies, Free University of Berlin.  
 
Lydall, H. (1984) ‘Yugoslav socialism: Theory and practice’, in Estrin, S. (1991) 
‘The case of self-managing market socialism’, The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 5(4), pp. 187-194. 
 
Lydall, H. (1989) Yugoslavia in Crisis, Oxford: Clarendon Press, in Estrin, S. 
(1991) ‘The case of self-managing market socialism’, The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 5(4), pp. 187-194. 
 
McKinnon, R. (1973) Money and Capital in Economic Development. Washington 
D.C: Brooking Institutions. 
 
Mankiw, N. G., Romer, R. D. & Weil, D. (1992) ‘A contribution to the empirics of 
economic growth’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, pp. 407-437. 
 
Marquez, R. (2002) ‘Competition, adverse selection, and information dispersion in 
the banking industry’, Review of Financial Studies, 15, pp. 901-926. 
 
Marshall, A. (1962) Principles of Economics, London: reprinted from the first 
edition of 1881 by Macmillan & Co ltd. 
 
Marvin, A. (1980) Cooperatives, principles and practices University for Wisconsin 
Extension, Madison publication A1457. 
 
Mata, J. (1994) ‘Firm growth during infancy’, Small Business Economics: An 
Entrepreneurship Journal, 6(1), pp. 27-40. 
 
Mathews, R. (2002) ‘Mondragòn: past performance and future potential’, Paper 
presented at the Capital Ownership Group Conference, the Kent State 
University, Washington. 
268 
Meade, J. E. (1972) ‘The theory of labour-managed firms and of profit sharing’, 
Economic Journal, 82, pp. 402-428. 
 
Meyer, M., Milgrom, P. & Roberts, J. (1992) ‘Organizational prospects, influence 
costs, and ownership changes’, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 
1, pp. 9-35. 
 
Milenkovitch, D. (1971) Plan and Market in Yugoslav Economic Thought, New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Milgrom, P., Qian, Y. & Roberts, J. (1991) ‘Complementarities, momentum, and 
the evolution of modern manufacturing’, American Economic Review, 81 
(Papers and Proceedings), pp. 84–88. 
 
Milgrom, P. & Roberts, J. (1980) ‘Rationalizability, learning and equilibrium in 
games with strategic complementarities’. Econometrica, 59, pp. 1255-1277. 
 
Milgrom, P. & Roberts, J. (1995) ‘Complementarities and fit: Strategy, structure, 
and organizational change in manufacturing’, Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 19, pp. 179-208. 
 
Mill, J. S. (1987) Principles of Political Economy, Faifield, New Jersey: reprinted 
from the first edition of 1848 by Augustus M. Kelley Publishers.  
 
Miller, D. (1993) ‘Equality and market socialism’, in Bardhan, P. & Roemer, J.E. 
(eds) Market Socialism: The Current Debate, New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Mises, L. von (1949) Human Action: A Treatise on Economics, London: William 
Hodge. 
 
Mjøset, L. (2006) ‘The study of Nordic varieties of capitalism. A plea for contextual 
generalization through comparative specification’, Economic Sociology - The 
European Newsletter, 8(1), pp. 4-11. 
 
269 
Mjøset L. & Clausen T. H. (2007) ‘An introduction to the comparison of 
capitalism’, in Mjøset, L. & Clausen, T. H. (ed) Capitalisms Compared, vol. 24 
of Comparative Social Research, Amsterdam: JAI/Elsevier. 
 
Mondragón Corporación Cooperativa (2009) ‘Economic Data’, available at: 
http://www.mondragon-corporation.com/language/en-US/ENG.aspx [Accessed: 
16 September 2009]. 
 
Monzon, J. L., Spear-Thomas, A. & Zevi, A. (eds). (1996) Cooperatives, Markets 
and Cooperative Principles, Liège: International Ciriec Association Press. 
 
Morales, A. C. (1990) ‘Le financement des cooperatives de travail associe en 
Espagne’, Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Special Issue, 61(2-3), 
pp. 367-385. 
 
Myers, S. C. & Majluf, N. S. (1984) ‘Corporate financing and investment decisions 
when firms have information that investors do not have’, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 13(2), pp. 187-221. 
 
Mygind, N. (1986) ‘From the Illirian firm to the reality of self-management’, in 
Jansson, S. & Hellmark, A. (eds) Labor-Owned Firms and Workers 
Cooperatives, Aldershot: Gower. 
 
Mygind, N. (1987) ‘Are self-managed firms efficient? The experience of Danish 
fully and partially self-managed firms’, in Jones, D. C. & Svejnar, J. (eds) 
Advances in the Economic Analysis of Participatory and Labor-Managed Firms, 
vol. 2, Greenwich: JAI press. 
 
Mygind, N. (1988) The design of the self-managed firm – Ownership structure, 
objectives, risk and External finance, Working Paper, Copenhagen Business 
School. 
 
Mygind, N. (1990) ‘The financing of self-managed firms in Denmark’, Annals of 
Public and Cooperative Economics, Special Issue, 61(2-3), pp. 287-308. 
270 
Mygind, N. (2008) ‘Trends in employee ownership in Eastern Europe’, Paper 
presented at the 14th Conference of the International Association For The 
Economics of Partecipation, 18-17 July, Hamilton College, Clinton, New York. 
 
Myrdal, G. (1957) Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions. London: 
Duckworth.  
 
Nadel, H. (2002) ‘Régulation and Marx’, in Boyer, R. & Saillard, Y. (eds) 
Régulation Theory. The State of the Art, London and New York: Routledge.  
 
Nicita, A. & Pagano, U. (2004) ‘Institutional complementarities, corporate 
governance and financial-technological equilibria’, Siena memos and papers on 
law and economics n.28, Università di Siena. 
 
Niskanen, M. & Niskanen, J. (2005) The determinants of firm growth in small and 
micro firms - Evidence on relationship lending effects, Working Paper, 
University of Kuopio. 
 
North, D. C. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
North, D. C. (2005) Understanding the Process of Economic Change, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.  
 
O’Hara, P. H. (2008) ‘Principle of circular and cumulative causation: Fusing 
Myrdalian and Kaldorian growth and development dynamics, Journal of 
Economic Issues, 42(2), pp. 375-387. 
 
Oakeshott, R. (1978) The Case for Worker Co-ops, London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul. 
 
Oakeshott, R. (1982) ‘Spain: the Mondragòn enterprises’, in Stephen, F. H. (ed) The 
Performance of Labour-Managed Firms, London: Macmillan 
 
271 
Ongena, S. & Smith, D. C. (2000) ‘What determines the number of bank 
relationships? Cross-country evidence’, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 
9(1), pp. 26-56. 
 
Onida, F. (2004) Se il piccolo non cresce. Piccole e medie imprese italiane in 
affanno, Bologna: Il Mulino. 
 
Orru, M. (1997) ‘The institutionalist analysis of capitalist economies’, in Orru, M., 
Woolsey Biggart, N. & Hamilton, G. G. (eds) The Economic Organization of 
East Asian Capitalism, London: Sage. 
 
Owen, R. (1813) A New View of Society and Other Writings, Reprint edition 1970, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin.  
 
Pagano M. (1993) ‘Financial markets and growth. An overview’, European 
Economic Review, 37, pp. 613-622. 
 
Pagano M., Panetta, F. & Zingales, L. (1998) ‘Why do companies go public? An 
empirical analysis’, Journal of Finance, 1, pp. 27–64. 
 
Pagano, U. (1985) Work and Welfare in Economic Theory, Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell. 
 
Pagano, U. (1991) ‘Property Rights Equilibria and Institutional Stability’, Economic 
Notes, 20(2), pp. 189-228. 
 
Pagano, U. (1992) ‘Organizational equilibria and production efficiency’, 
Metroeconomica, 43(1-2), pp. 227-246. 
 
Pagano, U. (1993) ‘Organizational equilibria and institutional stability’, in Bowles, 
S., Gintis, H. & Gustafsson, B. (eds) Markets and Democracy: Participation, 
Accountability and Efficiency, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
272 
Pagano, U. (2007) ‘Karl Marx after new institutional economics’, Evolutionary and 
Institutional Economics Review, 4(1), pp. 27-53. 
 
Pagano, U. & Rossi, M. A. (2004) ‘Incomplete contracts, intellectual property and 
institutional complementarities. European Journal of Law and Economics, 18, 
pp. 55-76.  
 
Pagano, U. & Rowthorn, R. (1994) ‘Ownership, technology and institutional 
stability, Structural Change and Economic Dynamics. 5(2), pp. 221–243. 
 
Panzar, J. C. & Rosse, J. N. (1987) ‘Testing for monopoly equilibrium’, The 
Journal of Industrial Economics, 35(4), pp. 443-56. 
 
Paunescu, M. & Schneider, M. (2004) ‘Wettbewerbsfahigkeit und dynamic 
institutioneller standortbedingungen: ein empirischer test des Varieties of 
Capitalism’, Ansatzes, University of Trier, unpublished manuscript. 
 
Pavitt, K. (1984) ‘Patterns of technical change: Towards a taxonomy and a theory’, 
Research Policy, 13, pp. 343-373. 
 
Pejovich, S. (1973) ‘The banking system and the investment behavior of the 
Yugoslav firm’, in Bornstein, M. (ed) Plan and Market: Economic Reform in 
Eastern Europe, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Pejovich, S. (1990) ‘A property rights analysis of the Yugoslav miracle’, Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 507, pp. 123-132, in 
Pejovich, S. (1992) ‘Why has the labor-managed firm failed?’, Cato Journal, 
12(2), pp. 461-473. 
 
Pejovich, S. (1992) ‘Why has the labor-managed firm failed?’ Cato Journal, 12(2), 
pp. 461-473. 
 
Penrose, E. (1959) The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
273 
Perotin, V. (1999) ‘Why are there so few labour-managed firms?’, Paper presented 
at the Conference on Democracy and Development, Columbia University.  
 
Perotin, V. (2006) ‘Entry, exit, and the business cycle: Are cooperatives different?’, 
Journal of Comparative Economics, 34(2), pp. 295-316. 
 
Petersen, M. A. & Rajan, R. G. (1995) ‘The effect of credit market competition on 
lending relationships’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, pp. 407- 443. 
 
Petersen, M. A. & Rajan, R. G. (2002) ‘Does distance still matter? The information 
revolution in small business lending’, Journal of Finance, 57(6), pp. 2533-2570. 
 
Petrunia, R. (2007) ‘Does Gibrat’s law hold? Evidence from Canadian retail and 
manufacturing firms’, Small Business Economics: An Entrepreneurship Journal, 
30, pp. 201-214. 
 
Piore, M. J., Sable, C. F. (1984) The Second Industrial Divide, New York: Basic 
Books. 
 
Pluta, L. (1978) ‘Introduction. The cooperative system and Central and Eastern 
Europe in the nineteenth century’, in Balawyder, A. (ed) Cooperative 
Movements in Eastern Europe, Montclair, New Jersey: Allanheld, Osmun & Co. 
Publishers. 
 
Podivinsky, J. A. & Stewart, G. (2007) ‘Why is labour-managed entry so rare? An 
analysis of UK manufacturing data’, Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, 63, pp. 177-192.  
 
Pollin, J. P. & Vaubourg, A. G. (2005) ‘Corporate governance and institutional 
complementarities: what consequences for European financial integration?’, 
Paper prepared for the conference The New Frontiers of European Union, 
Marrakech. 
 
274 
Prasnikar, J. (1994) ‘Participation and self-management in developing countries’, in 
Pagano, U. & Rowthorn R. (eds) Democracy and Efficiency in the Economic 
Enterprise. London and New York: Routledge.  
 
Prasnikar, J. & Svenjar, J. (1991) ‘Workers’ participation in management vs. social 
ownership and government policies: Yugoslav lessons for transforming socialist 
economies’, Comparative Economic Studies, 33(4), pp. 27-46. 
 
Prasnikar, J., Svenjar, J., Mihaljek, D. & Prasnikar, V. (1994) ‘Behavior of 
participatory firms in Yugoslavia: Lessons for transforming economies’, The 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 76(4), pp. 728-741. 
 
Putnam, R. D., (1993) Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Putterman, L. (1982) ‘Some behavioral perspectives on the dominance of 
hierarchical over democratic forms of enterprise’, Journal of Economic Behavior 
and Organization, 3, pp. 139-160. 
 
Putterman, L. (1984) ‘On some recent explanations of why capital hires labor’, 
Economic Inquiry, 22(20), pp. 171-187. 
 
Putterman, L. (1993) ‘Ownership and the nature of the firm’, Journal of 
Comparative Economics, 17(2), pp. 243-263. 
 
Rajan, R. G. & Zingales, L. (1998) ‘Financial dependence and growth’, American 
Economic Review, 88, pp. 559-586. 
 
Ramachandran, R., Russell, W. R. & Kun Seo, T. (1979) ‘Risk-bearing in a 
Yugoslavian labor-managed firm’, Oxford Economic Papers, 31(2), pp. 270-282. 
 
Rey, P. & Tirole, J. (2006) Financing and access in cooperatives, Working Paper n. 
404, Institut d’économie Industrielle, Toulouse. 
 
275 
Riksin, J. W. (2000) ‘Imitation of complex strategies’, Management Science 46, pp. 
824-844. 
 
Rostow, W. W. (1959) ‘The stages of economic growth’, The Economic History 
Review, 12(1), pp. 1-16. 
 
Rus, V. (1978) ‘Enterprise power structure’, in Obradovic, J. & Dunn, W. N. (eds) 
Workers’ Self-Management and Organizational Power in Yugoslavia, Center for 
International Studies, University of Pittsburgh.  
 
Saint-Paul, G. (1992) ‘Technological choice, financial markets and economic 
development’, European Economic Review, 36(4), pp. 763-781. 
 
Salani, M. P. (2005) ‘Le basi istituzionali della forma cooperativa’ in Mazzoli, E. & 
Zamagni, S. (eds) Verso una Nuova Teoria Economica della Cooperazione, 
Bologna: Il Mulino. 
 
Sapelli, G. (1981) ‘La cooperazione come impresa: Mercato economico e mercato 
politico’, in Sapelli, G. (ed) Il Movimento Cooperativo in Italia. Storia e 
Problemi, Torino: Einaudi. 
 
Schlicht, E. & von Weizsäcker, C. C. (1977) ‘Risk financing in labour-managed 
economies: the commitment problem’ Zeitschrift für die gesamte 
staatswissenschaft, 133, pp. 53-66. 
 
Schmidt, R. H., Hackethal, A. & Tyrell, M. (2002) ‘The convergence of financial 
systems in Europe’, Schmalenbach Business Review, special issue 1, pp. 7-53.  
 
Sen, A. K. (1966) ‘Labour allocation in a cooperative enterprise’, Review of 
Economic Studies, 33(4), pp. 361-371. 
 
Sertel, M. R. (1982) Workers and Incentives, Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
 
276 
Servèn, L. (2003) ‘Real exchange rate uncertainty and private investment in LDCs’, 
Review of Economic and Statistics, 88(1), pp. 212-218. 
 
Shaffer, M. E. (1994) ‘Worker participation in socialist and transitional economies’, 
in Pagano, U. & Rowthorn R. (eds) Democracy and Efficiency in the Economic 
Enterprise, London and New York: Routledge.  
 
Shaffer, J. (1999) Historical Dictionary of the Cooperative Movement, London: The 
Screcrow Press. 
 
Shaffer, S. (1998) ‘The winner’s curse in banking’, Journal of Financial 
Intermediation, 7, pp. 359-92. 
 
Shaw, E. (1973) Financial Deepening in Economic Development, New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Sillanpää, A. & Laamanen, T. (2009) ‘Positive and Negative Feedback Effects in 
Competition for Dominance of Network Business Systems’, Research Policy, 
38, pp. 871-884. 
 
Singh, A. & Whittington, G. (1975) ‘The size and growth of firms’, Review of 
Economic Studies, 42(1), pp. 15-26. 
 
Smith, S. C. (1984) ‘Does employment matter in the labour managed firm? Some 
theory and an empirical illustration’, Economic Analysis and Workers’ 
management, 18, 303-318. 
 
Smith, S. C. (2001) Blooming together or wilting alone? Network externalities and 
Mondragòn and La Lega co-operative networks, Discussion Paper n. 2001/27, 
World Institute for Development Economics Research, United Nations University. 
 
Staber, U. (1989) ‘Age dependence and historical effects on the failure rates of 
worker cooperatives: an event history analysis’, Economic and Industrial 
Democracy, 10(1), pp. 59-80. 
277 
Stiglitz, J. E. (1993) ‘Market socialism and neoclassical economics’, in Bardhan, P. 
& Roemer, J. E. (eds) Market Socialism: The Current Debate, New York: 
Oxford University Press 
 
Stiglitz, J. E. (2004) The role of cooperatives in globalization, Working Paper n. 9, 
University of Genova. 
 
Stiglitz, J. E. & Weiss, A. (1981) ‘Credit rationing in markets with imperfect 
information’, American Economic Review, 71(3), pp. 393-410. 
 
Storey, D. J. (1982) Entrepreneurship and the New Firm, London: Croom Helm. 
 
Strahan, P. E. (2002) ‘The real effects of U.S. banking deregulation’, Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 85(4), pp. 129-134. 
 
Sutton, J. (1997) ‘Gibrat’s legacy’, Journal of Economic Literature, 35, pp. 40-59. 
 
Thomas, A. (1990) ‘Financing worker co-operatives in EC countries’ Annals of 
Public and Cooperative Economics, Special Issue, 61(2-3), pp. 176-211. 
 
Thomas, A. & Defourny, J. (1990) ‘Financing workers’ co-operatives and self-
managed enterprises’, Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Special 
Issue, 61(2-3), pp. 167-174. 
 
Thomas, H. T. (1982) ‘The performance of the Mondragòn cooperatives in Spain’, 
in Jones, D. C. & Svejnar, J. (eds) Participatory and Self-Managed Firms: 
Evaluating Economic Performance, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Lexington Press. 
 
Thomas, H. T. & Logan, C. (1982) Mondragon: An Economic Analysis, London: 
George Allen and Unwin.  
 
Thorsdarson, B. (1987) ‘A comparison of worker-owned firms and conventionally 
owned firms in Sweden’, in Jones, D. C. & Svejnar, J. (eds) Advances in the 
278 
Economic Analysis of Participatory and Labor-Managed firms, vol. 2, 
Greenwich: JAI press. 
 
Tobin J. (1956) ‘Estimation of relationships for limited dependent variables’, 
Econometrica, 26, pp. 24-36. 
 
Tombs, R. (1984) ‘Harbingers or entrepreneurs? A workers’ cooperative during the 
Paris commune’, The Historical Journal, 27(4), pp. 969-977. 
 
Topiks, D. (1978) ‘Minimizing a submodular function on a lattice, Operations 
Research, 26, pp. 305-21.  
 
Topiks, D. (1998) Supermodularity and Complementarity. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Tschoegl, A. E. (1983) ‘Size, growth, and transnationality among the world’s 
largest banks’. Journal of business, 56(2), pp. 187-201.  
 
Unioncamere (2004) Primo Rapporto sulle Imprese Cooperative, Roma: Istituto 
Guglielmo Tagliacarne. 
 
Unioncamere (2006) Secondo Rapporto sulle Imprese Cooperative, Roma: Istituto 
Guglielmo Tagliacarne. 
 
Valentinyi, A. (1993) ‘The structure of the output decline and employment trends in 
Hungary, 1990-1992’, Paper prepared for the IIASA Conference on Output 
Decline in Eastern Europe, Laxenburg, Austria, 18-20 November, in Shaffer, M. 
E. (1994) ‘Worker participation in socialist and transitional economies’, in 
Pagano, U. & Rowthorn R. (eds) Democracy and Efficiency in the Economic 
Enterprise, London and New York: Routledge.  
 
Vanek, J. (1970) The General Theory of Labor-Managed Market Economies, 
Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 
 
279 
Vanek, J. (1975) ‘The basic theory of financing of participatory firms’, in Vanek, J. 
(ed) The Labor-Managed Economy, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 
 
Vanek, J. (1977) The labor-Managed Economy, Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press. 
 
Veblen, T. B. (1898) ‘Why is economics not an evolutionary science?’, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 12, pp. 373-397. 
 
Veblen, T. B. (1899) The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of 
Institutions, New York: Macmillan. 
 
Veblen, T. B. (1919) The Place of Science in Modern Civilisation and Other 
Essays. New York: Huebsch. 
 
Vejnovic, M. (1978) ‘Influence structure in a self-managing enterprise’, in 
Obradovic, J. & Dunn, W. N., (eds) Workers’ Self-Management and 
Organizational Power in Yugoslavia, Center for International Studies, University 
of Pittsburgh.  
 
Villena, M. G. & Villena, M. J. (2004) ‘Evolutionary Game Theory and Thorstein 
Veblen’s Evolutionary Economics: Is EGT Veblenian?’. Journal of Economic 
Issues, 39(3), pp. 585-610. 
 
Vitaliano, P. (1983) ‘Cooperative enterprise: an alternative conceptual basis for 
analyzing a complex institution’, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
65(5), pp. 1078-1083. 
 
Voets, H. (1990) ‘The financing of worker co-operatives in The Netherlands’, Annals 
of Public and Co-operative Economics, Special Issue, 61(2-3), pp. 267-285.  
 
Wade, R. (1990) Governing the Market. Princeton: Princeton University Press.   
 
280 
Wagner, J. (1992) ‘Firm size, firm growth, and persistence of chance: testing 
Gibrat’s law with establishment data from Lower Saxony, 1978-1989’, Small 
Business Economics: An Entrepreneurship Journal, 42(2), pp. 125-131. 
 
Wall, H. J. (2004) ‘Entrepreneurship and the deregulation of banking’, Economics 
Letters, 82, pp. 333-339. 
 
Waner, J. (2000) ‘New generation cooperatives and the future of agriculture: An 
introduction’, Illinois Institute for Rural Affairs, Western Illinois University, 
Macomb. 
 
Ward, B. (1958) ‘The firm in Illyria: Market syndicalism’, American Economic 
Review, 48(4), pp. 556-589. 
 
Ward, L. F. (1903) Pure Sociology, New York: Macmillan. 
 
Way, C. (2000) ‘Central banks, partisan politics, and macroeconomic outcomes’. 
Comparative Political Studies, 33(2), pp. 196-224.  
 
Weiss, C. R. (1998) ‘Size, growth, and survival in the upper Austrian farm sector’, 
Small Business Economics: An Entrepreneurship Journal, 10(4), pp. 305-312. 
 
Whitley, R. (1992) Business Systems in East Asia: Firms, Markets and Societies, 
London: Sage.  
 
Whitley, R. (1998) ‘Internationalization and varieties of capitalism: The limited 
effects of cross-national coordination of economic activities on the nature of 
business systems’, Review of International Political Economy, 5(3), pp. 445-481. 
 
Whitley, R. (1999) Divergent Capitalism. The Social Structuring and Change of 
Business Systems, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Whyte, W. F. & Whyte, K. K. (1988) Making Mondragón: The Growth and 
Dynamics of the Worker Cooperative Complex. Ithaca: ILE Press. 
281 
Wijewardena, H. & Tibbits, G. E. (1999) ‘Factors contributing to the growth of 
small manufacturing firms: data from Australia’, Journal of Small Business 
Management, 37(20), pp. 38-45. 
 
Williamson, O. E. (1975) Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Anti-Trust 
Implications: A study in the Economics of Internal Organisation, New York: 
Free Press.  
 
Williamson, O. E. (1980) ‘The organization of work. A comparative institutional 
assessment’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1, pp. 5-38. 
 
Williamson, O. E. (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, 
Relational Contracting, London: Macmillan. 
 
Williamson, O. E. (1988) ‘Corporate finance and corporate governance’, Journal of 
Finance, 43(3), pp. 576-591. 
 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2002) Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, 
Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
 
Young, A. A. (1928) ‘Increasing Returns and Economic Progress’, Economic 
Journal, 28(4), pp. 527-542.  
 
Zamagni, S. (2005) ‘Per una teoria economico-civile dell’impresa cooperativa’, in 
Mazzoli, E. & Zamagni, S. (eds) Verso una Nuova Teoria Economica della 
Cooperazione, Bologna: Il Mulino 
 
Zamagni, V. (2006) ‘L’impresa cooperativa italiana: Dalla marginalita’ alla 
fioritura’, Paper presented at the XIV International Conference of Economic 
History, 21-25 August, Helsinki. 
 
Zangheri, R., Galasso, G. & Castronovo, V. (1987) Storia del Movimento  
Cooperativo in Italia, Torino: La Lega Nazionale delle Cooperative e Mutue. 
 
282 
Zarutskie, R. (2006) ‘Evidence on the effects of bank competition on firm 
borrowing and investment’, Journal of Financial Economics, 81, pp. 503-537. 
 
Zeuli, K. A. & Cropp, R. (2004) ‘Cooperatives: principles and practices in the 21st 
century’, Madison: University of Wisconsin Center for Cooperatives.  
 
Zevi, A. (1982) ‘The performance of Italian producer cooperatives’, in Jones, D. C. 
& Svejnar, J. (eds) Participatory and Self-Managed Firms: Evaluating 
Economic Performance, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Lexington Books. 
 
Zevi, A. (1990) ‘The financing of cooperatives in Italy’, Annals of Public and 
Cooperative Economics, Special Issue, 61(2-3), pp. 353-365.  
 
Zevi, A. (2005) ‘Il finanziamento delle cooperative’, in Mazzoli, E. & Zamagni, S. 
(eds) Verso una Nuova Teoria Economica della Cooperazione, Bologna: Il 
Mulino. 
 
Zwerdling, D. (1980) Workplace Democracy, New York: Harper and Rowe. 
